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EDITORS’ PREFACE
Florin Abraham and Réka Földváryné Kiss
Violence is a phenomenon specific to humankind from its beginning to its 
end. The 20th century brought the horror of  carnage on an industrial scale 
such as that inflicted during the two world wars, the Holocaust and the 
Gulags. The extent and forms of  political violence raised profound ques-
tions concerning the very nature of  being human. The normalization of  the 
unimaginable or the so-called ‘banality of  evil’ conceptualized by Hannah 
Arendt oriented philosophic reflection and socio-historical research towards 
understanding the causes of  the industrialization of  death during the 20th 
century. This led to the emergence of  a transdisciplinary research field with 
extensive results: political violence. The first research field is that of  ideas 
(ideologies) analysis, as concepts that can determine the dehumanization of  
individuals, so that the most atrocious forms of  violence can be directed 
against civil populations, women and their children or, in the case of  terror-
ism, against random innocent victims. The second major research direction 
concerns the evaluation of  socio-political institutions and mechanisms in 
which the illegitimate violence employed by states or other types of  actors 
(terrorists, for example) is exercised. Finally, a third research field, inspired 
by sociology, psychiatry or criminology, aims to understand the manner in 
which individuals contribute to political violence, as perpetrators or victims.
In a vast, complex and contradictory thematic environment, with various 
historical and civilizational contexts, we wanted to offer readers some re-
flections and studies relating to political violence during the 20th  century 
in Europe. From a great number of  proposals, the journal’s editors selected 
only a few. We also wanted to include some of  the valuable academic con-
tributions presented to the public during events organized by the  European 
 Network Remembrance and Solidarity (ENRS). Thus this issue of  the 
journal  includes two distinct categories: studies and essays. In the first 
category we have included eight research papers with varying thematic 
and conceptual-methodological content. The editors have intentionally 
brought together a very diverse thematic programme in order to emphasize 
the  complexity and multiple perspectives from which the phenomenon of  
violence can be studied.
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The first study belongs to Christian Wevelsiep; the author tries to understand 
20th-century European violence from a phenomenological perspective. 
The German researcher does not provide final answers to issues such as 
the relation between totalitarianism, ethics and memory, but he does give 
a good introduction to these subjects.
From general aspects with theoretical features, we encourage the reader to 
make the transition towards positivist history with Polish historian Karol 
Kalinowski’s study dedicated to the repression of  the Catholic Church in 
occupied Warsaw during the Second World War. Based on numerous archival 
sources, his research emphasizes the complexity of  the forms of  violence 
involved in this episode of  the war.
The way in which violence is reflected in museums and literature is the object 
of  two interesting studies. First, Siobhán Doyle analyses the memorialization 
of  James Connolly (1868–1916), socialist and revolutionary leader, at the 
National Museum of  Ireland. The author describes in detail the process of  
memorialization and the multiple difficulties that hinder past reconstructions 
using the tools of  museology. Secondly, Petra James, an expert in com-
parative literature, gives an insightful analysis of  ‘enforced disappearance’, 
a common feature of  20th-century dictatorships and totalitarian political 
regimes, by comparing various representations found in novels and short 
stories published in Central Europe after 1989. The research of  Mykola 
Makhortykh also uses the method of  comparison in his fascinating case 
study that relates to an episode of  the Second World War: the Battle of  Kyiv 
in 1943 that has been interpreted differently and conflictingly by different 
national editions of  the Wikipedia online encyclopaedia.
Two authors from the Balkans also examine the phenomenon of  violence. 
In the first study, Afrim Krasniqi offers a historical and political viewpoint 
of  the way in which the party-state exercised control over Albanian society 
during the communist period. The second study, written by Ivana Polić, gives 
us an analysis with strong emotional implications for readers of  the way 
children were used in war propaganda by the Croatian and Serbian media 
during the Yugoslav Wars (1991–95).
Öykü Gürpınar provides the last study; using a very detailed comparative 
analysis, she reveals the differences of  approach in the France, Armenia and 
Turkey educational processes concerning a tragic event, the Armenian Genocide.
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The second category is the synthesis of  the most important lectures pre-
sented at the European Remembrance Symposium, ‘Violence in 20th-century 
European history: commemorating, documenting, educating’ in Brussels in 
2017. From an always fresh and stimulating sociological perspective, Michel 
Wieviorka presents ‘Theoretical issues of  violence: defining violence and 
types of  violence in the 20th century’. Combining different professional 
experiences, Arnold Suppan (Austria) and Andzrej Nowak (Poland) each try 
to show what unites and what differentiates the violence phenomenon in 
Western and Eastern Europe in the 20th century. North American sociolo-
gist Jeffrey K. Olick presents his own reflections concerning the multiple 
relationships between memory and violence, in order to arrive at the appar-
ently paradoxical conclusion that ‘memory itself  can be a form of  violence’.
The structure of  the current issue of  the journal closely reflects the ENRS’s 
values: a tolerant, pluralist and inclusive evaluation of  the past that respects 
and protects the victims’ dignity; encouraging thematic and methodological 
diversity; accepting contributions not only from researchers from member 
states of  the ENRS but also from several other countries; and aiming as 
far as possible to present a gender balance among the proposals accepted 
for publication.
We would like to thank the whole team of  the ENRS Institute, especially 
the project manager Zhanna Vrublevska, whose perseverance has kept the 
schedule on track.
Florin Abraham and Réka Földváryné Kiss 
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Department of Political Sociology, 
University of Flensburg
ABSTRACT
In order to understand a century of violence, we need to recognise the 20th 
century as an epoch of fundamental loss. This was a century of genocides and 
one in which subjects were systematically abused. We could call this situation 
and the industrial production of death an absurd misunderstanding. Understand-
ing or non-understanding: it is the knowledge of the facts and the examination 
of the faults that inform our impression of the last century. On this occasion 
fundamental questions of history have been picked out as central themes and 
a specific approach has been chosen for the historiography and memoria.
Introduction
The violence of  the 20th century has reduced people to impotence and 
vulnerability. Anne Applebaum described a haunting scene in the context 
of  the Gulags:
The prisoner who ran our barracks received me with the cry: 
Run and look under your pillow! My heart almost stopped: 
Did I finally receive my bread ration? I rushed to my bed and 
ripped off  the pillow. Below were three letters from home [...]  
It had been six months since I last received anything. Spontane-
ously I felt boundless disappointment. Then the horror seized 
me. What had become of  me when a piece of  bread was more 
important than letters from my mother, my father, my children 
[...] I burst into tears (Applebaum 2003, 332).
What we read in these records is the logic of  terror, the countless stories of  
the experience of  violence in the age of  totalitarianism. We understand this 
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power, if  we consider it at the centre of  our basic human situation, if  one 
designates force as something that reduces a human being to ‘its minimum, 
the bare body, its nakedness, its trembling, its hunger and the sheer will to 
survive’ (Metz 2010, 283). It is hard to understand humans when we look 
at the traditions, the excesses and the absurd futility of  power that comes 
from above, that is the upper echolons of  society. So how can we best 
understand the 20th century and how can we best approach the stories of  
that century?
In other words, have we correctly understood the 20th century? With its 
extreme violence, its totalitarian excesses and all its destructive power? 
From a historical point of  view, we may affirm this question. The great 
antagonisms of  the past century, fascism and communism, are the subject 
of  innumerable investigations. The years 1914, 1917, 1933 and 1939 – it is 
not only the data that shape historical consciousness but also the ciphers 
of  violence. A trace of  negativity runs through history: we speak of  the 
‘Great War’ or world civil wars between worldviews; with regard to the great 
catastrophes – the Holocaust, Holodomor, Auschwitz and Hiroshima – we 
know that at that time, there were breaks in history, in civilization, that 
could not be avoided. We have understood the history of  the 20th century, 
in the sense of  historical representation and memory of  events, but have 
we understood history in a much deeper way? Different depths of  under-
standing have to be integrated. There is a superficial understanding that 
relates to the existence of  documents, texts and traditions. ‘Something’ is 
maintained in the historical archive and preserved for the historical cur-
riculum, such as school education and public memoria. In contrast, there are 
the deeper efforts at understanding that cause greater difficulties. Some-
thing in the process of  remembering history is beyond comprehension, 
somehow it does not want to fit into the historical transitions, something 
seems to be missing. From this point of  view, the 20th century remains 
a permanent puzzle, considering the loss of  the subjectivity of  modernity, 
the self-negation of  Europe, the loss that could be lamented on all human 
levels, linguistically, culturally, morally, politically and in relation to notions 
of   civilization.
The following considerations, of  course, are not simply aimed at a form 
of  restoration. To summon morality, to regain reason, to revive the po-
litical subject after his supposed death – all this would be too simplistic. 
Understanding the century of  violence entails a method of  interpretation 
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that identifies the 20th century as a period of  great loss. As is well known, 
there were many abuses and genocides, a loss of  the world expressed in the 
possession and consumption of  the subject. This specific loss of  subject, 
the scheduled production of  death, the reduction of  generic members to 
their usefulness – all this may be called a great, grotesque misunderstand-
ing. Understanding and unwillingness to understand, knowledge of  what is 
happening and insight into its deficiency characterize our view of  the past 
century. Because border issues of  history are addressed here, a specific ac-
cess to the memoria has to be chosen. With the help of  a phenomenological 
framework, aspects are to be addressed that continue to occupy conscious-
ness. In the present case, this phenomenology leads from ‘below’ to ‘above’ 
without artificially separating the levels. The understanding of  history be-
gins with the questions of  the theory of  history, with the descriptions of  
the world’s civil wars, which were conceived in the 19th century, and the 
fundamental problem of  political religions. However, these efforts do not 
start by looking at the overall story of  the event, but instead attention is 
directed downwards: to the levels of  understanding that take place in the 
lower, inferior and small references that affect the common people. At this 
level, of  course, the historical questions are just as great: the integration of  
evil, guilt and responsibility, understanding and unwillingness to embrace 
this inter-existential level (that is, in contrast to the tradition of  Heidegger’s 
phenomenology), the value of  which is to be shown for the memoria.
Broken story
How can you tell the story of  the 20th century? Out of  the multitude of  
problems that appear at first glance, one stands out that is only seemingly 
‘theoretical’ in nature: how to turn a broken story into meaningful, co-
herent history. Which understanding of  history, which leading categories, 
which expectations can be read together? The history of  the 20th century 
is therefore a broken one, because in it the histories of  human history were 
expressed, but it is also because it lost the long-term images of  history and 
the certainties that bore them. Can this lost history be won back, can his-
torical power be rekindled? Not in the sense that the future drafts of  the 
past enable orienting patterns of  action (Hölscher 2009, 212 ff.). Not in 
the positivist sense could the past be seamlessly transformed into the pres-
ent and the future. The story is primarily possible only under the guidance 
of  the negative, that is, the only way of  making it meaningfully narratable. 
But even that only names a methodical formalism. The theoretical as well 
as a practical problem persist: that history is contested history, especially 
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the history of  the 20th century. That it disintegrates into a wide variety of  
historical images, making it almost impossible to speak of  or understand 
one integrated history. Historical images drift apart if  they are subjected to 
a preference of  their own, if  the historically cultural meaningful relation-
ships are divided into a collection of  limited stories.
One way of  countering this danger lies in the attempt to transfer history 
to a great third party: it was the guiding concepts of  divine omnipotence, 
later of  reason, that could maintain history in a unified context. This 
story was meaningful and in a certain way unquestionable. It was the great 
guarantors who promised a transcendental unity; a path that is blocked 
today for a variety of  reasons. It is a story that not only implies unbroken 
continuity, but also looks upwards. A conception of  history that, among 
other things, lacks the necessity of  anthropological integration. Let us stay 
with this juxtaposition of  ‘above’ and ‘below’. Characteristic of  transcen-
dental history was the foundation of  the historical in something that was 
supernatural.
In contrast, history ‘from below’ is considered an approach that understands 
history ‘from above’ as man-made. But this point of  view is not free of  
problems: social problems, when different points of  view no longer connect 
with each other, and temporal problems, when the present dominates the 
heart of  the existential basic situation and takes absolute priority over the 
past. The problem refers to a ‘missing link’ between concrete experiences 
in human life and history that exists in a different, autonomous sphere. To 
put it simply: there is tension between internal and external perspectives 
and past and present orientations. These are historical issues that have been 
known for some time. They certainly cannot be excluded here, but they 
should be avoided if  possible.
History, as it is understood here, is subject to hermeneutical reason, a phil-
osophy which first and foremost addresses the fundamental question of  an 
anthropological self-understanding: how a human world is possible, how we 
insert history into our understanding of  the world, just as we as individuals 
express meaning through our ways of  life. These include the sense criteria 
of  everyday life: the question of  guilt, sacrifice, responsibility, the existence 
and challenge of  evil as well as the pursuit of  non-violence. Some of  these 
motifs, which characterize the historical consciousness of  the 20th century 
in a particular way, are discussed below.
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Anthropological symbols: suffering, evil and violence
What remains of the 20th century is to be described in simple terms: the 
countless deaths, the immeasurable suffering and, finally, the violent 
events that historical research reports in detail. What remains controver-
sial is the interpersonal conflicts, the extent of any guilt, actions and acts, 
perpetration and involvement. Aspects of the basic human condition are 
known to have been thoroughly discussed and explored: the extent to 
which there are specific attitudes to the past – with the goal of catharsis, 
coping or repressing the fact that there are national or cultural peculiarities 
of dealing with history and that certain learning processes are ignited by 
such forms of remembering. However, it is always about an existential and 
a inter-existential dimension in which aspects of guilt and responsibility, 
perspectives of suffering and indulgence are addressed. It must be asked 
to what extent can the comprehensible desire to extract unambiguity from 
these anthropological aspects be satisfied. Therefore, two levels of historical 
consideration would have to be identified: the level of heroic and sacrificial 
discourse and a phenomenological level on which the transferability of 
a singular experience becomes ‘thematic’.
Talking about heroes and sacrifice marks the first, upper level of his-
tory. Tales about heroes were the focus of older historical cultures. They 
praised the founders of the state and its leaders, elevated historical fig-
ures and simply recounted the lofty mission of great men. This form of 
remembrance changed profoundly in the 20th century. The image of the 
hero faded, but also the concept of victim was subject to change. Among 
aspects of heroic remembrance such as disinterestedness, personal sacrifice, 
fearlessness and resilience, the victim stood for the specific experience of 
suffering. Suffering is, of course, an extremely broad concept: we are aware 
of momentary physical and psychological injuries, we endure permanent 
situations of injustice, we may be ready to make an active sacrifice or we 
may be forced to suffer helplessly. The memory of the historical suffer-
ing and the historical injuries are therefore never completely objective; 
they stand on the ground of the singular totality, a situation of finality 
and uniqueness. The strong difference between the two levels is a legacy 
of the 20th century. At the level of official remembrance, it is all about 
appropriate forms, representations, the who and the how of memory – 
but at the level of the existential experience there remains the reserve 
of an individual world experience that cannot simply be forced into 
official memoria.
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On closer inspection, there are different levels of abstraction of the memoria. 
How can they be conveyed, to what extent do they convey meaning, enable 
or force learning? How does memory anchored in daily existence stand in 
relation to social groups, collective memory and scientific reflection? How 
can we combine these levels? How can they be brought together in a mean-
ingful unity? Do these levels merge seamlessly or do they have their own 
validity, which makes politics with history so difficult to analyse (Reichel 
1995, 11–21)? Undoubtedly, social and group memories have a character of 
obligation. Members of a community are bound together by special nar-
ratives and meaningful actions; they learn orientation by placing them in 
temporal relationships. A common image of history, quasi-sacred places 
of memory or rituals cultivate the social memory. Whether these ties go 
hand in hand with transfiguration or exaggeration, or whether they simply 
occupy a highly valued educational-policy space, is an open question. As 
a ‘medium of temporalization’ (Reichel 1995, 13), social memory opens up 
horizons of a we-consciousness, an anchoring in time. It can extend beyond 
its own time and bridge a wide variety of time relationships.
More complicated and controversial, however, is the question of how and 
with what goal should one turn to a past, which is connected with the 
deepest guilt and inflictions of violence and suffering. As you know, high 
expectations are ignited in the culture of remembrance. The past should 
not simply be visualized, but uncovered with all ruthlessness. A serious 
examination of the burden of the past is considered an enlightenment 
and educational ideal. Although it serves as a catharsis and a process of 
purification, the insights are still very painful. The way to truth and recon-
ciliation led German memory past the criticism of it being thought’s final 
word (the so-called Schlusstrich debate). The future will only be clear, if 
we seriously face up to a bad past. This, of course, is not to be denied. An 
objection by Reinhart Koselleck is nevertheless to be considered that de-
parts from the level of official memory policy (see Koselleck 2010, 241–54, 
254–69). We recognize an anthropological ambivalence when we engage 
with the level of primary experience and allow the dignity of the individual 
experience of suffering. As a one-time reminder of their finality and their 
incompatibility, can these aspects be easily translated into learning pro-
cesses? Is a successful step possible from a one-time reminder of schooling 
and lessons learned from history? Koselleck denies this possibility with 
good reason. These considerations are not directed against the necessity 
of enlightenment and memory, but against the instrumentalization of the 
REMEMBRANCE AND SOLIDARITY      17
A CLUE TO WHAT IS MISSING ...
intrinsic value of suffering. A memory exercise does not work in your own 
experience. Self-experiences cannot be replaced or retrieved with habitual 
re-enactment. Koselleck marks a threshold here that identifies the signature 
of the 20th century to the same extent: we can recall the suffering of the 
past and illuminate the events, but we must, with equally good reasons, 
consider the inexplicability of a particular experience. This is a thought that 
turns a little against the zeitgeist of the memoria. Collective memories here 
remain in a twilight because they suggest something that creates a false 
image: that individual experiences can be integrated into a collective and 
thereby gain a higher level of validity. Collectives with shared memories, 
according to Koselleck, are a fallacy.
In other words, it is the dignity of one’s own experience that needs to 
be preserved between memory and history. Of course, social conditions, 
linguistic, mental, religious or political apply to these primary experiences. 
There are parts of language and traditions that have always shaped each 
individual’s own experience. However, they do not contradict the funda-
mental unrepeatability of self-experience. Because violent memories are 
‘not just stored in the brain, not just in memory: they capture the heart, 
kidneys, bile, intestine, all muscles and all nerves, and not just metaphori-
cally speaking’ (Koselleck 2010, 255). Literally experiences are burnt into 
the body and tie the bearer back to that experience. They disappear with 
death and escape unbridled mediation. This could well be described as 
the special legacy of the 20th century: below the level of top-level politics 
with memory, we recognize – in the lowest, vulnerable references – the 
unmanageable, nontransferable stubbornness of history in inter-existential 
relations. To speak of the memory of the 20th century’s violence, we have 
to link a historical with a fundamental anthropological approach: if finite 
irretrievability, the uniqueness of an existential event, is overlooked, history 
loses an essential part of itself. Aspects of defencelessness and the power-
lessness of the deceased are among the experiences that convey much more 
about the finite totality of the existential orientation space of history than 
any source can ever say. And the consequence of such a story would be 
nothing more than the realization that the story consists of primary sense 
situations that are not easily broken up into individual pieces.
One of the peculiarities of an inter-existentially mediated world is the 
question of how we can grasp moral criteria of responsibility, guilt and 
entanglement, not least how we can visualize the existence of evil within 
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the world. Even in this strongly moralized context, it is helpful to embed 
the historical aspects in factual and anthropological conditions. One of the 
greatest difficulties of remembering what happened in the age of totali-
tarianism is the fact that people were confronted with human abysses that 
were difficult or impossible to describe with language. The radical caesura 
associated with the horror of the Second World War is considered to be 
the low point of history. In the last phase of totalitarianism, as Hannah 
Arendt wrote in 1955, an absolute evil was revealed (Arendt 2002, 29–40). 
The attempt to understand failed in this confrontation with reality when 
we tried to approach things with conventional categories of reason. This 
was a shock that Hannah Arendt shared with those who faced the horrors 
of the past without reservation. The diagnosis of the age of totalitarian-
ism was that in the radicality of the negative revelation another time had 
come: experiences of evil with a metaphysical quality and insights with the 
taste of bitter ashes (also on the aspect of the culture of remembrance, see 
Assmann 2013, 180 ff.). A lot has been written about this. The difficulty 
remains of how we can create a transition from the past to the present. The 
problem is that a language which suffices in pictorial and transcendental 
constructions looks down on the basic human situation from an exalted, 
metaphysical point of view. The opposite direction is the measure here: we 
can speak of evil when we visualize the authenticity of the factual situation. 
As well as the experiences of fear or guilt, there are inter-existential figures 
of meaning. We move – in the existential sense – within the ‘limits of the 
possibility of constituting fragile beings’ (Rentsch 1999, 165). Meaning and 
fulfilment are closely related to threat and danger; solidarity is a sign of 
possible failure and freedom in principle opens up the possibility of evil.
It is important to preserve this view of the factuality of the common world, 
if we refer to the problem of acting in a space of violence. Also with this 
‘topic’ the conditions are not easy. The initial question was based on doubts 
and lacked an understanding of how the acts of violence in the sweep of 
the Second World War could ‘happen’. Arendt spoke of the banality of evil; 
others of ordinary men who appeared to be without scruples when exectut-
ing extreme, excessive acts of violence. The mystery seized by psychology 
and sociology from different angles evidently lay in the transition from 
a situation of normality to the exceptional situation in which everything 
became possible. It creates an anthropological puzzle for which different 
answers become available. The obvious answer is also the supposedly sim-
plest one: it is easier for the observers of what is happening away from the 
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events, both linguistically and emotionally, to assume that you are engaged 
in the violence of perversion, cynicism, brutality or illness. Violence is kept 
at a distance if you put the shock of the possible excesses of violence into 
a framework of interpretation that consists in nothing but indignation and 
lack of understanding. In contrast, modern source research shows that the 
background beliefs of the soldiers were time-typical framings – a frame, 
that consists of beliefs, ideologies and cultural meaning. So it was not so 
much psychological aberrations, morbidity and perversion that were at 
work as individual forces. It was the frame of reference of a time that made 
things seem ordinary, normal or necessary (Welzer, Neitzel and Gudehus 
2011). Such findings, which remain controversial, equate to deep insecurity. 
The paradoxical task of an impossible explication still exists, not only in view 
of dark pasts. How can violent acts be explained in areas of violence that 
occur in the past and present, in exceptional situations of war, or simply in 
very remote areas? In this respect, the events of the 20th century, in their 
mystery, are acute in the present. In other words, we cannot condemn the 
violence of the past century from a secure standpoint as something remote 
from us, but have to keep an eye on the ambivalences of violence. On the 
one hand, in our judgments, we can rely on moral certainties that categori-
cally differentiate between right and wrong, violence and non-violence. On 
the other hand, we always have to visualize the shades and facets of violence 
in social fields. Twentieth-century violence is proof that violence and injury, 
anonymity and individuality, normality and singularity must be regarded as 
interwoven phenomena. The shock produced by the violence of totalitarian-
ism was accompanied by a shock in social ontology: the capacity for killing 
has become differentiated. Injuring or killing someone is closely linked to 
an act of violence in which individual and collective forces must first be de-
termined. This does not mean giving up individual accountability and over-
looking the responsibility of the individual. But in the spaces of violence, 
fields of injury are divided, in which finer differences become visible, in 
which central and peripheral violence occurs. Structural violence goes hand 
in hand with the concrete violation of claims, rights and physical integrity.
The answer to the question of violence in the age of totalitarianism is, from 
the point of view of phenomenology, that the threatened and vulnerable 
individual finds his place in a social field ‘which is also a field of violence’ 
(Waldenfels 2000, 17). Responsibility and imputability also exist in this 
field, but beyond that there is a ‘diverse spectrum of irresolute perpetration 
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and complicity’ (Waldenfels 2000, 18). In other words, totalitarianism 
has provided evidence that modern violence cannot be traced back to the 
interests and intentions of the agents alone, that violence does not go into 
polarization. The clear sense-figures of morality, selflessness and martyrdom 
fade. By contrast, during the violence of  the 20th century, the mechanics 
and operative logic of  violence took hold.
The 20th century: understanding and the denial of understanding
It is precisely this dimension – the denial of  understanding – that makes 
the handling of  history so difficult. The big question of  whether we have 
understood the 20th century suggests that the most intensive efforts at 
understanding would be needed to bridge the gap between the centuries. 
But such efforts fail when they simply ignore the persistent distortions 
and irritations, biographical disruptions and individual dislocations, and 
ultimately also the changes in social values. There is silence in the face of  
sadness, shame in the face of  factual guilt; there is a void in the face of  
loss of  value. Out of  this speechlessness, no ‘lessons of  history’, whatever 
you associate with it, result. Mechanisms of  the denial of  understand-
ing are ignited by such speechlessness, which can become a hermeneutic 
subject – an enigmatic topic, which has yet to be solved. Therefore, not 
understanding is not just a failed attempt, a mere failure, but it describes an 
attitude, a conscious attitude to a past: that which is not ours is not allowed 
to be ours. Historical hermeneutics touches on the very limits of  historical 
understanding that were established in the 20th century and continue to 
exist today as curricular, pedagogical and social phenomena. A deliberate 
historical refusal to understand has its own dignity, reasons and motives. 
The contemporaneity of  the 21st century is marked by a sense of  unease 
about parts of  its own past that are beyond comprehension. It is a lack of  
understanding that cannot be framed in a positive factual context. It lingers 
with every ‘reconstruction’ of  what happened, through doubt, discomfort 
and dissonance. Something resistant that goes beyond the simplest history 
lessons (Hölscher 2009, 226 ff.).
Because at this point, it’s not about the gap between the times that do not 
want to match, not just mentalities with specific breaks. That which is mis-
understood has its own philosophical dignity. It illustrates the gap we must 
bridge in all our efforts to understand history in general. The intention to 
understand the violence of  the 20th century is thus a ‘case’ for hermeneu-
tics to the same extent as it is for history. After all, when in the past the 
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unreasonableness of  an event, even when violent ‘madness’ and startling 
futility are revealed, the question remains how against this recognition ho-
rizons of  expectation, hope and bravery can persist unscathed. From this 
point of  view, history and hermeneutics are in a peculiar tension. It unites the 
idea that the experiences of  history, no matter how disturbing, puzzling and 
remote, are directed to linguistic processing. The above-mentioned herme-
neutics of  non-understanding is also integrated into a linguistic framework: 
as a world-experience of  human existence. The tension, of  course, is that 
although we can reinterpret historical experiences, experiences of  violence, 
of  suffering using anthropological terms, human history is thus gripped in 
the polarity of  friend and foe, domination and bondage, killing and dying, 
as Reinhart Koselleck wrote (Koselleck 2000, 97 f.). But the basic question 
of  humanistic science remains: whether it simply picks up the rubble of  
history, looks at the flow of  tradition, whether it simply responds to the 
predetermined story, or whether its task is not the unattainable interpretation 
of  meaning that history demands from all understanding. In this context, 
Hans Georg Gadamer speaks of  the superiority of  what should be under-
stood (Gadamer 2000, 115 ff.).
This turns the considerations at the same time to a difficult issue. As men-
tioned in the introduction, it is about conveying a perspective of  the story 
from below with the supposedly ‘great story’, history in the context of  
great narratives, overarching structures. But how can the transition from 
the level of  self-experiences and inter-existential forms to that larger con-
text succeed? A particular difficulty has to be addressed: when things are 
oversimplified. Heidegger had famously tried to conquer the conditions 
of  possible history through the existential analysis of  human existence. It 
was a philosophically highly significant attempt to understand history ‘from 
below’ out of  the temporality and limits of  existence. But it led to a difficult 
anthropologization and at the same time moved into political semantics, 
which today appears hermetically sealed. Out of  concern for their own 
existence, political imperatives were formed, which called for the assump-
tion of  a folkish inheritance, the readiness for death of  a fated community. 
And even if  one does not want to understand philosophical reflection as 
a political command, this definition of  the analysis of  existence testifies to 
the inherent violence of  the time.
But the reflection of  history from the analysis of  existence is blocked for 
understandable reasons. The path we take in the future is based on other 
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assumptions. It is not on condition of  a deathwish that the horizon of  the 
historical becomes clearer – this was obviously Heidegger’s understand-
ing. He analysed existence in the face of  the individual death. But alone 
in the process of  asking and merging we can come closer to the horizon 
in Gadamer’s sense. It is not the thinness of  existence that establishes the 
conditions of  possible history, but the realization that the times of  history 
are, from the outset, interpersonal. The story is not due to one, single exis-
tence. The basic idea of  an ex istential analysis, to obtain a knowledge from 
the self-interpretation of  existence, only succeeds if  one surrenders to the 
inter-existential question of  the horizon of  history. It is well known that 
the 20th century has raised a multitude of  such questions that extend to the 
present day. One such moment will be discussed in the conclusion, which 
refers to the past and what is not perfect in the present: the moment of  crisis.
The world in a state of crisis
The 20th century was one of  extremes (Hobsbawm 1994), an epoch of  
the long shot, a time of  humanitarian catastrophes. This violence has been 
examined from a historical perspective from all angles. Have we learned 
from history as was assumed in previous times? The overriding question we 
attach to history goes beyond the horizon of  a century. It focuses on the 
overarching moments, the state of  a crisis that is not reserved for a specific 
time. It draws attention to the state of  permanent crises that existed in the 
early modern era and in all subsequent epochs. Their appearances and forms 
have changed. Of  course it seems difficult to see what extent the crises of  
the present time directly lead back to the past and whether we should not 
look at the world as in a state of  permanent crisis. This would, of  course, be 
a miserable finding, but one that demands a theory of  history. It is the polar 
tensions that seem to drive history forward with granite hardness. You have 
to look beyond the 20th century to be able to classify it. European history 
has become world history; from a philosophical point of  view, European 
society has captured the entire history of  the world over a long process. 
This turning point began in the 18th century; it began at the moment of  
self-empowerment of  a bourgeoisie who wanted to free themselves from the 
confines of  the absolutist state. This connection, which Reinhart Koselleck 
formulated in an ingenious way as early as 1959, cannot be misinterpreted 
(Koselleck 2013). It is not thought that the devaluation of  morality and the 
denial of  the violence of  the 20th century owes its origin here. But that 
only in the environment of  the Enlightenment could a motive unfold that 
could extend to all subsequent times. 
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Bourgeois society ‘created’ a world of  experience with an open horizon, it 
arose from curiosity and will-power to self-knowledge – all strong motives. 
But this society had to break open an old world and mentally reoccupy a 
new one from within. The negation of  the ancien regime created a new subject: 
humanity. This should reoccupy the future from the European point of  view. 
It should reclaim history, guarantee progress and create unity. It had to fail 
in the sense that at the same time it achieved the release of  morality. The 
demolition of  the absolutist order of  structure went hand in hand with the 
appeal to humanity. A utopian idea that should have an impact on tensions 
and extensive crises. The era of  ideological wars was ushered in with this 
process: the 18th century led to the release of  utopian modernity, which 
continued first in the ideological wars, later in the totalitarianisms of  the 
20th century. This idea is therefore important because it emphasizes the con-
nection between utopian philosophy of  history and revolutionary violence, 
between criticism and crisis – moments of  history that reach into the pres-
ent. The moment of  tension is at the moment of  release from a shell – the 
absolutist state failed because it had to make its policy without considering 
the moral interests of  its citizens. The emancipation of  the bourgeoisie, 
however, led to ideological conflicts that point to an anthropological aspect: 
morality contains an inherent difference (Koselleck 2013, 5). The inherent 
gradient of  morality is the moment that is anthropologically questionable, 
and at the same time it acts as an enduring motive in the history of  violence.
It is important to emphasize here that the specific perspective of  history 
that Kosellecks represents cannot be attributed to a defining and thus instru-
mental motive. The conceivable question as to whether, by way of  example, 
the French Revolution ‘produced’ totalitarianism leads us straight past the 
basic idea that Kosselleck followed. Rather, it is the view that the formal 
basic structures of  history is guiding our perception here: starting from the 
perspective of  acting and suffering people, their experiences and expecta-
tions, categorical distinctions can be singled out, which we recognize again 
as friendship and enmity, bondage and historical domination. They are, as 
it were, anthropological presuppositions that condition, facilitate and drive 
forward the long-term formal structures of  history. The 20th century, like 
all history, is marked by a surplus. When limits to the passionate opposition 
of  a friend or foe become sharper, or ‘when inescapable death is outbid by 
death or self-sacrifice, when the relation between above and below leads 
to enslavement and irretrievable humiliation, or to exploitation and class 
struggle’ (Koselleck 1989, p 660), only then is the irretrievable difference 
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between past reality and language revealed. At this point it shows how it is 
possible to tell the story of  the 20th century as a story from below while 
not ignoring the great unresolved questions of  history. The diversity of  the 
experiences of  violence and the variety of  broken perceptions cannot initially 
be captured in a great overarching narrative. On the contrary, historiography 
asks for the repressed, secret, forgotten and suppressed experiences that, as 
specific stories of  suffering, will always remain imperfect. 
Starting from the concrete space of  experience and suffering, we experience 
moments of  permanence in the repetitive structures of  history that open 
our view to political action. What makes up this view is well known and 
must always be repeated: the anti-totalitarian thrust aimed at the philosophy 
of  history with a totalitarian claim. The idea of   ‘making history’ has made 
a fatal career as a totalitarian idea as well as an impulse for concrete action, 
which we can only reconstruct. It was the ideological constructions of  his-
tory that conditioned the absurd project of  social and man-making beyond 
any human measure. In other words, in an epoch when people no longer 
regarded God as the supreme creator, mankind itself  became the creator 
and leader of  history, but also the destroyer, not only in totalitarian politics. 
These totalitarian conditions point, as it were, to the decline of  politics, to 
the collapse of  the moral as well as to the concrete worlds of  experience, 
for which language always succeeds in creating subsequent constructions. 
Therefore, results are derived from history that are viewed sceptically. It is 
difficult to ‘learn’ from history – if  we understand history as concrete experi-
ence in which the power of  language cannot fully emerge, if  we understand 
history as an object from whose structures we should derive guidelines for 
political action. The figure of  the Historia Magistra Vitae has lost its radiance 
for the historian. Nothing can be learned from history, but from the sets 
of  experience, the unique words, deeds and events that give us a clear view 
of  the conditions of  possible history. And perhaps it is just that scepticism 
still has its validity as a drive and a critical motive today.
Summary
Have we understood the 20th century? In its extreme violence, with its 
totalitarian excesses, with all its destructive power? From a historical point 
of  view, we may affirm this question. The great antagonisms of  the past 
century, fascism and communism, are the subject of  innumerable investiga-
tions. As we have seen, the years 1914, 1917, 1933 and 1939 have become 
the ciphers of  violence. The phenomenology of  violence in the 20th century 
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has moved in this case from ‘above’ to ‘below’. (1) The understanding of  
history begins first with the great questions of  the theory of  history; (2) 
the descriptions of  the global civil wars that were already conceived in the 
19th century and (3) the basic problem of  political religions. (4) However, 
the reflections gradually direct attention to the levels of  understanding that 
take place in the lower, inferior and small references in a common world, on 
an inter-existential level, which is far removed from the abstract views of  
any structural theory. At this level, too, the questions of  history are large: 
aspects of  the integration of  evil, guilt and responsibility, understanding 
and unwillingness to embrace this inter-existential level, the value of  which 
for the memoria is to be shown.
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OF GERMAN CRIMES IN POLAND
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ABSTRACT
This article deals with the German repression of the Catholic Church in occupied 
Warsaw from 1939 to 1945, derived from the testimonies of victims and wit-
nesses of Nazi terror recorded by the Central Commission for the Investigation 
of German Crimes in Poland. The text seeks to show the many types of violence 
employed as well as the vast number of victims they caused – the church hierarchy, 
priests, nuns and the laity. This history of repression follows from initial arrest 
of priests in October 1939 to the culmination of German violence against the 
Church during the Warsaw Uprising.
Witnesses of totalitarianism
‘At the start of  1940 we confessed in secret, since the Germans prohibited 
confession and communion. Arrested priests heard confession, whereas 
Holy Communion was given in such a manner that a priest brought [...] 
hosts and one of  the female prisoners called Mynka brought them upstairs 
where priests administered them. The prison chapel was only used for mass 
in March and April; afterwards, the Germans prohibited mass and, after 
some time, turned it into a room for research,’1 recalled official Janina Kozak, 
who was arrested by the Gestapo during the first months of  the war and 
imprisoned at Pawiak prison.
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‘There were approximately 50 of  us in a room sized 2½ by 5 metres. The 
SS-men placed their machine guns in front of  its doors after which two 
of  them began to throw hand grenades at the people pressed inside and 
then began shooting. All of  them fell to the ground [...]. Lured by groans 
one of  the SS-men ran into the room and began to kill off  those still liv-
ing with a revolver. He walked over the corpses, stood with his feet on my 
back and, seeing that I was still alive, shouted: “Der ist noch zu frisch” [He 
is still too fresh]. He shot at my head, but missed. The bullet grazed an ear, 
blood poured out, and the German, without checking whether I was alive, 
stopped aiming at me [...]. I heard from people living near our home that 
one of  the SS-men replied, in response to a question on what happened to 
the priests: “Ich werde jeden Priester niederschießen” [I’ll shoot each priest]. 
This entire campaign appeared to only be intended to destroy the civilian 
population because there could not be any motives of  a military nature,’2 
recalled Fr. Aleksander Kisiel, who survived a German massacre in August 
1944 at a Jesuit seminary at ul. Rakowiecka.
A resident of  Powiśle Czerniakowskie in Warsaw, Kazimierz Ceglarek, re-
called an episode related to the Warsaw Uprising: ‘I don’t remember the 
date, but it was after the surrender of  Śródmieście, in the ruins of  a factory 
at ul. Solec 53, we removed the body of  a priest hung in his robe with an 
AK armband from among steel rods in the destroyed building (I do not 
know the surname, but recognized him as a chaplain-insurgent from our 
neighbourhood).’3
Janina Kozak was able to receive Holy Sacraments, since hundreds of  
 arrested Polish Catholic priests passed through Pawiak prison during the 
war and exercised their priestly ministry even in conditions of  extreme op-
pression. At a Jesuit seminary, SS-men murdered sixteen fellow seminarians 
of  Fr. Aleksander Kisiel on the second day of  the uprising. Pallottine Józef  
Stanek, one of  many of  the clergy who served the underground as a chaplain 
for the Home Army, was hung. During a mass in Warsaw on 13 June 1999, 
Pope John Paul II declared him a blessed of  the Catholic Church among 
a group of  108 Polish martyrs murdered during the Second World War.
Accounts of terror
Metanarrations, statistics and lists of  martyrs mean more when combined 
with individual stories of  specific persons, particularly if  told by witnesses 
and participants of  events (Kozłowski and Stefanek 2017, 18). There is an 
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invaluable and interesting account of  violence employed by the totalitarian 
Third Reich against Polish citizens during the Second World War in the files 
of  the Central Commission for the Investigation of  German Crimes in Po-
land. Since 1945 the Central Commission has collected materials document-
ing German crimes committed during the war.4 A key resource for studying 
the history of  the occupation was thereby created. I wish to cite records of  
witness testimonies from this vast collection, the source material on which 
I will base this article. They constituted part of  the evidence in cases brought 
against Nazi criminals. These are minutes compiled by the Central Com-
mission, its regional delegations and the Supreme National Tribunal, that 
worked together with the commission before which these trials were held.5
The long-standing discussion on the credibility of  personal accounts does 
not negate the immense investigative value of  these materials (Madajczyk 
2017, 28). Investigators are sensitive to the fact that testimony was given 
at a time when the foundation for the communist system was being laid in 
Poland. The political situation may have induced some witnesses to conceal 
certain information for fear of  repression by the communist apparatus of  
coercion. On the one hand, reservations are raised over the extent to which 
witnesses wanted to or were able to speak about their traumatic experi-
ences. On the other hand, the interviewed persons were direct witnesses or 
participants of  the events they recount and the submission of  testimony 
immediately after the war had the advantage that the facts were still fresh 
in their memory (Gumkowski 1962, 8).
In summing up the above, we feel that it may prove interesting to view the 
violence of  the Germans against the Catholic Church during the occupa-
tion from the perspective of  the Central Commission files. Although an 
attempt may be made on the basis of  numerous testimonies collected by 
the commission to reconstruct the image of  Polish religiosity during the 
occupation, we will focus on the course and forms of  German repression 
of  the Church as well as on the martyrology of  the Catholic clergy6 and 
the laity. We will focus on the Roman Catholic Church, its clergy and laity 
if  sources show that oppression took place owing to religion. The territo-
rial scope of  our studies is limited to Warsaw and the surroundings linked 
to the capital through their common wartime fate as the ‘Warsaw ring of  
death’, for example, Palmiry or Pruszków with Dulag 121. The story of  oc-
cupied Warsaw comprised a key position in work of  the Central Commission 
(Madajczyk 2017, 31). It focuses on the case files of  Ludwig Fischer, the 
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head of  the Warsaw District of  the General Government. I am interested 
in the entire period of  the German occupation of  the Polish capital from 
30 September 1939 to 17 January 1945 with particular emphasis on the 
most important event during those years – the Warsaw Uprising. It can be 
stated from the Church’s perspective that this article concerns not only the 
Warsaw archdiocese, but also the area surrounding the city together with 
selected parishes close to Warsaw at that time. These include, for example, 
the suburban Warsaw parish of  St Thérèse of  the Child Jesus that is linked 
to the 1944 Warsaw Uprising.
It is also worth noting that testimony collected by the Central Commission 
for the Investigation of  German Crimes in Poland may constitute a source 
to study repression not only of  the Catholic Church and its faithful, but 
also the persecution of  other Christian denominations in Poland such as 
the Evangelical Church of  the Augsburg Confession, as well as the largest 
non-Christian religion of  the second Republic, Judaism.
Occupation
Pre-war Warsaw was a city with a variety of  traditions. It was not only 
a centre of  Polish statehood and a focal point for the Jewish population in 
Europe, but also a key location in the life of  the Catholic Church during 
the Second Republic. The city population on 1 January 1939, according to 
City Hall’s estimates, numbered 1,289,500 residents. The same source, the 
city administration, stated that 67 per cent of  residents were of  the Catholic 
faith (Warsaw ... 1939, 15).7 Obviously, the start of  the war precipitated vari-
ous human migrations or movements. Historians estimate that 1,275,000 
people resided in Warsaw when the occupation began. Undoubtedly, more 
than one-half  of  them were Catholics. At the start of  the Uprising the 
population was approximately 1,100,000 (Szarota 1988, 67–74), whereby the 
proportion of  Catholics residing in Warsaw increased due to the Holo caust 
of  the Jews. These statistics show that while Catholics were the predomi-
nant inhabitants of  the Polish capital, Warsaw also included a large number 
of  other creeds and religions in its demographic structure. A look at the 
organizational structure of  the Church also shows the significance of  War-
saw for Polish Catholicism. It included the Metropolitan Curia with all its 
offices, the Apostolic Nuncio, the seat of  various institutes or associations 
(for example, the Higher Religious Culture Institute, the Catholic Action 
Institute, the Marian Guild and the Catholic Union ‘Caritas’), the Archdio-
cese Museum and Archive, a seminary, as well as a Theology Department 
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at Warsaw University (Wysocki 1982, 274). The city had 36 parishes, 24 
subsidiary and seminary churches, as well as 104 chapels, and 12 men’s 
and 18 women’s religious orders had their monasteries in Warsaw. At local 
seminaries, 135 graduates prepared for the priesthood. Immediately before 
the war the entire archdiocese had 721 chaplains and 222 monastic priests 
(Compendium ... 1939), most of  whom served in Warsaw. The archdiocese 
was headed by Archbishop Stanisław Gall and after his death in 1942 by 
Bishop Antoni Szlagowski.8
In testimonies submitted before the Central Commission I found no info-
rmation on German violence against the Church during the defence of  
Warsaw in September 1939. Witnesses, even the clergy, did not mention any 
bombing of  churches in the capital, victims or resulting destruction. Warsaw 
capitulated on 28 September 1939. Official entry of  the Wehrmacht into the 
city took place on 1 October, even though German forces actually appeared 
in the city a day earlier. The initial arrests among the clergy in Warsaw on 
3 October 1939 were a foretaste of  imminent terror. In accordance with 
prevailing practice, the German security apparatus took hostages from 
among the clergy in the first days after occupying a given city (Fijałkowski 
1983, 74). From 100 to 300 priests fell victim to round-ups in the capital. 
They were incarcerated at Pawiak, the Mokotów prison, and the detention 
centre at Daniłowiczowska. Those arrested faced no specific charges, were 
not questioned and for the most part were released within several weeks. 
On releasing the priests, the occupiers instructed them that they needed to 
be loyal to the new order, as stated in a speech by Helmut Otto, then Reich 
Commissar for the city of  Warsaw: ‘Leave the care of  the motherland to the 
German authorities, who will account for it before God, and you, chaplains, 
only take care of  your good God and ecumenical affairs.’9
Adolf  Hitler issued a decree on 12 October 1939, which was binding from 
26 October 1939, in which he established the General Government headed 
by Hans Frank. Kraków was its administrative capital, whereas Warsaw was 
reduced only to the level of  the seat of  the occupation authorities of  one 
of  several General Government (GG) districts. Ludwig Fischer was gov-
ernor of  the Warsaw district during the entire occupation. GG authorities 
launched a certain Church policy expressed in the contemptuous motto of  
Governor Frank: ‘if  Catholicism is a poison, then Poles should have this 
poison’ (Piotrowski 1956, 459). The Germans sought to mould the Catholic 
Church in the GG into an obedient tool to serve their political and economic 
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aims. Priests were to influence the faithful by calling on them to adopt a loyal 
position towards occupying authorities or to encourage them to work for 
the Reich. In exchange, mass and other services could be held together with 
other Holy Sacraments. Monasteries and seminaries were not closed. Religion 
could also be taught in schools. However, realizing that Catholicism was 
one of  the historic foundations of  Polish identity, the Germans embarked 
on a systematic weakening of  the Church and religion. In the first stage 
they sought to extinguish Polish identity and leave ‘the final solution to the 
Church issue’ until after the war.
A series of  accounts by clerics10 well illustrates German repression of  an 
administrative nature whereby the Warsaw Church met during the occupa-
tion until the start of  the Uprising. From the perspective of  the Polish clergy, 
it was quite extensive and intense. Religious freedom was severely curtailed. 
It was prohibited to conduct processions outside a church, to hold funerals 
or to use church bells (which, in time, were requisitioned). Certain religious 
songs, for example, ‘Dear Mother’, could not be sung because their melody 
recalled ‘God, Save Poland’. An order was given to remove the words ‘Mother 
of  God, Queen of  the Polish Crown’ from liturgical prayers and to gener-
ally delete everything that recalled Polish identity from songbooks, missals 
and other church books, including the mention of  Holy Patrons of  Poland. 
Administratively, the celebration of  holidays was transferred from workdays 
to Sundays. Holidays of  a patriotic nature, such as on 3 May, 15 August 
and even 10 October in gratitude for the Victory in Chocim, were banned.
All religious associations of  a public nature were dissolved and their assets 
confiscated. All Marian Guilds, for example, were liquidated in this manner. 
A general prohibition of  the publication of  religious texts was issued, while 
printing and binding equipment was confiscated. Monasteries and seminaries 
were barred from accepting new members. Studies for theological academic 
institutions were forbidden. All personnel files on chaplains and clerics were 
taken from the Warsaw Metropolitan Curia for the surveillance of  the clergy.
A racial policy contrary to the usual principles of  the Catholic Church was in-
troduced, which limited religious services. Polish priests could not administer 
to either Germans or the Volksdeutsche (German origin). A ban was imposed 
on adjudicating all cases in an archbishop marital court in which at least one 
of  the parties had German nationality. The authorities removed all Poles 
from the masses for Catholic soldiers, even if  only several German soldiers 
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were present. The acceptance of  Protestants into the Catholic Church was 
prohibited. It was also prohibited to baptise persons of  Jewish origin and 
harsh penalties were imposed for such a breach. The Warsaw Curia was not 
allowed to correspond on church matters with diocese members residing in 
territories annexed to the Reich.11 An order was given to priests to use the 
pulpit to encourage the Polish population to leave for work in Germany.
According to priests recounting the above restrictions, the Warsaw District 
authorities issued orders on Church affairs either through the Metropolitan 
Curia or directly to parishes or monasteries. Fr. Professor Zygmunt  Kozubski, 
acting as a plenipotentiary for the Warsaw Archbishop for matters relating to 
public authorities, recalled a meeting with GG functionaries: ‘The behaviour 
of  German officials towards me as a representative of  the clerical leadership 
was always impolite, frequently brutal and combined with threats.’12 The Ger-
mans were able to justify their arbitrary actions towards Polish Catholicism 
as it was legally vulnerable, since the concordat concluded between the Holy 
See and the Second Republic, in the view of  the Nazis, ceased to bind due 
to the absence of  one of  its parties, the Polish state (Łażewski 2013, 293).
Repression
The above-noted imprisonment of  the clergy at the start of  the occupation 
in Warsaw was carried out as a deterrent, albeit somewhat chaotically. After 
a certain time nearly all priests were released. Arrests, which commenced 
in late autumn 1939, were more systematic and related to the extermina-
tion efforts conducted by the Germans. Releases were increasingly rare. 
Repression could be grouped in the following manner due to its reasons 
and purposes: efforts to liquidate the Polish intelligentsia, punishment for 
anti-German activity, reprisals and acts as deterrents (Sziling 1988, 190). The 
Central Commission’s accounts provide a highly diverse picture of  these 
events. Many accounts show a certain moment or element of  such repression. 
Some of  the witnesses were arrested, others saw colleagues imprisoned and 
one witness recalls a well-known priest who was murdered. Some witnessed 
the repression of  people who they did not personally know. After the war, 
Czesław Rychlik, an electrical technician working in the complex of  Parlia-
ment buildings next to where executions were held, recalled: ‘In the winter 
of  1940, I saw, among others, how a nun was shot in the Parliament garden. 
She was wearing her habit. It could not be seen from under the hood on 
her head whether she was an old or young woman.’13 I will recreate a sense 
of  this period of  oppression from various excerpts.
34      REMEMBRANCE AND SOLIDARITY
‘I ’LL SHOOT EVERY PRIEST’ . . .
Arrests of  clergy that began in November 1939 were part of  the campaign 
to destroy the Polish intelligentsia. Many priests involved in political or 
social organizations before the war or who worked in education were im-
prisoned. In Warsaw, for example, Fr. Professor Franciszek Rosłaniec, an 
outstanding Bible specialist and dean of  the Catholic Theology Department 
at Warsaw University, was arrested.14 Some chaplains, after being incarcer-
ated at Pawiak, were murdered during mass executions in Palmiry outside 
Warsaw. In 1940, this fate, among others, befell Fr. Prefect Jan Krawczyk, 
a doctor of  theology and parish priest in Wilanów; Fr. Marceli Nowakowski, 
priest at the Holy Saviour parish in Warsaw and pre-war parliamentary 
deputy; and Fr. Zygmunt Sajna, parish priest in Góra Kalwarii, who was 
tortured at Pawiak.15
Pawiak was the primary site in Warsaw where the imprisoned clergy, practis-
ing faithful and non-Catholics experienced violence inflicted by the occupier. 
After its takeover by the German Security Police and Security Service of  the 
District of  Warsaw, Pawiak became the largest political prison in occupied 
Poland. The Gestapo banned official religious practices and persons sen-
tenced to death were denied last rites. The prison chapel was converted into 
a room to torture detainees. Religious life went underground, as recounted 
by Janina Kozak, who was cited in the first paragraph of  this article. There 
were, however, cynical attempts to exploit the religiosity of  prisoners on 
the part of  the Gestapo. Fr. Stanisław Mystkowski, himself  imprisoned 
for nine months at Pawiak, faced a situation when a German official ap-
proached a barely alive beaten-up member of  the resistance movement and, 
falsely claiming to be a Catholic priest, encouraged him to ‘confess’. When 
he began to ask about political and non-spiritual matters, the battered Pole 
realized that this was a ruse.16
The prison at ul. Dzielna was an execution ground for many clerics. Warsaw 
University Professor Mieczysław Michałowicz recalled: 
Immediately upon being brought to Pawiak, we heard a beat-
ing in the cellars. Fr. Archutowski was pummelled for being 
a priest. Cellmates expressed sympathy when he was finally 
thrown back into the cell. Then, an SS-man brought everyone 
out into the corridor and ordered us to jump up and down 
like a frog. Fr. Archutowski’s robe was taken off  and put on 
the Jew, Bąbel, and prisoners were ordered to kiss his hand.17 
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The theme of  torture, beating, kicking, degradation and inhuman interro-
gation is reiterated in numerous accounts. German functionaries, at times 
merciless, were also capable of  showing a different face, that of  corruption. 
Fr. Jan Rzymełka, priest at the Holy Cross parish in Warsaw and previously 
a co-worker of  Wojciech Korfanty in the elections in Upper Silesia was 
sought by the Gestapo. Germans were bribed with 19,000 złoty and the priest 
was released after a two-day investigation. In reality, this did not at all mean 
that the Gestapo was no longer interested in such a person: Fr. Rzymełka 
was arrested nine months later and imprisoned at Pawiak.18
A characteristic issue, as is evident from the testimonies, was the German 
hatred for male monastic orders. Arrests were systematically made at mon-
asteries, which nearly annihilated several of  them from Warsaw through 
deportations to concentration camps. Salesians, Capuchins and Vincentians 
(the Congregation of  the Missionary or Lazarists) were particularly perse-
cuted. The activity of  monks who remained in the city was constantly being 
restricted and a considerable part of  their property was requisitioned. Pijar 
Augustyn Mańkowski particularly recalled the nighttime interrogations at 
Pawiak: ‘I was not asked about anything at all during this questioning, but 
directly told that I was hostile towards the German nation and that I taught 
youth and preached in this spirit.’19 In 1941 all Capuchins at the seminary at 
ul. Miodowa were arrested. Most of  them were shipped to the KL Ausch-
witz concentration camp.20 On 7 February 1944 the Germans arrested all 
priests and brothers at houses of  the Congregation of  the Missionary at 
Krakowskie Przedmieście and Salesian priests at ul. Lipowa. The impris-
oned Salesian priest Józef  Oleksy found that: ‘since the Germans did not 
find anything that could incriminate us politically, I have the impression 
that the entire campaign was aimed at destroying the clergy.’21 After an 
intervention by Bishop Szlagowski several fathers and brothers from both 
monasteries were released over time, yet most clergymen were transported 
to concentration camps in Gross-Rosen and Sachsenhausen where many 
lost their lives.
Students over the age of  sixteen at the Salesian handicrafts school shared 
the fate of  the teachers who were arrested and deported. There were no 
mass arrests among Warsaw Jesuits, but the Germans confiscated print-
ing equipment with which the esteemed socio-cultural periodical Przegląd 
Powszechny was published. The previously mentioned Fr. Aleksander Kisiel 
summarized church policy of  the occupier during that time: ‘I have the 
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impression that in their political acts, the Germans wanted to create the 
appearance of  a certain religious freedom that actually did not exist. We 
lived in a state of  relentless terror.’22
During the occupation, the Germans also had one more tool for violence: 
propaganda. It had a dual form – on the one hand, it sowed hatred towards 
the Church, yet, on the other hand, it sought to exploit the Church for its 
own purposes. As we have seen priests were ordered to use the pulpit to 
encourage people to leave for work in the Reich, and they were also ordered 
use their position to appease the public mood. With the worsening military 
situation on the Eastern front, the Nazis sought to win over the Catholic 
clergy through anti-communist slogans. In 1943 Governor Fischer pro-
posed that Bishop Szlagowski issue a pastoral letter against Bolshevism. He 
also pressured priests to publicly denounce the killing of  Germans by the 
resistance movement. Bishop Szlagowski did not fall prey to vague prom-
ises of  improving the plight of  Poles and refused to meet the occupier’s 
demands.23 The disconsolate Fischer stated that the Warsaw Church – as 
with the Kraków Church under the guidance of  Archbishop Adam Stefan 
Sapieha – was conducting an opportunistic policy in relation to the wishes of  
the German authorities. Also, lower-ranking officials called on priests with 
similar propositions. Pressed to hold an anti-Bolshevik rally, Fr. Chrościcki 
skilfully responded ‘that he does not engage in politics’; after all, since the 
start of  the occupation, German authorities had demanded that the Church 
did not engage in politics.24
Tragic Uprising
The pinnacle of  German violence against the Church was during the Warsaw 
Uprising (1 August–2 October 1944). The Warsaw Church suffered its great-
est casualties at that time (Jacewicz and Woś 1977, 345). Most testimonies 
submitted to the Central Commission with regard to the persecution of  the 
Church deals with the Uprising. In contrast to many episodes in the years 
before the occupation, specific events during the time of  the 1944 Uprising 
are simultaneously described in the records of  numerous witnesses. Violence 
at this time was bloodier and had more faces. The clergy and faithful per-
ished in planned massacres in neighbourhoods and through ‘spontaneous 
executions’ against the walls of  bombed churches. As Home Army chaplains, 
priests were killed during massacres while attending the wounded, who they 
did not want to leave behind while serving on the front line, or during the 
murder of  entire monastic communities. Compared with the clergy, both 
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before and during the Uprising, the nuns were the most repressed group 
and sacrificed the largest number of  people.
The first large-scale massacre of  the clergy took place on the second day of  
the Uprising at the Jesuit monastery at ul. Rakowiecka in Mokotów. An SS-
unit arriving at the building accused the clergy of  shooting at the German 
soldiers. There is no evidence to support this accusation. SS-men took away 
the head of  the monastery, Fr. Edward Kosibowicz, allegedly to elicit further 
explanations. He was shot in the head at Pole Mokotowskie. The remaining 
Jesuits and lay people who hid in the monastery were looted and locked in 
the cellar. They were then fired on by machine guns and then a shower of  
grenades killed off  the wounded. Approximately forty people, including eight 
fathers and eight brothers of  the Society of  Jesus, were murdered in the mon-
astery, whereas fourteen people, mostly the wounded, managed to survive. 
After the execution, the Germans plundered and set the monastery on fire.25
A massacre of  residents in the borough of  Wola took place at the start of  
the Warsaw Uprising. Its victims included Redemptorists from the monastery 
at ul. Karolkowa. Units of  Heinz Reinefarth seized this area on 6 August 
1944. The Germans then brought more than twenty Redemptorists to the 
Kirchmayer and Marczewski Factory at ul. Wolska 79/81 and murdered 
them one by one with shots to the rear of  the head. Several other seminary 
residents also perished or disappeared without a trace during that time. The 
Wola massacre took the lives of  thirty Redemptorists (fifteen fathers, nine 
coadjutor brothers, five clerics and one novice cleric).26 Macabre events also 
took place in other parts of  the borough. The chaplain of  Wola Hospital, 
Fr. Kazimierz Ciecierski, was shot,27 seven serving Benedictine nuns were 
murdered at the St Lazarus Hospital28 and Fr. Tadeusz Jachimowski, chief  
chaplain of  the Home Army,29 was executed in unclear circumstances. In turn, 
Fr. Mieczysław Krygier, parish priest at St Lawrence’s Church, was killed at 
the base of  the altar during a Holy Mass that he was officiating.30 Fr. Bernard 
Filipiuk, who survived a mass execution at ul. Górczewska 32 without even 
being wounded, had more luck.31 Also spared was Bishop Karol Niemira, 
who lived in Warsaw during the war after being expelled from his diocese in 
Pińsk. The Germans nevertheless beat him and sent him to forced labour.32
During the Ochota massacre, several priests were murdered by units of  
the Russian Liberation Army who were collaborating with the Germans. 
They included the outstanding logician, Fr. Jan Salamucha, chaplain of  
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the Ochota defenders, who refused to withdraw with the insurgents and 
stayed with the wounded.33 In Śródmieście, Fr. Stanisław Trzeciak, parish 
priest at St Anthony’s Church, who was well known for his civic activities, 
was shot.34 In Żoliborz, Fr. Hieronim Brzozowski went pleaded with the 
Germans to halt a massacre of  the population. The soldiers ceased firing 
and released the civilians, but after a certain time they murdered the priest.35 
Four priests, thirty-five nuns and approximately a thousand laymen were 
killed during battles in the Old Town following the bombardment of  the 
Convent Church.36 In Powiśle, the Dominican priest Michał Czartoryski, 
who gave spiritually support to the wounded as they died, was shot during 
a field-hospital massacre.37 During the pacification of  Czerniakow, SS-men 
hung the Pallotine priest Józef  Stanek, mentioned at the beginning of  this 
article, after taking him prisoner.38 It is claimed that twenty-one priests 
were killed during the Uprising, according to probably incomplete data, not 
including monastic chaplains (Jacewicz and Woś 1977, 345).
The cessation of  fighting did not signify the end of  the losses inflicted on 
the Warsaw Church. After the Uprising, the Germans conducted a campaign 
of  planned destruction and burnt the city. Most historic churches in the 
capital were destroyed, including St John’s Archcathedral, which was blown 
up. Libraries and church vaults were looted, particularly of  artworks and valu-
able liturgical objects. The destruction of  the material assets of  Polish and 
Catholic culture in the autumn of  1944 was continuation of  German actions, 
which had commenced in 1939, to steal and confiscate Church property.39
Balance sheet
An important element of  contemporary historiography is a look at ‘the brief  
20th century’ (1914/1918–1989/1991) through the prism of  mass violence 
and suffering. The Central Commission files are a good source for such 
a perspective. We find evidence in the analysed material of  the correctness 
of  certain conclusions drawn through such a methodological approach. 
We see focused and strategic planning and various means of  coercion: the 
state machinery of  the Third Reich fought the Church forcefully over the 
course of  more than five years. The vast majority of  the murdered clergy or 
laity were civilians who were not taking part in armed struggle. Methods of  
killing and inflicted suffering were conducted on an industrial scale, having 
maximum effectiveness as its purpose, for example, through deportation 
to concentration camps. The Nazis idealized violence, thus Catholics along 
with other Poles had to endure a legitimized form of  terror justified by racist 
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ideology. This entire evil that the Church suffered, particularly during the 
Warsaw Uprising, was subject to trivialization.
The files show that the Germans applied the same methods of  repression 
and extermination to both the clergy and the remainder of  society in Warsaw: 
arrests, executions and deportations. Complex and overlapping causes for 
the persecution of  the clergy are evident; they were not only clergy but also 
had Polish nationality or were members of  the national elite. The clergy was 
repressed for its faith and that the Nazi terror apparatus had a predilection 
towards the Catholic clergy for ideological reasons. Another element of  the 
Third Reich’s systemic anti-Catholic policy and repression of  the Church 
was an attack on Polish nationality. Everyone suffered: the hierarchy, the 
diocesan clergy, members of  monasteries and the laity. Intense persecution 
of  male monastic orders has already been noted, but little can be gleaned 
from Commission files on repression levelled against convents. The testi-
monies show us an unimaginable series of  coercive measures employed 
by the occupying Germans; they were of  an administrative, ideological 
and primarily physical nature. Materials show that the Gestapo oppressed 
the Catholic Church the most until August 1944, whereas the SS assumed 
this role during the Uprising. It is also worth noting that witnesses in their 
testimonies on the Church very seldom speak of  its involvement in the 
resistance movement. Therefore, other sources must be sought to study 
the reprisal aspect of  anti-German activity.
The fate of  the Church in occupied Warsaw and the tragic balance sheet of  
losses show the strong imprint of  Nazism in the physiognomy of  Polish 
Catholicism and the entire nation. However, the survival of  the Church 
despite this oppression brings a universal message of  hope.
KAROL KALINOWSKI
Karol Kalinowski is a graduate of the History Institute at Warsaw University 
(2013). From 2011 to 2016 he worked at the John Paul II and Primate Wyszyński 
Museum in Warsaw, where he was secretary of a team working on its  exhibitions. 
Since 2016 he has worked in the Programme Section of the Witold Pilecki 
Centre for Totalitarian Studies in Warsaw, where he co-produces the website 
‘Records of Terror’. Karol Kalinowski is a participant of the doctoral seminar of 
Prof. Paweł Skibiński. He also writes for the monthly W Sieci Historii [In the 
history network]. His academic interests focus on the history of the Church in 
the 19th and 20th centuries.
40      REMEMBRANCE AND SOLIDARITY
‘I ’LL SHOOT EVERY PRIEST’ . . .
ENDNOTES
1  National Remembrance Institute (hereafter: IPN) GK case no. 196/63: Trial of 
Ludwig Fischer, vol. V, 78–79 (testimony of Janina Kozak).
2  IPN GK case no. 196/67: Files in the indictment of Ludwig Fischer and others, 
vol. XIII–XIV, 225–27 (testimony of Fr. Aleksander Kisiel).
3  IPN GK case no. 182/59: Investigative materials on German crimes committed 
during the Warsaw Uprising in Mokotów, GISZ and at Aleja Szucha 12/14. Minutes from 
witness testimony, reports from on-site inspections, correspondence, 177 (testimony of 
Kazimierz Ceglarek).
4  Due to the efforts of the Witold Pilecki Centre for Totalitarian Studies, files of the 
Central Commission for the Investigation of German Crimes in Poland are available online 
on the portal ‘Records of Terror’ (http://www.zapisyterroru.pl). The collection presently 
numbers nearly 3,500 accounts given before the Central Commission and is constantly 
growing. Testimony is published on the portal in two language versions – Polish and English.
5  Presently, all of these archives combined into a single resource are available at the 
National Remembrance Institute (case numbers starting from IPN GK).
6  Interestingly, the classic five volume work on this subject called Martyrology of 
the Polish Roman Catholic clergy under Nazi occupation 1939–1945 authored by Frs. Wiktor 
Jacewicz and Jan Woś did not utilize archival resources from the Central Commission for 
the Investigation of German Crimes in Poland. This may be explained by the fact that this 
work appeared in the 1970s during a time of conflict between the Catholic Church and the 
communist state of which the Central Commission was formally a part.
7  Data for 1931, whereby subsequent years of the Second Republic did not clearly 
change the proportion of denominations. In statistics for 1938, the Archbishop Curia in 
Warsaw counted 639,464 Roman Catholics in the city. Another 105,500 persons who 
resided in parishes, according to church structure in the deanery outside Warsaw, yet within 
city limits, should be added to this number. This concerns, for example, parishes in Bielany 
or Okęcie (Compendium ... 1939).
8  The long-standing Warsaw ordinary, Cardinal Aleksander Kakowski, died in 1938 
and his position was not filled on the outbreak of the war. Archbishop Gall headed the arch-
diocese as a vicar capitular and was appointed an apostolic administrator in 1940 by Pope 
Pius XII. Bishop Szlagowski headed the archdiocese as a vicar capitular.
9  IPN GK case no. 196/72: Minutes of the Main Trial in the form of a stenogram 
(transcript of the court proceedings) in the case of Ludwig Fischer and others dated 17, 18 
and 19 December 1946, vol. II, 274 (testimony of Fr. Stanisław Mystkowski).
10  IPN GK case no. 196/67: Files in the indictment of Ludwig Fischer and others, 
vol. XIII–XIV, 209–10 (testimony of Fr. Julian Chrościcki), 219–20 (testimony of Fr. Jan 
Paszyna), 223–24 (testimony of Fr. Aleksander Kisiel), 238–40 (testimony of Fr. Zygmunt 
Kozubski) and from the IPN GK case no. 196/72: Minutes of the Main Trial in the form of 
a stenogram in the case of Ludwig Fischer and others dated 17, 18 and 19 December 1946, 
vol. II, 276–77 (testimony of Fr. Stanisław Mystkowski).
11  A part of Warsaw Archdiocese territory in the region of Kutno and Sochaczew 
fell within the zone of the Reich zone Warta lands and within the area of Nowy Dwór in the 
Ciechanów region, thus, outside the borders of the General Government.
REMEMBRANCE AND SOLIDARITY      41
‘I ’LL SHOOT EVERY PRIEST’ . . .
12  IPN GK case no. 196/67: Files in the indictment of Ludwig Fischer and others, 
vol. XIII–XIV, 236 (testimony of Fr. Zygmunt Kozubski).
13  IPN GK case no. 196/62: Fischer Trial; vol. III–IV, 39–40 (testimony of Czesław 
Rychlik).
14  IPN GK case no. 196/67: Files in the indictment of Ludwig Fischer and others, vols 
XIII–XIV, 237 (testimony of Fr. Zygmunt Kozubski). Fr. Rosłaniec, after passing through vari-
ous prisons, was brought to the KL Sachsenhausen concentration camp and later to Dachau, 
where he was murdered in 1942. Pope John Paul II beatified him in 1999 as a Catholic martyr 
of the Second World War.
15  IPN GK case no. 196/72: Minutes of the Main Trial in the form of a stenogram in 
the case of Ludwig Fischer and others dated 17, 18 and 19 December 1946, vol. II, 274–75 
(testimony of Fr. Stanisław Mystkowski) and IPN GK case no. 196/67: Files in the indict-
ment of Ludwig Fischer and others, vols XIII–XIV, 237 (testimony of Fr. Zygmunt Kozubski). 
Ks. Sajna perished during the AB Campaign of genocide conducted against Polish political 
and intellectual elites. In 1999, he was declared blessed by Pope John Paul II.
16  IPN GK case no. 196/72: Minutes of the Main Trial in the form of a stenogram 
in the case of Ludwig Fischer and others dated 17, 18 and 19 December 1946, vol. II, 280 
(testimony of Fr. Stanisław Mystkowski).
17  IPN GK case no. 196/66: Files in the indictment of Ludwig Fischer and others; vols 
IX–XII, 203 (testimony of Mieczysław Michałowicz). Ks. Archutowski is erroneously named 
‘Arkutowski’ in a handwritten script; the above citation was corrected as a slip of the pen..
The superior of the Warsaw Seminary, after imprisonment at Pawiak, was deported to the 
concentration camp in Majdanek, where he died in 1943. In 1999 Pope John Paul II beatified 
Fr. Roman Archutowski.
18  IPN GK 182/149: Concentration camp Gross-Rosen (minutes of a witness’s tes-
timony), 57 (testimony of Fr. Jan Rzymełko).
19  IPN GK case no. 196/83: Files of the Kraków Regional Commission to Investigate 
German Crimes on the criminal case of a former Commandant of the concentration camp 
Oświęcim-Brzezinka, 47–48 (testimony of Fr. Augustyn Mańkowski). In 1940, he was sent 
to KL Auschwitz I. He was able to survive and wrote a well-known brochure after the war 
entitled ‘Behind the wires of the Auschwitz concentration camp’.
20  IPN GK case no. 196/67: Files in the indictment of Ludwig Fischer and others, 
vols XIII–XIV, 220–21 (testimony of Fr. Jan Paszyna).
21  IPN GK case no. 196/67: Files in the indictment of Ludwig Fischer and others, 
vols XIII–XIV, 234 (testimony of Fr. Józef Oleksy).
22  IPN GK case no. 196/67: Files in the indictment of Ludwig Fischer and others, 
vols XIII–XIV, 224 (testimony of Fr. Aleksander Kisiel).
23  IPN GK case no. 196/67: Files in the indictment of Ludwig Fischer and others, 
vols XIII–XIV, 240–42 (testimony of Fr. Zygmunt Kozubski).
24  IPN GK case no. 196/67: Files in the indictment of Ludwig Fischer and others, 
vols XIII–XIV, 210 (testimony of Fr. Julian Chrościcki).
25  IPN GK case no. 182/35 vol. 2: The Warsaw Uprising in the Old Town, Mokotów, 
GISZ, Ochota and Śródmieście – minutes of witness testimony, accounts, maps. Copies 
of minutes of the testimony of witnesses of Nazi crimes in Mokotów, 127–29 (testimony 
42      REMEMBRANCE AND SOLIDARITY
‘I ’LL SHOOT EVERY PRIEST’ . . .
of Fr. Karol Sawicki), 130–32 (testimony of Fr. Aleksander Kisiel), 133–134 (testimony of 
Fr. Hugo Kwas), 137–40 (testimony of br. Felicjan Korsak).
26  IPN GK 196/73: Minutes of the Main Trial in the form of a stenogram in the case 
of Ludwig Fischer and others dated 20. XII, 21. XII, 30. XII. 1946; vol. III, 91–94 (testimony 
of Fr. Jan Igielski); IPN GK 196/67: Files in the indictment of Ludwig Fischer and others; 
vol. XIII–XIV, 256–58 (testimony of Fr. Jan Igielski); IPN GK 166/1100 vol. 5: Files on Nazi 
crimes during the Warsaw Uprising and the destruction of Warsaw, 384–86 (testimony of 
Stanisław Jaworski), 387 (testimony of Fr. Jan Igielski).
27  IPN GK 166/1100 vol. 5: Files on Nazi crimes during the Warsaw Uprising and the 
destruction of Warsaw, 212–13 (testimony of Anna Wielowiejska).
28  IPN GK 166/1100 vol. 5: Files on Nazi crimes during the Warsaw Uprising and the 
destruction of Warsaw, 226–28 (testimony of Salomea Strzębała).
29  IPN GK 166/1100 vol. 5: Files on Nazi crimes during the Warsaw Uprising and the 
destruction of Warsaw, 323 (testimony of Fr. Wacław Murawski).
30  IPN GK 166/1100 vol. 5: Files on Nazi crimes during the Warsaw Uprising and the 
destruction of Warsaw, 396–98 (testimony of Marianna Smolińska).
31  IPN GK 166/1100 vol. 5: Files on Nazi crimes during the Warsaw Uprising and the 
destruction of Warsaw, 162–71 (testimony of Fr. Bernard Filipiuk).
32  IPN GK 166/1100 vol. 5: Files on Nazi crimes during the Warsaw Uprising and the 
destruction of Warsaw, 33–38 (testimony of Wacław Szlachet).
33  IPN GK 182/35 vol. 6: The Warsaw Uprising in the Old Town, Mokotów, GISZ, 
Ochota and Śródmieście – minutes of witness testimony, accounts and maps. Materials on 
Nazi crimes committed in Wola, 20–21 (testimony of Fr. Władysław Kwaśniewski), 74–76 
(testimony of Maria Lachert).
34  IPN GK 182/102: The Warsaw Uprising, Old Town – minutes of the testimony of 
witnesses of the murder of elderly persons at ul. Przyrynek 4, St Stanisław home and City 
Shelter Church of the Blessed Virgin Mary, 12–13 (testimony of Fr. Stanisław Lewarski).
35  IPN GK 182/40: The Warsaw Uprising. Minutes from a questioning of witnesses of 
Nazi crimes committed against residents of a building at ul. Dembińskiego 2/4 (in Marymont, 
Warsaw), 28–29 (testimony of Stanisław Taran).
36  IPN GK 182/35 vol. 1: The Warsaw Uprising in the Old Town, Mokotów, GISZ, 
Ochota and Śródmieście – minutes of witness testimony, accounts, maps, 25 (testimony of 
br. Benigno Murlinkiewicz).
37  IPN GK 182/80: The Warsaw Uprising 1944. Powiśle, 27 (testimony of Henryk 
Dziewięcki). Fr. Czartoryski was beatified by Pope John Paul II in 1999.
38  IPN GK 182/35 vol. 1: The Warsaw Uprising in the Old Town, Mokotów, GISZ, 
Ochota and Śródmieście – minutes of witness testimony, accounts, maps, 157 (testimony 
of Małgorzata Damięcka).
39  IPN GK case no. 196/72: Minutes of the Main Trial in the form of a stenogram in 
the case of Ludwig Fischer and others dated 17, 18 and 19 December 1946, vol. II, 276 (tes-
timony of Fr. Stanisław Mystkowski) and IPN GK 196/67, Files in the indictment of Ludwig 
Fischer and others; vol. XIII–XIV, 247–51 (testimony of Feliks Skowroński).
REMEMBRANCE AND SOLIDARITY      43
‘I ’LL SHOOT EVERY PRIEST’ . . .
LIST OF REFERENCES
Compendium ...  (1939) Katalog Kościołów i Duchowieństwa Archidiecezji Warszawskiej na rok 
1939 [Compendium of the Church and clergy in the Warsaw Archdiocese for 1939]. Warsaw: 
Seminarium Metropolitalne.
Fijałkowski, Zenon  (1983) Kościół katolicki na ziemiach polskich w latach okupacji hitlerowskiej 
[The Catholic Church in Poland during the Nazi occupation]. Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza.
Gumkowski, Janusz  (1962) ‘Introduction’, in Zbrodnie okupanta hitlerowskiego na ludności 
cywilnej wczasie powstania warszawskiego w 1944 roku (w dokumentach) [Crimes of the Nazi 
occupiers on civilians during the Warsaw Uprising in 1944 (in documents)], ed. Szymon 
Datner and Kazimierz Leszczyński. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, 
5–13.
Jacewicz, Wiktor and Jan Woś  (1977) Martyrologium polskiego duchowieństwa rzymskokatolick-
iego pod okupacją hitlerowską w latach 1939–1945. Zeszyt 2, Wykaz duchownych zmarłych, 
zamordowanych lub represjonowanych przez okupanta w diecezjach chełmińskiej, częstochowskiej, 
łomżyńskiej, łódzkiej i płockiej oraz archidiecezji warszawskiej [Martyrology of the Polish Roman 
Catholic clergy under the Nazi occupation of 1939–1945. Notebook 2: List of clergy who 
perished or were murdered or repressed by the occupiers in the Chełmno, Częstochowa, 
Łomża, Łódż and Płock Dioceses and the Warsaw Archdiocese]. Warsaw: Akademia Teologii 
Katolickiej.
Kozłowski, Wojciech and Tomasz Stefanek  (2017) ‘Miasto, które przeżyło własną śmierć’ [The 
city that survived its own death] in Zapisy Terroru. Warszawa [Records of terror. Warsaw], ed. 
Leszek Zaborowski. Warsaw: Witold Pilecki Centre for Totalitarian Studies, 18–25.
Łażewski, Eryk  (2013) ‘Katolicyzm polski in Generalnym Gubernatorstwie’ [Polish Catholi-
cism in the general government], Christianitas, no. 52.
Madajczyk, Piotr  (2017) ‘Świadectwa zbrodni – Główna Komisja Badania Zbrodni Niemieckich 
in Polsce’ [Testimonies of crime – the Central Commission for the Investigation of Ger-
man Crimes in Poland], in Zapisy Terroru. Warszawa [Records of terror. Warsaw], ed. Leszek 
 Zaborowski. Warsaw: Witold Pilecki Centre for Totalitarian Studies, 26–31.
Piotrowski, Stanisław, ed.  (1956) Dziennik Hansa Franka tom 1 [Diary of Hans Frank, vol. 1]. 
Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Prawnicze.
Szarota, Tomasz  (1988) Okupowanej Warszawy dzień powszedni: studium historyczne [Everyday 
life in occupied Warsaw: historical study]. Warsaw: Czytelnik.
Sziling, Jan  (1988) Kościoły chrześcijańskie w polityce niemieckich władz okupacyjnych w  
Generalnym Gubernatorstwie  (1939–1945) [Christian churches in the policy of the Ger-
man occupation authorities in the General Governorship  (1939–1945)]. Toruń: Nicholas 
Copernicus University.
Warsaw ...  (1939) Warszawa w liczbach: 1939 [Warsaw in numbers: 1939]. Warsaw: Wydział 
Statystyczny Zarządu Miejskiego w m. st. Warszawie.
Wysocki, Jan  (1982) ‘Archidiecezja warszawska’ [Archdiocese of Warsaw], in Życie religijne 
w Polsce pod okupacją hitlerowską 1939–1945 [Religious life in Poland under the Nazi oc-
cupation 1939–1945], ed. Zygmunt Zieliński. Warsaw: Ośrodek Dokumentacji i Studiów 
Społecznych [Centre of Documentation and Social Studies], 269–346.

REMEMBRANCE AND SOLIDARITY      45
JAMES CONNOLLY’S BLOODSTAINED VEST .. .
JAMES CONNOLLY’S 
BLOODSTAINED VEST: MEDIATING 
DEATH AND VIOLENCE IN 
COMMEMORATIVE EXHIBITIONS
Siobhán Doyle
Graduate School of Creative Arts and Media 
(GradCAM), Dublin School of Creative Arts in 
the Dublin Institute of Technology, Dublin
ABSTRACT
The actions surrounding the display of images and artefacts in museums – 
 collection, conservation, research and exhibition – are bound up with how the 
past is presented and remembered. These conditions and decisions relating to 
exhibitions are largely invisible to viewers who are confronted with the  apparent 
completeness of an exhibition display. By conducting a historical and visual analy-
sis of the bloodstained vest of political leader James Connolly, this  article uncovers 
how this artefact has become a relic of historical violence due to the way in which 
particular aspects of its configuration, form and trajectory have been manipu-
lated in order to elicit powerful emotional responses from the  exhibition’s viewers.
... I have done nothing but see 
in the National Museum of  Ireland 
the rusty red spot of  blood, 
rather dirty, on the shirt 
that was once worn on the hero 
who is dearest to me of  them all ... 
(MacLean 1971, 270–71)
Sorley MacLean’s poem ‘National Museum of  Ireland’, written in 1971, 
contemplates the display of  the bloodstained shirt of  political leader James 
Connolly that he wore during the 1916 Rising. The shirt has been on display 
in the National Museum of  Ireland (NMI) in several exhibitions and has 
been subject to considerable attention and research.1 Another bloodstained 
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item of  Connolly’s clothing – his vest – is part of  the NMI collection and 
was displayed publicly for the first time in 2016 as part of  their centenary 
commemorative exhibition. Connolly’s vest, which is soiled with a bloodstain 
on the back of  the left arm, marks the location of  one of  the wounds he 
received during this 20th century conflict.
As discussed by Mary M. Brooks, ‘garments that protected, shaped and 
presented the body in life can become surrogate bodies in the museum, 
evoking and memorialising the absent wearer’ (Brooks 2017, 20). The way in 
which the vest is carefully laid out in the exhibition display, creates a feeling 
that the vest has been untouched since Connolly last wore it and heightens 
its symbolic potency. This symbolism is created by the way the garment is 
folded in half  with the arms crossed at the front. Positioning the folded 
arms in this way resembles the positioning of  the arms of  a deceased body 
and congeals the transfiguration of  Connolly from a citizen, who took up 
arms with a view to achieving independence, into a martyr who gave the 
ultimate sacrifice for his country.
Brooks also contends how careful judgements when exhibiting garments 
is essential as artefacts must be comprehensible as dress in order to carry 
the meaning selected for a specific display context, whether as a work of  
art, a design statement or, in this case, as a representation of  its previous 
wearer (Brooks 2017, 22). The positioning of  the vest in the display case 
differs from other pieces of  clothing in the exhibition. Rather than putting 
the vest on a life-size mannequin at eye level like all of  the other forms of  
clothing within the exhibition, the vest has been folded and placed in a glass 
counter-top display case. This has been done for two reasons; firstly, in order 
to explicitly expose the bloodstain; and secondly, to evoke the absence of  
the deceased body it represents.
This article centres on James Connolly’s bloodstained vest – a valuable mat-
erial artefact of  the 1916 Rising, which was loaned to the NMI by his family 
in 1941. With its display in the ‘Proclaiming a Republic: The 1916 Rising’ 
exhibition, this biographic relic has become symbolic as a tangible link to 
the death of  a principal figure in Ireland’s political history. By examining 
this artefact through the institutional processes of  acquisition, preservation 
and exhibition, this article demonstrates how ordinary objects can foster 
particular historical understandings when they are authenticated and medi-
ated within the museum environment. Using grounding principles of  visual 
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culture, museology and material culture to undertake a visual analysis of  this 
artefact and its display, I direct attention to the visual processes employed 
when representing death in exhibitions and raise questions about the ways in 
which exhibition displays can perpetuate particular aspects of  violent events.
James Connolly and the 1916 Rising
The 1916 Easter Rising is regarded as ‘the most controversial event in mod-
ern Irish history’ (McGarry 2010, 8). The conflict lasted for six days during 
which militant Republicans sought to seize political power from Britain, and 
declared – though unsuccessfully in the short term – an independent state 
(Brück and Godson, 2015, 1). At the time, the public perception of  the Rising 
was hostile due to the unpredictability and chaotic nature of  the rebellion 
from the outset.2 As noted by David Fitzpatrick, the determination of  the 
leaders to stage a rebellion marked by honour and chivalry was inevitably 
sullied by cases of  brutal or cowardly conduct, callousness towards civilians, 
and looting; but the leaders emerged after the surrender with impressive 
dignity to meet their fate (Fitzpatrick 2016, 82–83).
James Connolly (1868–1916), socialist and revolutionary leader, is a signifi-
cant figure in the story of  the Rising and in the history of  modern Ireland. 
Connolly was instrumental in establishing the Citizen Army in 1913 and 
during the Rising he commanded military operations. As Commandant 
General of  the Republic’s forces, he fought in the city centre where the 
majority of  the battles took place until surrendering on 29 April. Connolly 
received several injuries during the six days of  fighting with the most severe 
shattering his left ankle. He was court-martialled and was the last one of  the 
fifteen leaders to be executed by firing squad. He was shot dead in Kilmain-
ham Gaol on 12 May 1916 and was survived by his wife and six children.
The execution of  the leaders of  the Rising without trial caused widespread 
public consternation, encouraged sympathy and swayed public opinion in 
favour of  the rebel forces. Darragh Gannon contends that the beatification 
of  the dead of  1916 persisted through the publishing of  obituary biogra-
phies of  those who had been killed as a result of  the Rising, along with 
photographs of  the widows and children left behind that evoked natural 
sympathy (Gannon 2016, 218). Jack Elliott also notes how in the aftermath 
of  the 1916 Rising, there was a proliferation of  images of  the executed lead-
ers that circulated widely in newspapers and on pieces of  mass-produced 
ephemera. These visual and material representations of  the executed leaders 
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played a particular role in shaping sympathetic and intelligible narratives 
of  the conflict and created a familiarity with the appearance of  the leaders 
(Elliott 2015, 91–95). 
In a time when the visualization of  the conflict was limited to newspapers 
and material artefacts, tangible entities became extremely significant in ‘the 
construction of  both personal and official histories’ (Brück and Godson, 
2015, 1). In April 1917, a three-day gift sale compromising of  relics of  
the Rising and souvenirs of  other Irish rebellions was held in support of  
 Republican relief  organizations. Many of  the items auctioned that day even-
tually made their way into the MMI’s Easter Week Collection, such as leader 
Éammon Ceannt’s imitation ancient Irish costume worn when playing the 
Irish warpipes before Pope Pius X in 1908. Connolly’s wife Lillie donated 
a pair of  his gloves to the auction but their whereabouts today is not known. 
Material and artefacts within the Easter Week Collection associated with 
Connolly are mainly ephemeral, consisting of  leaflets promoting his lectures, 
communicative documents used during the Rising and handwritten post-
cards and letters. Given the limited nature of  his material legacy, the NMI 
are immensely restricted in how they represent Connolly through artefacts.
National Museum of Ireland (NMI)
The NMI has a long history of  hosting exhibitions commemorating the 1916 
Rising with its first in 1932. In the years following the inaugural exhibition, 
the NMI collected materials and objects bound together only by their as-
sociation with the Rising and established what is known as the ‘Easter Week 
Collection’ – the first thematic collection in the institution. The NMI still 
stands apart as the pioneer in hosting 1916 exhibitions and its collection built 
around this pivotal event in Irish history set the stage for the preservation 
and presentation of  the material culture of  Ireland.
The ‘Proclaiming a Republic: The 1916 Rising’ exhibition that opened in 
March 2016 is the NMI’s eighth exhibition on the subject and has been 
the centrepiece of  the NMI’s centenary programme. Housed in the Riding 
School at the Department of  Decorative Arts and History, Collins Barracks 
in Dublin, this exhibition has been described as revealing ‘the physicalities 
of  life in Ireland before, during and after the events of  Easter Week in the 
form of  three hundred objects, articles and images’ (Gannon, 2016, xvi). 
Artefacts, which have visible traces of  use because of  the conflict, have been 
mobilized by curators throughout the exhibition in order to accentuate the 
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distress and physicalities of  war. Many of  these artefacts are everyday ma-
terials, which have become extraordinary because of  their association with 
this significant event in Ireland’s political history and illustrate how ordinary 
lives and actions collided during the conflict. Artefacts such as a crucifix hit 
by a stray bullet, a sign from the front of  the burnt-out General Post Office 
(GPO) and James Connolly’s bloodstained vest are examples of  ordinary 
objects whose storytelling ability is enhanced because they have visible 
evidence of  the physicalities of  violence.
Many of  the exhibited objects have never been on public display before 
while others, such as the flags that flew over the rebel garrisons around 
Dublin city, were specially conserved for this display. Through the combined 
effect of  the objects, words and imagery of  the period, visitors follow the 
stories of  those caught up in the events of  that momentous week – civilians, 
combatants and survivors alike.
The exhibition is laid out in a series of  ten zones: introduction, the procla-
mation of  the Irish Republic and early 20th-century Ireland; establishing the 
rebel garrisons and the British countermoves; surrender and the scenes of  
destruction; courts martial and execution; widows and orphans; deportation 
and imprisonment; commemorating the Rising through the last 100 years; 
Art Ó Murnaghan’s national memorial; the legacy of  1916 and a resource 
room. The narrative ordering of  the exhibition content presents episodes 
of  the conflict semi-chronologically meaning that visitors get a general 
sense of  the chronology of  events, but this arrangement also allows visitors 
to make their own narrative connections between the different zones. For 
example, in the centre of  ‘Zone 3: Establishing Rebel Garrisons and the 
British Countermoves’, there is a large glass case displaying the Irish Republic 
flag that flew from the GPO during the Rising. The flag was captured by 
British soldiers after the surrender, kept as a war trophy and entered the 
Royal Collection of  King George V of  England.3 A large-format digital 
photograph of  British soldiers with the captured flag immediately after 
the Rising features prominently on a display panel in ‘Zone 4: Surrender 
and the Scenes of  Destruction’. The displays do not refer to one another, 
encouraging viewers to connect both artefact and image autonomously.
Visual, auditory and kinaesthetic learners are catered for using object displays, 
text panels, graphics, interactive touch screens, soundscapes, audio record-
ings and short film. Speakers in the main exhibition area play a looped audio 
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soundtrack, which contains noises of  a street scene overwhelmed by explosions 
and guns. The overall mood of  the soundtrack creates a sensory environment, 
which summons feelings of  chaos and provides context for the exhibition. 
This soundscape is most prominent in ‘Zone 3: Establishing Rebel Garrisons 
and the British Countermoves’ but is phased out gradually so that ‘Zone 5: 
Courts Martial and Execution’ achieves a reverential mood for viewers to 
reflect silently and ‘empathise with the executed leaders’ (Heise and Tandem 
Design 2015). This is an intentional curatorial strategy implemented in order 
to promote intimacy and contemplation in this section of  the exhibition.
‘Zone 5: Courts Martial and Execution’
As discussed by Jane Tynan, ‘notions of  tragic heroism dominate the mem-
ory of  the Rising’ – a narrative which also emerges in the ‘Courts Martial 
and Execution’ section of  the exhibition (Tynan 2015, 32). This section 
of  the exhibition details the last moments of  the executed leaders of  the 
1916 Rising individually, by describing their last meetings with families and 
displaying artefacts, which were in their possession before they met their 
death by firing squad in the yard in Kilmainham Gaol. A generous graphic 
area introduces the executions, interprets the reaction of  the public and the 
swing in public opinion that followed. The curators and exhibition design-
ers have positioned this section in a particular way so that it is possible for 
visitors to bypass the display of  last letters and objects if  they choose. This 
positioning represents the exhibition makers’ consciousness of  the sensitive 
nature of  the death-related content on public display. The possible bypass-
ing of  this section is not made explicit on display panels or in a disclaimer, 
so that visitors can come to their own decisions on how to deal with the 
complex nature of  displaying artefacts closely associated with death and 
more specifically, execution.
The central feature of  this section is a long bespoke display case, where 
each execution is treated separately with its own grouping of  objects. The 
‘last objects’ are housed within the case, with the associated last letter and 
death certificate viewable within a drawer positioned directly underneath the 
case. Visitors can listen to dramatized readings of  each of  the last letters on 
a bank of  listening pods that helps them to ‘decipher the letters of  the often 
difficult to read handwriting and understand the emotions behind the words’ 
(Heise and Tandem Design, 2015). The objects belonging to the leaders 
include a button from Michael Hanrahan’s uniform, which he gave to his 
sisters during their last visit to him, rosary beads given by Joseph Plunkett 
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to firing squad member Sergeant W. Hand before his execution and a silver 
cigarette case inscribed by John MacBride during Easter Week. The object 
that materially represents Connolly in this section is his bloodstained vest. 
As Albano has outlined, by displaying such artefacts as biographical mat-
erial evidence, not only is something about the objects themselves revealed, 
but information about those who acted on them is also uncovered (Albano 
2007, 17). The aim of  this display strategy is to produce a human connection 
between the exhibited artefacts and the viewer.
James Scott asserts how the perception of  objects can be influenced heav-
ily by what surrounds them in displays (Scott 2015, 500). The difference 
between Connolly’s vest and the other objects on display within the ‘Courts 
Martial and Execution’ section of  the exhibition is that the majority of  
artefacts representing the other leaders were gifted to visitors before they 
met their death, indicating a conscious effort to leave a material legacy of  
their last moments. This gifting of  artefacts by the leaders before their ex-
ecutions is an example of  what Guy Beiner refers to as ‘prememory’ – ‘the 
anticipations and expectations of  those who are committed to predetermine 
how history will be remembered’ (Beiner 2016, 34). Unlike the other leaders 
who bequeathed material artefacts to trusted individuals during their final 
visits from family and final moments with others in Kilmainham Gaol, Con-
nolly did not intentionally leave a ‘prememory’ personal possession.4 The 
bloodstained vest was among Connolly’s possessions, which were returned 
to his family after his death along with his watch and wallet.5 Perhaps if  
Connolly had bequeathed his watch or wallet during the final visit with 
his wife and daughter, curators of  the exhibition may have selected those 
objects to represent his last moments instead of  a piece of  clothing that he 
possibly last wore two weeks prior to his execution. The watch and wallet 
were not donated to the museum by the Connolly family, but were instead 
kept as private relics of  his last possessions. In fact, the vest and undershirt 
are the only material artefacts in the NMI collection that were donated by 
Connolly’s family and which can be tangibly associated with his execution.6
That said Connolly’s execution was different to that of  the other leaders due 
to the severity of  the injuries he had sustained during Easter Week. Upon 
arrival at Kilmainham Gaol, Connolly was removed from the ambulance 
in a stretcher and unlike the other leaders who were positioned on wooden 
boxes pending the gunshots from the firing squad, Connolly was strapped to 
a chair where he sat in an extended position with his head falling backwards.7
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It is unlikely that Connolly wore this vest during his execution as it was stated 
by witnesses that he was wearing only his pyjamas prior to execution and had 
lost a lot of  blood after the shots were fired, meaning that the bloodstains 
on the vest do not correspond with the details of  his death.8 However, the 
display of  the vest in relation to the other last objects on display and the 
selective information in the accompanying display label suggest that the cu-
rators may, in fact, intend visitors to assume it was worn by Connolly during 
his execution. While many of  the other artefacts describe how they were 
distinctly used or gifted during the leaders’ final moments with their loved 
ones, the information accompanying Connolly’s vest makes no reference to 
the visit but instead focuses on the injuries he received during Easter Week 
and how the vest was deposited in the National Museum.
Display texts in museums can provide a basic starting point for directing 
viewers towards the politics of  exhibition – the unseen features of  artefacts 
such as their creation, acquisition and historical background. Considering 
that many of  the other leaders’ biographies detail their final moments prior 
to execution and display material evidence of  those moments, the avoidance 
of  this description in Connolly’s case may represent a conscious curatorial 
strategy, which is implemented in order to heighten the emotional strength 
of  the vest. Examining such aspects of  display outlines the importance of  
considering the invisibility of  the construction of  exhibition displays and 
exposes the extent to which museums control visitors’ engagement with the 
past. Focusing on the institutional acquisition of  the vest after Connolly’s 
death can be seen as a selective manipulation of  certain attributes of  the 
artefact in order to correspond with other artefacts on display and to validate 
the NMI’s role in displaying this contested personal possession, despite the 
original owner’s unwillingness to engage in material acts of  ‘prememory’.
Historical configuration of the vest
On Thursday, 27 April 1916, surrounded by burning buildings and a hail 
of  gunfire and artillery shelling, James Connolly led 30 volunteers out into 
a street to erect a barricade at the rear of  the GPO, which was the insurgent’s 
headquarters for the duration of  the Rising. A few minutes later, Connolly 
returned to the building and asked the medical orderly, Jim Ryan, if  he could 
speak to him somewhere in private. Behind a screen, Connolly took off  
his coat and revealed a flesh wound in his arm where he had just been shot. 
After having the wound dressed, he told Ryan: ‘Not a word about this to 
anyone’ and returned outside to the fighting (Nevin 2005, 654).
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This sequence of  events uncovers three aspects that affect the display of  the 
vest in the museum environment. Firstly, the witness accounts of  Connolly’s 
injury correspond with the configuration of  the bloodstain, authenticating 
the description presented by the NMI in the exhibition display. Secondly, it 
reveals reluctance on the part of  Connolly for his injuries to become common 
knowledge and demonstrates how the eventual trajectory of  personal arte-
facts often goes beyond the control of  their owners.9 Finally, they reveal how 
an everyday artefact can be transformed into a tangible link and a symbolic 
representation of  a first-hand experience of  a violent conflict in Irish history.
After his execution, Connolly’s daughter Nora recalled going to Dublin 
Castle to retrieve some of  his personal items:
We went to the Castle after that, to claim his watch, his wallet, 
or anything they might have belonging to Daddy. We thought 
there might be a chance of  getting his uniform; but we did not. 
We only got his underclothes; and they were marked with his 
blood, where he had been hit by a sniper. I have given them 
to the Museum also.10
Nora’s wish to retrieve her father’s uniform accentuates the emotional weight 
that is attached to personal items of  clothing, particularly in the absence of  
their wearer. Nora loaned the bloodstained vest and undershirt to the Easter 
Week Collection in 1941, where they remain in the care of  the NMI. The 
transfer of  these items from a private collection to a national collection in 
a public institution shows an awareness, on the part of  the Connolly family, 
of  the significance and potential value of  such soiled artefacts.
As outlined by Annie E. Coombes, the way an object is used, how it is moved 
around and its very survival is an indication of  value and meaning (Coombes 
1988, 89). The display label states that ‘The vest, along with the shirt he 
wore over it, was returned to his family after execution and his daughter 
Nora, kept it until she deposited in the National Museum.’ This selective 
information gives viewers an insight into the actions surrounding the col-
lection and acquisition of  this artefact; and offers an understanding of  the 
range of  actions that take place in order for an object to become part of  
a museum collection and subsequent display. There is limited information 
available in the NMI archives on the vest and undershirt aside from the dates 
of  donation and a request some years later from Connolly’s other daughter 
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Ina to view the items.11 The preservation of  the vest by the wearer’s family 
and the NMI memorializes and authenticates Connolly’s presence in the 
violent battles of  the 1916 Rising.
Form and style of the vest
Eastop and Brooks have outlined the importance of  leaving stained textiles 
untouched as the stains often ‘contain’ considerable historical and cultural 
evidence (Eastop and Brooks 1996, 688). It is a specific event in Irish 
history – the 1916 Rising: Connolly being shot for the first time – which 
caused its eventual configuration and the reason why this artefact was col-
lected as a historic relic, loaned to the museum, conserved and now on 
display to the public. Like many other soiled historical artefacts, the form 
and style of  this artefact is configured by an unintentional event – that 
is, the vest only looks the way it does by accident (residue of  blood from 
a flesh wound after a stray bullet hit Connolly). Furthermore, the vest was 
not intended by its user to be made visible as presumably it would have 
been worn underneath his uniform and as already mentioned, the wearer 
hoped to keep his injury secret. Instead, it was the subsequent custodians 
of  the vest – Connolly’s family – who deliberately collected and donated his 
bloodstained underclothes as evidence of  the experience and conditions of  
the 1916 Rising. As the vest has remained in the care of  the NMI since it 
was loaned in 1941, it is their institutional practices of  collection, conserva-
tion and curation that now control the cultural visibility of  the vest after 
Connolly’s death.
As discussed by Jane Tynan, the peculiar dynamics of  the Rising demanded 
an equivocal attitude to uniform (Tynan 2015, 31). The rebel leaders for 
example, wore uniforms that were dark green in colour and distinct from 
the other Volunteer uniforms. However not all of  the insurgents were noted 
for their elegant appearance. Due to financial hardship, lack of  military ex-
perience and the chaotic unfolding of  events, the majority of  participants 
in the fighting had a casual and unmilitary appearance (Tynan 2015, 29).
Connolly was described as wearing ‘a green Volunteer uniform with rings on 
his arm, and a wide-awake hat’ (Nevin 2005, 665). His daughter Ina elicited 
the delight she felt the first time seeing her father in his green Volunteer 
uniform: ‘How splendid he looked! How pleased I was to see him in the 
uniform of  Ireland’s green! Wouldn’t mother be proud of  him if  she could 
get one glace of  him?’12
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Connolly’s ‘splendid’ appearance was not maintained in the aftermath of  
the conflict as he was brought to Kilmainham Gaol to meet his death wear-
ing ‘his pyjamas only’.13 His material legacy in the ‘Proclaiming a Republic’ 
exhibition is reflective of  the unheroic image chosen to represent the Rising, 
which as Tynan has asserted ‘features what appears to be a working class 
man wearing civilian clothes’ (Tynan 2015, 33).14 This vest has agency as 
material culture as it communicates either the physical body or presence of  
its owner and signifies his personal identity through its traces of  use, general 
wear and tear and personal style. The proximity to the body it represents is 
intensified by the presence of  a visible bodily residue, which is exposed by 
the particular positioning of  the vest in the display case.
Conclusion
The actions surrounding the display of  images and objects in museums – 
collection, conservation, research and exhibition – are bound up with how 
James Connolly’s 
vest marked with 
a bloodstain from 
one of the wounds 
he received during 
the 1916 Rising. 
This image is 
reproduced with 
the kind permission 
of the National 
Museum of Ireland 
(HE:EWL.292.2).
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the past is presented and remembered. These conditions and decisions of  
exhibition display are largely invisible to viewers who are confronted with 
the apparent completeness of  an exhibition display.
Conducting a historical and visual analysis of  this bloodstained vest has 
uncovered how particular aspects of  this artefact have been manipulated in 
order to be appropriate alongside other artefacts within the exhibition. Other 
than representing his clothing and reinforcing the casual heroism of  the 
Rising, Connolly’s vest was not crucial to the theme of  the ‘Courts Martial 
and Execution’ section of  the exhibition. Instead its significance lies in the 
particular positioning of  the artefact in the display case in order to make 
the bloodstain fully visible. This mode of  display intentionally gives the vest 
a heightened sense of  tangible connection to the violence of  the Rising in an 
attempt to elicit powerful emotional responses from the exhibition’s viewers.
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ABSTRACT
The article analyses various literary representations of one of the common fea-
tures of 20th-century dictatorships and totalitarian political regimes: the ‘en-
forced disappearance’. The study focuses on several Central European novels 
and short stories (German, Czech, Slovak and Polish) published after 1989. The 
methodological framework adopted here is that of cultural memory and trauma 
studies that have lately received systematic scholarly interest in Central Europe 
(Kratochvil 2015; Lysak 2015). The study draws on the works of Paul Ricoeur 
(French), Michel de Certeau (French), Jacques Derrida (French), Berber Bever-
nage (Belgian), Alexander Etkind (Russian) and Stef Craps (Belgian), especially 
on the way they define and interpret trauma and the ‘work of mourning’. The 
mechanisms of the ‘work of mourning’ function also on a collective level and are 
one of the ways of dealing with a traumatic past.
Literature has played an important role in the debates on the legacy of  com-
munist dictatorships in post-communist Central Europe since 1989, and 
historical topics have flourished in Central European literatures. We propose 
to interpret them as specific ways of  coming to terms with the legacy of  
the traumatic past of  the 20th century in Central Europe, especially the 
long-term collective trauma caused by Nazi and communist dictatorships.
We want to address the concept of  ‘lieux de mémoire’ [places of  memory], its 
limits and dangers as it is discussed (among others) by the philosopher Paul 
Ricoeur (1913–2005) in his major contribution to this theoretical debate La 
mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli [Memory, History, Forgetting] (Ricoeur 2000; English 
62      REMEMBRANCE AND SOLIDARITY
THE TRAUMA OF ‘ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE’ . . .
trans. 2004). Furthermore, we will pay attention to the recurring patterns 
that keep appearing in contemporary Central European literatures. Indeed, 
in our previous research, we discovered recurrent patterns and structures 
that allow us to read many of  these texts as commemorative rituals and 
the ‘work of  mourning’ (we draw on the Freudian terminology here) for 
traumatic elements of  the 20th century in Central Europe. The work of  
Paul Ricoeur inspires us to transpose the Freudian model of  trauma and 
mourning (used in the psychoanalysis of  an individual) onto the processes 
put in motion in national and other communities. As our topic focuses on 
the connection between literary representations of  history and psycho-
analysis, we should mention the crucial research of  the French thinker 
Michel de Certeau (1925–86). He was directly addressing the link between 
literature, historiography and psychoanalysis in several of  his studies, es-
pecially L’Écriture de l’Histoire [The Writing of  History] (1975) and Histoire 
et psychanalyse [History and Psychoananlysis] (1987). We will also call on the 
works of  the philosopher Jacques Derrida (1930–2004) and his concept 
of  the ‘spectral’, ‘haunting’ past and the works of  scholars that Derrida’s 
work inspired in their reflections on historical trauma and literature: those 
of  Berber Bevernage, Stef  Craps and Alexander Etkind.
We will focus on concrete examples of  such texts, dealing with the traumatic 
aspects of  20th-century Central Europe, especially with the topic of  en-
forced disappearance. More specifically on novels dealing with the memory 
of  the German presence in Central Europe and post-Second World War 
expulsions. This topic keeps coming back as an almost obsessive theme in 
German, Polish and especially Czech post-1989 literature. A link to psycho-
logical trauma seems evident with this reoccurring theme.
The authors we will pay special attention to in our interpretations will 
be W. G. Sebald, Paweł Huelle, Pavel Vilikovský, Jiří Kratochvil, Kateřina 
Tučková, Radka Denemarková and Jakuba Katalpa. All these authors and 
their works have received constant attention from literary theoreticians 
and the public. They have been awarded important literary prizes and have 
been taking part in the public debate on historical and social issues in their 
respective countries. Some of  the books have been adapted for theatre or 
cinema. Each novel offers a critical evaluation of  an individual’s encoun-
ter with dictatorship, of  the massive expulsions of  populations after the 
Second World War (especially that of  the Germans from Central Europe) 
or of  the Holocaust, topical issues and challenging topics linked to the 
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collective memory of  today’s European society1 and even more so in post-
com munist countries.
Enforced disappearance
‘Enforced disappearance’ has become an official term in international law. 
The United Nations (UN) established a committee on enforced disappear-
ances that issued an official text entitled ‘International Convention for the 
Protection of  all Persons from Enforced Disappearance’, which was adopted 
by the UN General Assembly in December 2006 and enforced from Dec-
ember 2010.2 Enforced disappearance is considered a crime and, in certain 
circumstances, defined in international law as a crime against humanity. The 
convention stipulates, among other things, ‘the right of  any victim to know 
the truth about the circumstances of  an enforced disappearance and the 
fate of  the disappeared person, and the right to freedom to seek, receive 
and impart information to this end’.3 It is this need and right to ‘know the 
truth’ and ‘seek, receive and impart information’ about the disappeared 
that is at the core of  the literary works considered in the present article. As 
Berber Bevernage explains, the notion of  the right to seek the truth was 
pioneered in the Inter-American Court of  Human Rights with cases on 
enforced disappearance. Furthermore, it was included in two reports by 
UN special rapporteurs Louis Joinet and Diane Orentlicher.4 The right to 
know, Joinet explains:
is not simply the right of  any individual victim or closely related 
persons to know what happened, a right to the truth. The 
right to know is also a collective right, drawing upon history 
to prevent violations from recurring in the future. Its corollary 
is a ‘duty to remember’, which the State must assume, in order 
to guard against the perversions of  history that go under the 
names of  revisionism or negationism; the knowledge of  the 
oppression it has lived through is part of  a people’s national 
heritage and as such must be preserved (Bevernage 2018).5
The enforced disappearance causes trauma to the survivors; trauma that 
is both personal and collective. As stated by editors of  a recent collective 
monograph on trauma studies, the theory and concept of  trauma is still 
evolving (Bond, Craps, Vermeulen, 2017). Indeed, trauma officially gained 
the status of  a disease in the Western world in 1980, when it was rape, military 
combat, earthquake, aeroplane crash or torture. Later, various long-term 
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stress factors were added, such as witnessing or learning of  one’s family or 
friends being exposed to serious danger (Bond, Craps and Vermeulen, 2017).
There are several aspects that justify the interpretation of  the literary texts 
within the methodological framework of  trauma studies. The plots of  the 
texts are constructed around an absence that implicitly points to a traumatic 
disappearance. The disappearance further infers a missing, disappeared body 
(with clear hints of  its previous maltreatment or torture). The disappear-
ance might concern an individual or a whole group. The topic of  enforced 
disappearance can even serve as metonymy of  a dictatorship or a totalitar-
ian regime. The disappeared groups represented in the texts of  our corpus 
might be Jews (systematically exterminated during the Second World War 
as one of  the consequences of  totalitarian fascist ideology), the bourgeois 
middle classes (as an integral part of  the Soviet application of  the Marxist 
theory of  the class struggle in the Soviet Union and in countries of  the 
Eastern Bloc), or the Germans expelled from Central and Eastern Europe 
after the Second World War. All these motifs and topics can be found in 
the studied texts. Thanks to the crucial work of  Paul Ricoeur L’Histoire, la 
mémoire, l’oubli (Ricoeur 2000), we can apply the Freudian model of  trauma 
and mourning on the mourning mechanisms of  groups and communities. 
Indeed, the texts are constructed as mourning rituals, revealing the mourning 
processes described by Freud and Ricoeur. Furthermore, the contributions 
of  Berber Bevernage (Bevernage 2012), Alexander Etkind (Etkind 2013) and 
Stef  Craps (Craps 2013) help us to see the specificities of  trauma as they are 
expressed in the literary texts of  contemporary Central European authors.
Literary texts as ‘places of memory’?
We would like to reflect on the problematic aspects, dangers and limits of  
the concept of  ‘places of  memory’ (lieux de mémoire) introduced in the 1980s 
by the French historian Pierre Nora. The concept is indeed closely related to 
our topic. Nora directed a large research project published in three volumes 
between 1984 and 1992 under the same title, Lieux de mémoire [Places of  
Memory]. His ambition was nothing less than describing the basic elements 
that, in his opinion, constitute French national identity.
The present paper is inspired, among others, by the methodology and theoreti-
cal concepts of  Paul Ricoeur as he developed it in his book La mémoire, l’histoire, 
l’oubli [Memory, History, Forgetting] (Ricoeur 2000; English translation 2004)]. 
Our starting point is Ricoeur’s commentary on the work of  Pierre Nora and 
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on the concept of  ‘places of  memory’. Ricoeur pinpoints the major dangers 
and limits of  Nora’s concept and shows that Nora himself  changes his way 
of  perceiving the ‘places of  memory’ and that, during the preparation of  the 
successive volumes, Nora already realizes the potential abuse of  his concept:
Nora himself  complains of  a similar assimilation of  the theme 
of  the ‘places of  memory’ by ‘commemorative bulimia (that) 
has all but consumed all efforts to control it’ (Ricoeur 2004, 
Kindle loc. 609).6
 
The destiny of  these Lieux de mémoire has been a strange one. The 
work was intended, by virtue of  its conception, method, and 
even title, to be a counter-commemorative type of  history, but 
commemoration has overtaken it ... What was forged as a tool 
for maintaining critical distance became the instrument of  com-
memoration par excellence (Ricoeur 2004, Kindle loc. 1404).7
The concept of  ‘places of  memory’ has been very successful and has been 
widely used in Central and Eastern European Studies after 1989. It has been 
applied also in studies dedicated to contemporary literature of  this region 
(see for example Smorag-Goldberg and Tomaszewski 2013). Nevertheless, 
one needs to keep in mind that the concept of  ‘places of  memory’ can be 
used as a tool for commemorative needs for various interest groups that 
do not aim at historical objectivity. The notion of  the problematic aspects 
of  memory was also one of  the major motivations for Ricoeur’s work as 
he himself  admits in the introduction:
Public preoccupation: I continue to be troubled by the unset-
tling spectacle offered by an excess of  memory here, and an 
excess of  forgetting elsewhere, to say nothing of  the influence 
of  commemorations and abuses of  memory – and of  forget-
ting. The idea of  a policy of  the just allotment of  memory is 
in this respect one of  the avowed civic themes (Ricoeur 2009, 
Kindle loc. 51).
In countries that have been undergoing essential geopolitical changes, as is 
the case for Central European post-communist countries, the question of  
public memory and commemorations is an important one. Indeed, the com-
memorative strategies are an integral part of  the identity-creating process. 
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The fragile national identity of  the new geopolitical units is also  projected 
on the way society deals with its memory. As Ricoeur notes, the fragility 
of  identity opens possibilities for the manipulation of  memory (Ricoeur 
2000, 579). This is the reason why this study focuses more on the aspects 
of  trauma expressed in literary texts than on the way they deal with memory 
and commemoration.
Trauma, the work of mourning and the haunting past
In our analysis, we use the parallel that Paul Ricoeur draws between the 
work of  mourning (‘le travail de deuil’) as it is described by Freud and used 
in psychoanalysis and the work of  memory (‘le travail de souvenir’) and of  
forgetting in the collective memory of  communities and societies, especially 
in connection to traumatic collective memory:
It is the bipolar constitution of  personal and community iden-
tity that, ultimately justifies extending the Freudian analysis 
of  mourning to the traumatism of  collective identity. We can 
speak not only in an analogical sense but in terms of  a  direct 
analysis of  collective traumatisms, of  wounds to  collective 
memory. The notion of  the lost object finds a direct  application 
in the ‘losses’ that affect the power, territory, and populations 
that constitute the substance of  a state. Mourning behaviours, 
from the expression of  affliction to complete reconciliation 
with the lost object, are directly illustrated by the great funeral 
celebrations around which an entire people is assembled. In 
this way, we can say that such mourning behaviours constitute 
a privileged example of  the intersecting relations between pri-
vate and public expression. It is in this way that our concept 
of  a sick historical memory finds justification a posteriori in 
this bipolar structure of  mourning behaviours (Ricoeur 2009, 
Kindle loc. 1214).8
The traumatic collective memory and traumatic ‘losses’ mentioned by 
Ricoeur correspond to losses put forward in numerous novels by Central 
European authors after 1989. The burden of  history, its taboos and deforma-
tions constitute central preoccupations of  the literary texts that we analyse. 
However, the Freudian ‘complete reconciliation with the lost object’ that 
Ricoeur refers to does not seem to happen in these texts, which maintain 
the haunting presence of  the lost object.9 Indeed, the recent contributions 
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to the classical works of  trauma studies (we mean works by Cathy Caruth, 
Marianne Hirsch or Dominick LaCapra) address the limits of  the Freudian 
model (we mean Western, modernist concept of  mourning) according to 
which a successful work of  mourning is when the mourning person totally 
reconciles themselves with their loss. Historian Berber Bevernage (Bevernage 
2012) and literary theoretician Stef  Craps (Craps 2013) both draw on Jacques 
Derrida and his Specters of  Marx (1993, English translation 1994) while ad-
dressing the limits of  the Freudian model of  mourning.10 Indeed, Derrida 
proposes against Freud’s model of  a concept of  ‘demi-deuil’ (semi-mourning).11 
Both Craps and Bevernage bring evidence from Western and non-Western 
examples of  mourning (be it personal or that of  a community) that do not 
correspond in their practice to the Freudian ideal model of  the final and utter 
‘dismissal’ of  the lost/grieved object. Instead, the traumatized individuals 
and communities maintain a certain way of  contact and spectral presence of  
the grieved object, person or past. It goes with the observations of  Derrida 
in Specters of  Marx who claims that the possibility of  a just future (when we 
talk about traumatic pasts of  communities or nations) depends on our readi-
ness ‘to learn to live with ghosts’ and ‘thinking the possibility of  the spectre’. 
Berber Bevernage, inspired by Derrida, uses the term ‘haunting past’ in order 
to describe the reality of  people and communities dealing with historical 
trauma. Instead of  being able to draw a thick line over a traumatic past, the 
communities are faced with the necessity of  coming to terms with a ‘haunt-
ing past’, which maintains its presence in the everyday lives of  its members.12 
Bevernage’s book pleas for a different approach to history. Inspired by 
Michel de Certeau and his L’Écriture de l’Histoire [Writing history] and in ac-
cord with current tendencies in historiography, Bevernage questions certain 
concepts of  modern historiography. Many theoreticians have dealt with the 
link between artistic creation, historiography and the work of  mourning:
a close relationship exists between the writing of  history 
and the work of  mourning. Dominick LaCapra, for ex-
ample, analyzes post-holocaust historiography by using the 
psycho analytical concepts of  ‘working through’ and ‘acting 
out’, and he has proposed that the German Historikerstreit 
should be interpreted as a form of  collective mourning. 
Jörn Rüsen argues that in relation to the traumatic character 
of  the experiences of  the last century, the writing of  his-
tory can be conceived as a ‘procedure of  mourning’. [...] 
I agree with LaCapra, Rüsen, and Domanska that a close 
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relationship exists between mourning and histor iography, 
and I think that these authors are right when they  argue that 
a lot can be learned about the writing of  history by analyzing 
it from the perspective of  the practice of  mourning or the 
discourse on death (Bevernage 2012, 147, Kindle loc. 3595).
It is in this sense that we adhere to Bevernage’s comment:
one can analytically distinguish between at least two profoundly 
different concepts of  mourning and death that relate to differ-
ent notions of  historicity: namely, a modern (mostly Western) 
concept of  mourning and a non-modern (but not necessarily 
non-Western) concept of  mourning. The most important 
difference between the relatively young modernist theory of  
mourning and the much older and much more widespread 
non-modern concept of  mourning, I will argue, can be found 
in different ways in which they relate the notions of  ‘loss’ and 
‘absence’ (Bevernage 2012, 148, Kindle loc. 3614).
This seems to be the recurrent pattern of  the representation of  history in 
the chosen corpus. The texts are full of  ghosts and spectres of  the past. The 
characters are incapable of  drawing a thick line over the past that maintains 
a haunting presence and interferes with the lives of  the characters.
The expulsion of Germans: whose trauma is that?
In the case of  ‘German memory’, we suggest drawing again on the parallel 
made by Paul Ricoeur between the process of  personal and collective ‘work 
of  mourning’. The events linked directly or indirectly to the expulsion of  
Germans from Central Europe after 1945 and the loss of  German cultural 
heritage can be viewed from this perspective: the loss that must be worked 
through during the process of  mourning. The obsessive reoccurrence of  
the topic of  German memory in post-1989 Polish (see Huelle, Chwin, 
Tokarczuk), German (see Reinhard Jirgl or Uwe Johnson) and especially 
Czech literature (Jiří Kratochvil, Jáchym Topol, Kateřina Tučková, Radka 
Denemarková and Jakuba Katalpa) seems to prove the importance and extent 
of  this collective trauma. It is important to note that contemporary Central 
European writers focus almost exclusively on the topic of  expulsions and not 
on numerous other aspects of  the long history of  the Germans’ presence in 
the culture, politics and economics of  Central Europe. Interestingly enough, 
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this omission is mirrored in the works of  Czech historians. Those who focus 
their research on Czech-German relationships, work mostly on the post-
Second World War period and the topics related to the expulsions. It is, of  
course, connected to the fact that Central and Eastern European historio-
graphy has undergone important changes since 1989 primarily thanks to the 
opening of  numerous important archives that were inaccessible before 1989. 
It is nevertheless interesting to note that the highly relevant and significant 
period of  Czech-German tension and armed clashes between 1918 and 1923 
when many German-speaking inhabitants of  the Sudeten region contested 
(sometimes armed) their inclusion in post-First World War Czechoslovakia.
It is surprising to discover that the Germans represented in Czech contem-
porary novels are mostly depicted as positive characters or as (innocent) 
victims described in a way that inspires compassion. This approach, whereby 
the honouring of  a certain memory causes the amnesia of  other memories, 
leads inevitably to certain distortions. As Václav Maidl states in his study, 
if  we look at the literary representations of  German-speaking characters 
and the German environment over the last 200 years, their image in Czech 
literature is mostly negative (Maidl 1998). For Kateřina Tučková especially, 
her novel The Expulsion of  Gerta Schnirch has a performative function. It is 
her ‘duty of  memory’ and ‘duty of  commemoration’ that she claims to 
honour in the prologue because she has the impression that the political 
representatives do not do fulfill these duties sufficiently well. We can thus 
legitimately ask the question whether both historians and the writers do 
not take part in a process of  consciously creating a new Czech post-1989 
‘European’ identity, forming what Berber Bevernage designates as ‘reconcili-
ation historiography’ or ‘shared history’:
Bridging can happen negatively through levelling attempts to 
expose myths of  conflicting parties or it can happen through 
the construction of  so-called positive histories which stress 
common traditions, shared values and cultural exchanges in 
the past. Bridging reconciliation historiographies are also often 
referred to as shared histories. Yet, the term ‘shared history’ 
is often used more broadly among scholars and practitioners 
focusing on reconciliation and can refer to at least three po-
tential aspects of  reconciliation historiographies: it can refer 
to shared methodological procedures or shared authorship, 
to a focus on shared events, values or actions in the past, or 
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to the construction of  a single ‘common’ narrative which 
claims evenhandedly to represent the different perspectives 
of  conflicting parties (Bevernage 2018).
These questions, however, need more space and thought than is possible 
within the scope of  this study. But we can certainly argue that texts of  con-
temporary Central European writers reveal much more of  the circumstances 
of  the time of  the writing of  the novels than about the actual historical 
subjects they try to present and assess.
If  we apply Ricoeur’s adaptation of  Freud’s psychoanalysis to the collec-
tive wounded memory, Ricoeur justifies this methodological transfer (as 
we have already stated) by the fact that Freud himself  alluded to ‘situations 
that go far beyond the psychoanalytic scene, in terms of  both the work of  
remembering and the work of  mourning’ (Ricoeur 2004, Kindle loc. 1203). 
Furthermore, ‘all of  the situations referred to in the psychoanalytical treat-
ment have to do with the other, not only the other of  the “familial novel”, 
but by the psychosocial other and the other, as it were, of  the historical 
situation’ (Ricoeur 2004, Kindle loc. 1203).
The link between personal work of  mourning and collective sick memory is 
alluded to in the very title of  one of  the analysed novels – Jakuba  Katalpa’s 
novel The Germans: Geography of  Loss (2012). The process of  personal mourn-
ing for the loss of  a mother of  one of  the central characters (Klara, the 
mother, left for Germany after the Second World War and left her baby 
behind in Czechoslovakia) stands here for the collective mourning for the 
expulsed German minority (or maybe more for the act of  expulsion?). 
 Katalpa’s novel can thus be seen as a literary transposition of  a commemo-
rative mourning ritual. Klara, the main character, of  Katalpa’s novel, comes 
closest to the idea of  a ‘pure’ German among all the Czech contemporary 
novels that deal with the topic of  expulsions. She is born in Germany to 
a wealthy family and hardly questions Germany’s political orientation under 
Hitler. She is a teacher and refuses to intervene for one of  her Jewish students 
when she asks for help. After a series of  personal tragedies (the death of  
her fiancé among others), she decides to accept a placement as a teacher in 
the Sudeten region. She works with German-speaking children but is seen 
as a stranger by the local Sudeten Germans. She becomes pregnant and is 
welcomed at the end of  the war by the family of  one of  her Czech friends 
in Prague. She gives birth to a boy and finally decides, under circumstances 
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that are never totally explained in the novel, to leave the baby behind when 
she has to depart form Czechoslovakia as a German. The boy, Kurt, is then 
adopted by the family that welcomed Klara and the fact of  his adoption is 
revealed to him by his foster mother when he becomes an adult and father 
of  three children himself. The boy is the father of  the narrator of  the novel. 
After her father’s death, she decides to find out the truth about her real 
grandmother and she meets Klara’s two daughters in Germany. She even 
meets Klara, an old woman in an old people’s home. Klara has Alzheimer’s 
disease and cannot help the narrator with her quest for the ‘truth’.
Jiří Kratochvil draws a link between personal psychological trauma and 
a collective one in most of  his novels. The metaphor of  schizophrenia that 
structures his first novel Medvědí román (Bear’s Novel, 1985, 1990) covers both 
a mental breakdown of  one of  the central characters and a schizophrenic 
psychological split of  people living under communist dictatorship. His novel 
Slib (The Pledge, 2009), which features as one of  its themes the expulsion of  
Germans from Brno, has a subtitle: The Requiem for the 1950s. The topic of  
expulsions in Kratochvil’s novels is always closely connected to the ques-
tioning of  the legacy of  communism.
One of  the dangers of  obsessive insistence on the topic of  expulsions as the 
central moment of  German memory in Central Europe is the distortion of  
history by the feeling of  the ‘duty to remember’ or ‘duty of  commemoration 
(memory)’ as we have already stated. Ricoeur talks about the ‘devoir de mémoire’ 
(duty of  memory) and going back to Nora’s ‘lieux de mémoire’, he evokes the 
potential ‘abuse of  commemoration’ (Ricoeur 2000, 528).
We therefore argue that the representation of  the expulsion of  Germans 
always closely reflects the communist dictatorship in Central Europe.13 In-
deed, in all analysed texts, the authors choose to present history from (or 
even before) the Second World War until very recent times (often up until 
now). In relation to the expulsion of  Germans and dealing with Germans, 
1945 is often interpreted like a first step in the establishment of  communist 
rule in Central Europe (this is most strongly present in Kratochvil’s writ-
ings). The trauma of  the communist past is being projected onto the topic 
of  the expulsions of  Germans. Paradoxically, the texts focus more on the 
Czech collective historical trauma than on the suffering of  the Germans. 
The vision of  history thus seems to fall into a narrow frame of  a national 
trauma that it finds difficult to overcome. We conclude this part by stating 
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that even in the case of  literary representations of  German memory and 
especially of  the expulsions, the process of  mourning at work in the novels 
is not so much about the loss of  the German community but about the 
long-term legacy of  communism in Central Europe.
The trauma of the enforced disappearance and the figure of absence
Common to the analysed works is the use of  a subjective and individual 
perspective to represent the enforced disappearance. In Central Europe, 
under both Nazi and communist regimes people were made to ‘disappear’, 
often leaving their families without news as to their fate. The enforced dis-
appearance is often represented by an absence. There is an absent body, an 
absent person, whose loss is being mourned. Austerlitz’s trauma in Sebald’s 
novel (Sebald 2001) of  the same name stems from the disappearance and the 
absence of  his parents and from the lack of  any precise information concern-
ing their death. Austerlitz is a Jewish child born in Prague and sent to safety 
by his parents thanks to one of  the trains heading from Prague to England 
during the Second World War. In the course of  his investigation in the 1990s, 
he finds out that his Czech-Jewish mother was sent to the Theresienstadt 
concentration camp and very probably died in a killing facility in Poland. 
This was most likely the fate of  his father too, who went to France and was 
sent from Paris to one of  the concentration camps in the south of  France 
where he disappears without trace. Nevertheless, Austerlitz learns nothing 
certain about their fate nor can he find the place of  their burial. The whole 
book thus seems to be constructed around this traumatic loss and absence. 
In Huelle’s novella Mercedes Benz (2001), the two dictatorships (fascist and 
communist) and their treatment of  people are juxtaposed, making the 
parallels between the use of  enforced disappearance by both dictatorships 
deliberate and evident. The whole family of  the central character, the Jewish 
photographer Chaskiel Bronstein, meets a ‘terrible end’, ‘in a mass death-pit 
near Buczyna’ (Huelle 2001, 101). The Jewish brothers Baczewski, whose 
‘vodka and liqueur factory’ is ‘bombed by the Luftwaffe’ (Huelle 2001, 95), 
die from ‘no less cruel death’, ‘in the Donbas mineshafts’ (Huelle 2001, 
101) in 1940 after having been deported by the Soviets. Their deaths are 
thus emblematic of  the end of  Jewish civilization in Eastern Europe during 
the Second World War and the way Jews have been targeted both by the 
Nazi and Soviet dictatorships (topics difficult to address in Polish fiction or 
historiography before 1989). As we will see, it is their disappearance that is 
interpreted as a major force behind the creation of  Mercedes Benz.14
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In Pavel Vilikovský’s novel The Autobiography of  Evil (2009) the major char-
acter of  the first part of  the text, Jan Karsten, after being kidnapped by the 
Czechoslovak secret police during his tentative escape to Austria, decides 
to commit suicide when he realizes that he has adopted the same behaviour 
as his tormentors. He kidnaps a girl whom he believes to be the daughter 
of  one of  the agents (which she is not) and holds her prisoner. Finally, he 
decides to let her go. Nevertheless, his decision to stick to his humanity 
leads to his suicide as he does not see any other outcome of  the situation he 
finds himself  in. His body is disposed of  and his family is never informed 
about his final fate. The disappearance and absence of  his father shapes 
the life of  his son, the central character in the second part of  the novel. At 
the end of  Vilikovský’s novel, Igor talks about the book he plans to write. 
Writing about the mysterious disappearance of  an unknown woman dating 
back to the 1970s might be seen as compensating for the impossibility of  
discovering the truth about the disappearance of  his own father. It is at the 
same time an act of  mourning over the absent body and the missing story 
of  his disappeared father.
In Kratochvil’s novel The Pledge (2009), the beloved sister of  architect 
Modráček dies after being interrogated by the Czechoslovak secret police 
in the early 1950s. Having not been allowed to see the body of  his dead 
sister, he does not believe that she committed suicide as the police claim. 
He vows to avenge his sister’s death and to punish the policeman, Láska, 
whom he believes to be responsible for his sister’s death. Modráček cap-
tures Láska and holds him prisoner in his underground prison alongside 
more and more people who could endanger his secret and destroy his plan 
for vengeance. At the end of  the book, Láska’s daughter appears and talks 
about the mysterious and never-explained disappearance of  her father that 
haunted her and her mother their whole lives. The book is thus conceived 
by the author as a requiem for the victims of  the Stalinist era of  1950s 
Czechoslovakia, represented in Kratochvil’s text by his mother (herself  
a victim of  the communist persecution to whom the book is dedicated and 
who appears as a minor character in the novel), Modráček’s sister, and the 
policeman Láska, unjustly imprisoned and punished.
The motif  of  traumatic disappearance also appears in the novels that deal 
with German memory. In Kratochvil’s novel Uprostřed nocí zpěv [In the midst 
of  the night a song] (1989), the Germans are represented intriguingly by 
a couple of  lesbian women who are ostracized by everyone – their Czech 
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neighbours as well as the other Germans; they finally die during the expul-
sion process and their absence haunts the memory of  one of  the main 
characters of  the novel, Petr, for the rest of  his life.
In her novel The Expulsion of  Gerta Snirch (2010), Kateřina Tučková tells 
the life story of  Gerta Snirch, a girl from Brno, born to a mixed Czech-
German family.15 After the war, she is included in the ‘death march’ of  
Brno Germans destined for expulsion. Gerta finally avoids the expulsion 
and comes back to her hometown. Her life seems to be returning to normal 
as she attempts to rebuild her life with her teenage love who had become 
a committed communist in the meantime. Nevertheless, her life is finally 
shattered when her lover disappears at the moment of  the show-trial with 
the communist leader Rudolf  Stránský and his collaborators in 1952. It 
is this traumatic disappearance that seems to shape Gerta’s life most pro-
foundly. Each text is characterized by the absence of  bodies; the people 
simply disappear, making the process of  mourning, if  not impossible, at 
least extremely difficult.
‘State-sponsored violence’ and the tortured bodies
The trauma of  those left behind is magnified by unverifiable images of  
torture. Enforced disappearance can hardly be dissociated from political 
violence and torture. It is the ‘state-imposed violence’ that Berber Bevernage 
uses as part of  the title of  his book. Michel de Certeau wrote a decidedly 
relevant text on the subject ‘Corps torturés, paroles capturés’ [Tortured bodies, 
captured speech] included in the volume Histoire et psychoanalyse (1987). He 
claims that violence is systemic in the imposition of  social order, especially 
in dictatorships: ‘Totalitarian violence needs credibility and, scientifically, it 
strives to produce the ersatz with living bodies’ (Certeau 1986).16
The frequent use of  metonymy in the studied texts might be connected to 
the theme of  torture, as Alexander Etkind remarked in his book Warped 
Mourning when he spoke about prevailing features of  post-1989 Russian 
literature: ‘In this process, the metonymical poetics of  magical historicism 
emulate the “piecemeal” logic of  torture, which also manipulates parts of  
the body with the aim of  changing the whole truth, integrity, and history’ 
(Etkind 2013, Kindle loc. 4329).
This might be also the reason why the main characters in novels dealing with 
the memory of  expulsion of  the Germans are subjected to horrible violence. 
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Female Germans are often subjected to rape, physical torture and abuse. As 
if  this violence suffered by individual examples of  Germans was to stand in 
for the suffering and violence inflicted on the expelled German community.
The haunting past and rituals of mourning
How is the absence of  the disappeared personified in the texts? Very often 
old photographs are used as a link to the missing era, person or community. 
Sebald and Huelle even incorporate black-and-white photos directly into 
their books, Huelle using authentic photographs from his family’s archive. 
When in 1992 Austerlitz finds his former nanny in Prague, she shows him 
two photographs from before 1939 (the time of  Austerlitz’s early childhood), 
possibly depicting Austerlitz’s parents. While looking at the photos, Auster-
litz affirms that it seems as if  the pictures had their own memory and were 
remembering the dead and those who survived (Sebald 2001, 266). When 
Austerlitz tries to find some traces of  his parents in the archives in Prague, 
he also watches one of  the films made in Teresienstadt. Austerlitz describes 
the music that accompanies the film as a funeral march coming from the 
‘subterranean world, through the most nightmarish depths’ (Sebald 2001, 
356). This description is a direct reference to the underworld of  the dead 
and the phantoms of  classical antiquity. In the archives, Austerlitz also finds 
a photo of  a woman who might be his mother but he says that she looks 
rather like a phantom.17 Sebald’s writing illustrates perfectly Derrida’s semi-
mourning and Derrida-inspired Bevernage’s term ‘haunting past’. 
Indeed, photography has a close link to memory, trauma, death and forget-
ting18 – it also shows the limits and failings of  photography to bring back 
the disappeared. Especially in Sebald’s work, the figures in the photos look 
rather like ghosts (Lachmann talks about phantasma and simulacrum, Der-
rida about spectres and revenants) and the found pictures problematize 
rather than facilitate the process of  mourning (Sebald 2001, 117).19 As 
Carolin Duttlinger puts it:
it is the latency and the transience of  the photographic im-
age, rather than its permanence and stability, which serve as 
a model for the process of  memory, as the image of  neither 
photography nor memory can be grasped or arrested, and 
are hence both prone to disappearance. Photography is thus 
figured as a model not for the permanence of  memory but for 
the phenomenon of  forgetting (Duttlinger 2004, 158).
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Whereas Sebald stresses in his use of  photography the haunting character 
of  the past, Vilikovský and Huelle are more affirmative about the charm of  
old photographs and their capacity to perpetuate objective memory. Igor, 
the protagonist of  Vilikovský’s novel, contemplates the significance of  the 
photography and what impresses him most is the lasting trace of  a human 
life that photography saves even after the death of  the portrayed person 
(Vilikovský 2009, 147). In Huelle’s Mercedes Benz, when the narrator’s grand-
father, Karol, understands that Poland is subject to the double invasion of  
Hitler’s Germany and of  the Soviet Union, he reacts in a surprising way – 
on his return from the eastern part of  Poland invaded by the Russians, he 
starts to sort out family photographs:
When he got home at last, instead of  reporting for work at the 
now German factory, he spent days on looking through old 
photographs, putting his archive in order, writing the missing 
dates and names of  people and places on their cardboard 
backing. As he unrolled it again, this particular reel of  time 
already felt like something very different from a catalogue of  
ordinary memories; it felt as if  those moments captured in the 
past by the cold shutter of  his Leica now made up a completely 
new volume that he’d never intended to create, consisting of  
chance moments, twists and turns of  light, bits and pieces of  
matter and voices that stopped sounding long ago; it was like 
a suddenly open, secret gate, revealing a previously unknown 
vista to the astonished passer-by, a wonderful spectacle of  
phantoms of  time and space, swirling like golden pillars of  
dust in a dark old granary (Huelle 2005, 96).
Photography functions in Huelle’s work as witness to history. At the same 
time it also works as means of  transmitting cultural memory. The fact 
that Karol buys his rolls of  film and photographic paper from the Jewish 
photo grapher Chaskiel Bronstein is particularly important. Karol pays the 
last visit to Chaskiel just after having sorted out the family photographs. 
On this occasion, the Germans have already closed down Chaskiel’s shop 
and Karol learns that Chaskiel’s family was sent to the ghetto. On leaving, 
Chaskiel gives the last rolls of  film to Karol to show him his gratitude. With 
the means of  capturing images (the rolls of  film), he also transmits to Karol 
the duty to remember. Indeed, the memories from the past in Huelle’s book 
come back to life through photos that accompany the book (alongside the 
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poster of  Chaskiel’s shop, making the link between history and literature 
explicit). Writing is then an act of  invocation of  phantoms from the past 
through a kind of  funeral ritual (Huelle 2001, 145). The commemorative 
aspect of  Huelle’s text is thus evident.
The patterns of  mourning that transpire from these texts have a clearly 
cathartic function – writing becomes a funeral ritual and at the same time 
a commemorative act (with all the dangers Ricoeur warns against). The 
Jewish photographer Chaskiel of  Huelle’s story cannot share the story of  
the life and death of  the Polish Jewish community, but with the remaining 
films delegates the task to Karol who transmits the duty of  remembering 
and the transmission of  cultural memory to his grandson (the author of  
Mercedes Benz). The text of  Mercedes Benz is evidence of  the fulfilled pledge 
to the narrator’s grandfather. And we can assume that it is the collection 
of  photos sorted by Karol before his stay in the concentration camp and 
later transmitted to the narrator that serves as the starting point to the text 
of  Mercedes Benz: ‘when I got home and sat at the table, I spread out the 
small set of  photographs from Chaskiel Bronstein’s company envelope, 
and the first sentence rolled out all by itself ’ (Huelle 2001, 154). The texts 
thus have the cathartic and ‘memorial’ function assigned to literature by 
Renate Lachmann:
At the beginning of  memoria as art stands the effort to trans-
form the work of  mourning into a technique. The finding of  
images heals what has been destroyed: The art of  memoria 
restores shape to the mutilated victims and makes them rec-
ognizable by establishing their place in life. Preserving cultural 
memory involves something like an apparatus for remembering 
by duplication, by the representation of  the absent through the 
image (phantasma or simulacrum), by the objectification of  
memory (as power and ability, as a space of  consciousness, or 
as thesaurus), and by the prevention of  forgetting through the 
retrieval of  images (the constant recuperation of  lost meaning) 
(Lachmann 2008, 302).
Writing as therapy to historical and personal trauma is present also in Den-
emarková’s book. The main character, Gita Lauschmann, dies in the middle 
of  the process of  writing her memoirs that would say and explain ‘every-
thing’. Her last thoughts are ‘not yet’: ‘But indeed, I am not ready yet, not 
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even close to ready, I do not feel like dying yet, I haven’t brushed my teeth 
yet, I am not properly dressed, I haven’t said everything yet ...’20
Time has run out for Gita and prevented her from finishing her story. In 
Denemarková’s book the trauma of  the past maintains its haunting pres-
ence and the wish to know the truth and to arrive at a total reconciliation 
with the loss is not totally fulfilled (as it is implied in models of  trauma and 
mourning commented by Bevernage and Craps).
The narrator of  Katalpa’s The Germans chooses to overcome the trauma 
and the depression that haunted the life of  her father (and the whole fam-
ily) after the revelations concerning his biological mother. If  we go back to 
Ricoeur’s comparison of  the individual work of  mourning in psychoanalysis, 
Kurt, the father, chooses the sadness of  acedia (lack of  care), whereas his 
daughter goes through the work of  mourning towards life (through the work 
of  sublimation), very much in the sense of  the short epilogue that Ricoeur 
adds at the end of  his book:
Under history, memory and forgetting. 
Under memory and forgetting, life. 
But writing a life is another story. 
Incompletion (Ricoeur 2004, Kindle loc. 7535).21
Indeed, her success at the work of  mourning is due to her acceptance of  
the incompletion of  this reconciliation and thus of  the work of  mourning: 
‘I turn the envelope in my fingers. It came from Germany, so it is clear that 
it constitutes another piece of  our investigation, information as useless as 
the previous one. What should interest us now does not lie in the past.’22
The narrator receives a letter from Germany that could give her some new 
information. But instead of  opening it and going back to the past and the 
wounded, sick memory (as Ricoeur calls it), she chooses life and goes out to 
join her little daughter who is playing in the garden, accepting the incomple-
tion of  her quest for the truth.
Conclusion
All the interpreted texts have a common topic: the enforced disappear-
ance (of  an individual or that of  a whole community). As we have shown, 
these literary works also share descriptions of  historical trauma and the 
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mechanisms of  the work of  mourning. ‘The haunting past’ maintains its 
disturbing presence and does not allow the Freudian-ideal final reconcilia-
tion with the lost object or past. The successful work of  mourning seems 
to depend rather on the capacity to accept its incompletion and to learn 
to live with the spectres of  the past (as suggested by De Certeau, Ricoeur, 
Derrida, Bevernage, Craps and Etkind).
As we have disclosed, the texts only partly become ‘lieux de mémoire’, places 
of  remembrance of  the dictatorships of  Central Europe and its victims. 
Indeed, the authors put topics that have been taboo for decades into the 
public realm through artistic representation. These texts are rather literary 
transpositions and representations of  historical traumas and their possible 
mourning mechanisms. Indeed, we have shown the tricky limits of  Pierre 
Nora’s concept of  ‘lieux de mémoire’ as it is discussed by Paul Ricoeur. Indeed, 
the reserve expressed by Nora himself  and shared by Ricoeur of  memory 
being consumed and dissolved in commemoration seems to be justified in 
relation to these interpreted texts. By its nature, literature can be used as 
a tool for subjective depictions of  history and contemporary writers are 
taking part in debates on highly sensitive political and social issues (such as 
the Holocaust and massive expulsions). It seems that (often unintentionally) 
the writers might put themselves in the service of  various ‘memory activists’. 
In extreme cases, far from giving ‘objective’ descriptions of  national history, 
they are not only not participating in the noble cause of  the struggle against 
politically imposed amnesia of  the communist past but might be taking part 
in promoting other, new political causes. The mourning in these texts could 
often bring back memories and reveal a point of  view of  a specific social 
group that particularly suffered under communist rule in Central Europe – 
for example, that of  the bourgeois elites of  the interwar period (the texts 
of  Huelle and Kratochvil are the best representations of  this perspective). 
This topic is certainly worth further analysis and examination.
The analysed literary texts show clearly common ways of  expressing col-
lective mourning. They reveal a more general pattern of  dealing with the 
collective past, especially a traumatic one. However, this mourning is far 
from objective and expresses clear subjective bias. It is even more evident 
in the literary texts dealing with the memory of  the German past. Indeed, 
even if  the texts might be considered to a certain extent as ‘places of  
memory’ (as problematic as this concept might be), they are not so much 
places of  memory as expressions of  personal and historical traumas of  the 
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20th century in Central Europe. As writers have focused almost exclusively 
on the issue of  post-Second World War expulsions from the long-standing 
history of  the German presence in Central Europe, we feel entitled to ask 
whether we are not dealing here with the mourning process for the cleansed 
national memory? The novels dedicated to the memory of  the German past 
would thus be less about the mourning of  the loss of  the cultural legacy 
of  the lost German community and more about a way of  coming to terms 
with the legacy of  dictatorships of  the 20th century in Central Europe, 
especially that of  communism.
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ABSTRACT
One of the main features of the communist regime in Albania (1944–90) was 
the rule through intimidation and the psychosis of the ‘enemy at the gates’. 
More than two generations grew up and lived under such psychosis. Over the 
years they took such a situation for granted, by making it an essential part of 
their language, lifestyle, thought and vision for the future. The system of collec-
tive intimidation, ‘the enemy at the gates’ turned into a system of the rule of 
law. It was anchored in laws and punishments used against any critical form of 
resistance to the regime. In such society happiness, sovereignty, survival and 
success were only considered possible in a closed, isolated system guarded by 
vigilantes who monitored and rejected of any kind of external  influence. This 
paper analyses the evolution of the concept of the ‘enemy’ and the system of 
establishing a feeling of permanent fear emanating from the top (systemic 
authorities) towards the bottom (citizens), through official political discourse. 
It looks at how these notions ‘succeeded’ and how they influenced the political 
formation of society. It discusses the dynamics of the creation of a collective 
consciousness based on the primacy of  survival.
Introduction
A large part of  Albania’s modern political history (1945–90) unfolded under 
the heavy shadow of  one-party rule, marked by the uncontested control 
of  a sole leader over the party. Albanian politics of  that period showed 
markedly totalitarian traits, shaped by the syndrome of  perpetual anxiety 
over perceived internal and external threats. The regime built up a system 
capable of  using violence and triggering fear, able to eradicate potential 
threats identified among suspect groups and individuals.
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The relationship between state and citizen was built on a widely shared 
understanding of  the state as an all-powerful entity, ultimately embodied 
in the dictator and his inner circle. It was able to claim and ultimately wield 
total control over society as a whole and on individual citizens who had no 
role to play in decision-making and a sacred duty to accept orders, guidance 
and instructions. The fear-instilling system was functional and effective. It 
was anchored in the constitution through severe limitations on civil rights, 
through complementary legislation on surveillance, through state propa-
ganda and through a far-reaching control over an individual’s private life, 
family, community, workplace, career advancement and religious beliefs.
As Arendt wrote, ‘totalitarian ideologies aim to transform human nature itself, 
since the human condition of  plurality is the greatest obstacle standing in 
the way of  the realization of  an ideologically consistent universe [...] since 
tyranny destroys the public realm of  politics and is therefore anti-political 
by definition’ (Arendt 2002). Nevertheless, the state of  ‘isolation’ and ‘im-
potence’ experienced by the individual in tyrannical forms of  government 
springs from the destruction of  the public realm of  politics whereas the 
mobilization of  the ‘overwhelming, combined power of  all others against 
its own’ does not eliminate entirely a minimum of  human contact in the 
non-political spheres of  social intercourse and private life. Thus, if  the fear-
guided actions of  the subject of  tyrannical rule are bereft of  the capacity 
to establish relations of  power between individuals acting and speaking 
together in a public realm of  politics, the ‘isolation’ of  the political subject 
does not entail the destruction of  his social and private relations. Therefore, 
in all nontotalitarian forms of  government, the body politic is in constant 
motion within set boundaries of  a stable political order, although tyranny 
destroys the public space of  political action (Ngjela, 2003, 21).
No other state in the socialist bloc was able to conceive and apply such extreme 
measures as in Albania, and none was as effective in eliminating dissidence, 
in prohibiting religion in the Constitution, and in ultimately cutting itself  off  
from both East and West. Two generations were born and lived under this 
psychotic regime. As the years went by, the nature of  the regime was taken 
for granted. Its existence and functioning was internalized. It became part of  
the way people lived, spoke and thought about the past, present and future.
The ‘enemy at the gates’ system of  collective control through fear evolved 
into a method of  ruling through pervasive violence that was sanctioned in 
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legal acts and practical measures targeting each and every form of  possible 
and actual dissidence against the regime. Under such a system, the quest 
for personal happiness was overridden by the need for survival: a personal 
life was only possible inside a closed shell that refused to be influenced by 
the outside world. The fall of  the regime in 1990 and the establishment of  
the multi-party system were understood as a departure from the regime of  
fear, where people could meet and speak openly.
The old concept of  ‘the enemy’, as mostly associated with Western Dem-
ocracy, was then superseded by the concept of  ally, friend, partner and 
unconditional supporter of  the Euro-Atlantic integration process.
‘The enemy’ as a constitutional principle and as a basis of legitimacy
Communist Albania’s prevailing concept of  ‘the enemy’ was related first and 
foremost with the relationship between the individual and the Party1 and with 
the connection between the individual, state and society. The only official 
Albanian dictionary of  that time (dictionary of  today’s standard Albanian 
[FGJSH], 1980, 53)) describes the entry ‘enemy’ as ‘the person who stands 
against the interests of  the class, party, motherland and socialism, by fight-
ing and acting against them’.2
This definition is to be also found in previous academic and official papers 
and documents, in the official media, in public discourse and in the notes 
and documents of  the Political Bureau, Albania’s Communist Party’s highest 
decision-making body from 1948 to 1990. The Communist Party’s sources 
mention several types of  ‘enemies’, among the most notable we can list 
are ‘the enemy of  the party’, ‘the enemy of  the people’, ‘the class enemy’, 
‘enemy of  the people’s rule’. Marking individuals as ultimate enemies, should 
they engage in activities marked as harmful to ‘the interest of  the [working] 
class and of  the party’, is indicative of  the core philosophy that sustained 
Albania’s communist system.
Under charges of  ‘hostile activity’, implying acts or opinions and percep-
tions opposed to the Party, the communist regime executed 5,157 citizens; 
9,052 more citizens died in prison; 17,990 citizens underwent prolonged 
imprisonment sentences; and 30,383 citizens were exiled in conditions similar 
to labour camps, bringing the total number of  people subjected to political 
persecution to 65,582. With an effective population of  just 1.1 million in-
habitants, this resulted in 5.9 per cent of  the population or 10.2 per cent of  
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citizens over eighteen years of  age being subjected to political persecution. 
Officially Albania had twenty-three political prisons and forty-eight labour 
camps for political detainees.
The ascent to power of  the communists in Albania was later exemplified in 
the Constitution of  1945. It was consolidated in the Constitutions of  1950 
and 1976, and supported by several pieces of  secondary legislation. Accord-
ing to the political programme of  Albania’s Communist Party of  1948, and 
to the Constitution of  the Republic of  Albania of  1950:
in the present historical era, the Communist Party (of  Albania) 
mobilizes and guides the working class, the peasants, and all of  
the country’s workmen, in their struggle against the remain-
ders of  the fascism, feudalism, bourgeoisie and reactionaries, 
to uphold the country’s independence and territorial integrity, 
to advance democracy and the people’s rule, to rebuild and to 
industrialize the country, to build up its electrical power grid, 
to develop the state sector and the cooperatives to raise the 
economic, cultural and technical level of  knowledge of  the 
working class and of  the whole population (Labour Party of  
Albania [LPA] 1950).
The Statute of  the Communist Party stated the following basic criterion with 
regard to its members: ‘to protect the party and its unity from the attacks 
of  internal and external foes’ (LPA 1948, 520).
This definition creates a relationship of  interdependence between the con-
cept of  the struggle against the ‘internal enemies’, including the ‘bourgeois’ 
identified as the urban middle and upper class, the ‘remainders of  feudalism’ 
consisting of  the landed gentry, ‘the reactionaries’ implying religious com-
munities in general and Roman Catholics in particular, and ‘the remainders 
of  fascism’, consisting of  the individuals and the families of  those directly 
or indirectly involved with the state administration under the German and 
Italian occupation in the period 1939–44.
The total war waged against the above categories, which back in 1948 rep-
resented the most educated strata of  Albanian society, was justified with 
the struggle ‘to preserve national independence and territorial integrity’ 
and ‘rebuild the country’. Further to punishing or disciplining critics of  the 
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regime, the party would argue that it had ‘eliminated’ enemies of  Albania’s 
independence and progress. This alibi seemed to work well during Albania’s 
post-Second World War state of  exception that saw the final establishment 
and consolidation of  communist rule further to the total eradication and 
suppression of  any effective threat to the new regime. After that, it seemed 
to have been accepted without any reservation, as all dissenting voices were 
already effectively suppressed.
The concept of  the enemy as a hallmark of  ‘class struggle’, in the sense of  
boundless class warfare waged against all those holding differing opinions, 
was sanctioned in the Constitution with the following wording (Consti tution ... 
1976): ‘The Socialist Republic of  Albania is a country ruled by the dictator-
ship of  the proletariat, as the expression of  the interests of  all workers’; ‘the 
leading ideology being Marxism–Leninism’; ‘poised to continuously advance 
the revolution, the class struggle, towards the final victory of  socialism over 
capitalism, and towards the ultimate establishment of  and communism.’
Article 55 of  the Constitution prohibits the establishment ‘of  any organi-
zation of  fascist, anti-democratic, religious or anti-socialist nature. Fascist 
activity, any type of  anti-democratic and religious propaganda, and the 
instigation of  racial and national hatred shall be prohibited.’
The Constitution and the Criminal Code entailed over seventy articles sanc-
tioning the death penalty over several criminal offenses (Repishti 2017). 
Offences such as ‘activity directed against the party’, ‘emigration from the 
country’, ‘economic sabotage’, ‘religious practices’ and the establishment of  
organizations outside the Labour (Communist) Party were subject to harsh 
sanctions, further detailed in secondary legislation and in other specific 
measures, such as the unifying decision of  1968 to suppress the Ministry of  
Justice. The decision remained in force until spring 1990, leaving Albania 
without a Ministry of  Justice for twenty-two years.
The execution of  these extreme political and ideological decisions was en-
trusted to an extended network of  informers built around the secret police, 
also known as Sigurimi – State Security. The State Security as approved by 
the Political Bureau (Decision no. 30 1954) aimed to create a system of  total 
surveillance of  Albania’s citizens, including low profile enemies of  the Party, 
for the purpose of  protecting the leader and the party ‘from internal and 
external enemies’.
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The surveillance was carried out by the departments of  the Ministry of  
Interior in conjunction with ‘voluntary cooperation groups’, consisting of  
party loyalists and members of  its auxiliary organizations. The structure 
had a vertical line of  command and a horizontal extension, covering all 
inhabited areas and production facilities. It controlled all mailing services, all 
correspondence between citizens, especially the correspondence of  families 
with convicted and exiled members. Over one third of  the Albanian citizens 
were covered by personal surveillance files.
‘The enemy’ as a mechanism of persecution and control
The concept of  social class, entailing a regime ‘of  workmen and country-
men’ in charge of  ruling over the rest of  the social classes is found in 
 different forms in the Soviet models and in the ideologies of  other  socialist 
countries all over the Eastern Bloc. In Albania the class concept was at 
the very foundation of  the country’s legal framework and at the heart of  
public discourse. It was the source of  all legal and administrative acts. The 
classification of  citizens into two large categories – party loyalists and en-
emies – marked the line of  division between a totalitarian regime and the 
alternatives to it. The singularity of  Albania’s communist regime has been 
widely debated, also with regard to the question whether ‘class struggle’ was 
‘properly’ borrowed as a system of  reference from the October Revolution, 
or whether it was mostly adapted to the social reality where the Albanian 
communists had to operate.
The critical thesis maintains that ‘class struggle’ was ‘misused as an alibi for 
paying lip service to the totalitarian structure’, therefore ‘the destructive 
war waged against the individual in Albania was wrongly referred to as class 
struggle ... the very definition of  class struggle is an expression coming from 
a totalitarian mind set ... there was no class struggle in Albania, rather a war 
of  all against all’ (Klosi 1993, 57).
As discussed by Lefort, ‘the attack against the enemies of  the people was 
launched in the manner of  a disease prevention campaign: the integrity of  
the body depends on the elimination of  the parasites feasting upon it’ (Le-
fort 1994, 115). The communist regime came into being precisely through 
the quest for the total elimination of  all potential resistance. In 1944 and 
1945 Albania’s communists undertook extreme measures (arrests, executions 
and long sentences of  imprisonment of  twenty to a hundred years) against 
all individuals with a potential to provide political representation. They 
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indiscriminately attacked high-profile political opponents, minor political 
associations, influential local religious leaders and the whole of  the liberal 
elite of  their time. In 1945 the communists embarked upon a far-reaching 
‘agrarian reform’ that wiped out the well-to-do farmers, and created a loyal 
social group of  peasants entitled to the use of  land, totally dependent on 
the decisions taken by the regime. In 1948 Albania passed a law on the 
forced expropriation of  all cattle stock (Law no. 598 1948). That law paved 
the way to the establishment of  farming cooperatives. Those who resisted 
its implementation, or those found to have hidden the cattle subject to 
expropriation, were considered as ‘saboteurs and reactionaries’, liable to be 
sentenced to up to ten years’ imprisonment.
The same approach was followed with the law on the confiscation of  agri-
cultural products, with the adoption of  the system of  extraordinary taxation 
for retail traders and with the decision to confiscate monetary values saved 
outside financial institutions. The professed goal of  the regime was ‘to crush 
the resistance of  political opponents, to expropriate the upper class ... to 
safeguard the victories of  the revolution’ (Omari 1977, 119). A decision of  
the Political Bureau identified eighteen cases that qualified an individual as 
‘a hostile kulak’, liable to be put under surveillance, have their possessions 
confiscated and be deprived of  freedom.
The description of  ‘kulaks’ includes the following: ‘he/she has a nice house 
and extensive property’, ‘he is very active in the bazaar’, ‘he used to lend 
money at interest’, ‘he was connected to the regime of  [King] Zog’, ‘he is 
opposed to the modernization of  agriculture’, ‘he acted as if  he were the 
most important and the most intelligent man in the village’, ‘he is a double-
crosser’, ‘he has family connections with rich families’, ‘he opposes womens’ 
participation in social life’. The same methods of  classification applied to 
other types of  enemies: religious enemies, enemies in the fields of  arts and 
culture, enemies in the fields of  sport, economy, army and so on.
The branding as an enemy affected all leaders of  religious communities, 
urban elites, important landowners in northern Albania, and those individu-
als with connections in Western Europe. This ecletic mix of  individuals 
fell into the category of  ‘enemy of  the people’. This category was periodi-
cally expanded to include persons holding public functions, subsequently 
denounced as ‘saboteurs’ and ‘collaborationists’, especially if  they failed 
to achieve the objectives set by the central planning committee. When the 
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works to drain the Maliq swamp failed to be completed in 1946 within the 
given deadline, the communist regime arranged a ten-day trial that served to 
execute all the technical experts of  the project, including a pregnant woman. 
They were accused of  ‘sabotage’ and of  being ‘US and British spies’. Over 
seventy former students of  the Harry Fultz College in Albania met tragic 
deaths, imprisonment and confinement.
A unique case is given by the arrest, trial, sentencing and execution within 
the timeframe of  only seventy-two hours of  twenty-two well-known intel-
lectuals in February 1951, accused of  ‘hostile acts’ and ‘involvement with 
foreign espionage’. The review of  their files in 1991 showed that the Political 
Bureau had decided to set an example, and to this end, it brought together 
and evaluated a list consisting of  170 intellectuals from different locations. At 
the end of  the meeting, the Bureau set apart twenty-two people to be killed, 
and the decision was passed to the secret service, the Prosecutor’s Office 
and to the state police for immediate execution. Such acts of  terror were 
meant to establish and perpetuate a climate of  fear, in which every single 
individual would sense that his life and his survival were out of  his control.
The politically motivated attack against the concept of  the independence 
of  the individual was only the first ring in a long chain of  measures geared 
towards conditioning him, his family, friends and colleagues. If  a person 
were to be sentenced on political charges, he would automatically relinquish 
his rights of  citizenship including the right to vote. His family would be 
included in the list of  those to be possibly sent to exile, in conditions very 
similar to the Soviet Gulags or to the Nazi labour camps. Their property 
could be seized at any time. The very fact of  being a family member, a friend 
or a relative of  a person found to be an enemy of  the people would auto-
matically make them guilty.
The courts decided which individual was guilty, while the decision to send his 
family into exile was taken by a select committee of  the Ministry of  Interior. 
Often no prior consultations with those affected were deemed necessary.
The concept of  wholesale persecution and collective punishment was ad-
equately anchored in the legal framework of  that time. The legal practice 
of  sending persons into exile started in 1949 with the first decree issued 
against the families of  political opponents (Decree no. 649, 1949, art. 3). In 
1979 the law on exile was supplemented with additional elements, laid out 
REMEMBRANCE AND SOLIDARITY      93
CONTROL THROUGH FEAR – THE ENEMY AT THE GATES .. .
in a decree of  the Presidium of  the People’s Assembly (Decree no. 5912, 
1979). More concretely: ‘The punishment by exile as an administrative 
measure can be given against Albanian citizens, foreign citizens and state-
less persons of  more than 14 years of  age, have the capacity to act and are 
dangerous to the social order of  the Republic of  Albania ... exiling may be 
also applied against the relatives of  the persons who have escaped abroad’. 
The law further established that ‘relatives’ are the ‘spouses, children, parents, 
brothers and sisters, and other persons living together with the person or 
who were under his custody’.
‘The enemy’ as an alibi for personal power
The justification for committing crimes ‘for public interest’ and ‘in the 
name of  the people’ was widely in line with the regime’s Bolshevik model, 
which taught that ‘the dictatorship of  the proletariat was to be considered 
as similar to a terrorist formation. The Bolsheviks considered themselves as 
chosen by God to bring about peace, development and equality in a world 
dominated by crime, therefore crime was to be fought by crime, yet crime 
was to be perpetrated only for a higher purpose’ (Ngjela 2011, 193). In line 
with these teachings, dictator Enver Hoxha was keen on acting resolutely 
against ‘the enemy’.
He ordered the imprisonment and execution of  seventeen high-level politi-
cians and maximum sentences against seventy important statesmen, founders 
of  Albanian independence in 1912, former prime ministers, ministers and 
intellectuals, including the spouse of  his own sister, Bahri Omari. The ex-
ecution of  Hoxha’s brother-in-law was not linked to any specific accusation 
or crime. It is to be rather understood as an attempt to show to everybody 
that the same standard applied to everyone, including the close relatives of  
the high party officials, who dared to criticize the dictator.
In the period 1944–48 Albania entered into a preferential relationship with 
Yugoslavia. As a result of  this, hundreds of  individuals, including high party 
officials, critical of  the political control wielded by the Yugoslavs, were 
prosecuted and found guilty as internal enemies. From 1948 to 1961 upon 
severing its links to Yugoslavia, Albania aligned itself  to the USSR. The rule 
remained the same: whoever was found to be a critic of  the Soviets was sen-
tenced to from four to seven years of  imprisonment. After the interruption 
of  the relationship with the USSR, and further to Albania’s alignment with 
Communist China (1966–75), the rule was applied once again: whoever was 
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found to be critical of  China was to be punished, those who were considered 
to be pro-Russian or trained in Moscow were prosecuted and punished.
After the interruption of  the relations with China (after 1975), those who 
made a career during Albania’s Chinese alignment had to pay a high price. 
Some ministers were executed, including the ministers of  defence, economy 
and industry. The highest profile case was related to the forced suicide of  
the communist Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu in 1981. He was declared 
as an enemy of  the state after his death. The engagement of  Shehu’s son 
with a girl from a family with a ‘bad political biography’ was used by the 
communist regime to ‘prove’ that Prime Minister Shehu had passed over to 
the enemy camp. Further to Shehu’s suicide and to the execution of  several 
ministers, including the minister of  interior and the minister of  health, their 
families were arrested or exiled, and some of  the close relatives, including 
the wife of  the former prime minister were executed, on charges related 
to ‘treason’ against the party and the people. Each of  the waves of  massive 
retribution relied on the same official justification: the need to punish the 
enemies of  the people, spies and traitors.
The punishments were followed by hefty propaganda campaigns aimed at 
proving the treason of  those punished and at providing information on 
their alleged efforts ‘to overthrow the rule of  the people and to eliminate 
the highest leaders of  the state’ (Pipa 2010, 98). A wealth of  archived docu-
ments and research studies of  this period seems to prove the thesis that there 
was no actual involvement of  Albanian politicians or political groupings 
with foreign governments. Their punishment mostly came as a result of  the 
dictator’s fear of  possible contacts between his high officials with important 
allied states (Yugoslavia, USSR, China etc.) that might threaten his leader-
ship. It is clear that the war against such ‘enemies’ was  instrumentalized by 
the dictator, always looking for ways to ensure his personal and unilateral 
grip on power. This also explains the system of  fluid alliances and Alba-
nia’s subsequent self-isolation from both the East and the West, and the 
escalation of  the periodic campaigns of  ‘class struggle’ against ‘the enemy’.
This thesis is corroborated by the increased number of  sentences after the 
early fifties, a period in which virtually no actual ‘enemies’ were left. Precisely 
in this timeframe, a new wave of  punishments against all types of  perceived 
enemies (informers, rival political formations, intellectuals critical of  the 
regimes, dissidents, agents coming from outside Albania) was launched. 
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According to the official figures, from 1949 to 1953, 2,611 people escaped 
from Albania, or 0.3 per cent of  the total population (Xhafer 2013, 187). 
After 1954, when Albania was able to almost fully seal its borders, it started 
to send growing numbers of  its ‘enemies’ to exile inside its territory. In the 
period 1954 to 1957, the average number of  families sent to exile was 300 
to 500. After the break in relations with the USSR, in the period 1954 to 
1957, the number of  families sent to exile increased considerably, reaching 
1,200 to 1,300 families per year. The same situation repeated itself  after the 
break with China in the seventies.
Control through fear in Albania
When Dictator Hoxha died in April 1985, his obituary noted that under his 
leadership ‘Albania was safe’, implying that his death might turn Albania 
into an unsafe place. Far from being an intentionally made hint, this de-
liberation was closely related to a mentality created in the course of  many 
years, according to which Albania was permanently being threatened by 
an impending invasion by its foes. The key slogans from this isolationist 
period were: ‘We build socialism with a pickaxe in the one hand and with 
a gun in the other’, ‘We dance on the face of  danger’, ‘The enemy holds 
us at gunpoint, but we aim at him with a cannon’. In his memoirs, author 
Agim Mero mentions that in the mid-sixties, after the break with the Soviet 
Union, Albania’s communist regime started to bring into circulation slogans 
such as: ‘We will pour molten lead into the mouths of  those who dare rise 
up against us’, or ‘We will eat grass rather than surrender’ (Mero 1997, 65). 
Both slogans seem to confirm the ‘enemy at the gates’ thesis, as they appeal 
to the ultimate sacrifice in the struggle against the enemy.
During the second half  of  the seventies, the Albanian communist regime 
built over 700,000 bunkers, as an extreme measure of  protection against ‘the 
enemy’. The construction of  the concrete pillboxes was treated as a matter of  
absolute priority. The pressure on the technicians and on the engineers was 
extreme. Quality was ‘an absolute requirement, and that was ensured to the 
detriment of  other projects’ (Mero 1997, 129). The coastline was viewed as 
a potential landing area for enemy forces. Special bunkers were constructed 
along the whole of  it. The dictator stopped all major infrastructural projects, 
because highways might eventually be used as airstrips for invading US armies.
In addition to fortifying its defences against its external foes, Albania waged 
an internal war against its religious institutions. The Labour Party was proud 
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of  its ‘systematic struggle against religion, which is a reactionary ideology 
and opium for the people’.3 It boasted that under its leadership, ‘people 
rose up in towns and in the countryside, asking for the final removal of  
all churches, mosques and all holy places’. The religious structures were 
forced to relinquish their functions, and most of  the religious buildings 
were converted into ‘Cultural Centres’. The madness of  extreme isolation 
was in parallel with the establishment of  a system of  permanent vigilance, 
to which all citizens were called to contribute. The former secretary of  the 
Communist Youth in the mid-seventies, and later himself  a victim of  the 
purges made by the system, Agim Mero noted that ‘under the slogan “one 
citizen – one soldier” all eligible Albanians had to toil in permanent military 
drills. Women had to perform military drills with wooden rifles and to train 
in hand-to-hand combat’ (Mero 1997, 129).
All students, workers and intellectuals had to perform obligatory biannual 
military drills. Most of  the academic staff  were sent to work for periods 
ranging from one to three years in the agriculture or industry sector, so as 
to strengthen their revolutionary ties with the peasants and the working 
class. Albania refused to have contact with most Western democracies. 
Albania’s football teams refused to play against certain Western teams, and 
had to pay the penalties imposed by the Union of  European Football 
Asso ciations (UEFA) and the Fédération Internationale de Football Asso-
ciation (FIFA).
The system of  control through fear was as brutal as it was effective. The 
regime undertook some steps to ease its controls in 1990. It passed legisla-
tion that changed the sanctions in force against migration from the death 
penalty to prison terms from three to seven years. Nonetheless, thirty-three 
citizens, mostly young, were killed at the border by army units and state 
security service. In some cases the bodies of  those killed at the border were 
paraded across city centres so as to strike terror and fear into the popula-
tion, especially among those hoping to leave the country. The relatives of  
the victims were not allowed to organize their burials, and their friends 
were prosecuted.
The system was both forthright and pervasive. Mero writes: ‘the regime was 
a huge and intricate machine, structured in parallel state and party structures 
... a small leadership is at the top, but around and below there were many 
smaller pyramids of  power extending down to the smallest village. They 
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reached out from the ministries down to the most minuscule production 
units, from the army’s chief  of  staff  down to the women’s military unit 
of  the neighbourhood, from the central committee of  the party down 
to the kindergartens which had their own children’s units. Guidance and 
instructions were passed down from the very top to the lowest structure; 
everybody was held accountable for their implementation’ (Mero 1997, 
127). Children in the kindergartens were frequently asked what their par-
ents talked about at home. Potentially sensitive information was passed 
to the security service for further investigation that could lead to arrests 
and  imprisonments.
The security service applied similar methods in primary and high schools. 
For a period stretching over forty-six years, university studies were consid-
ered a political prerogative and were not linked to the talents and capacities 
of  the applicants. No students were admitted from the families marked by 
the regime with ‘bad biography’. Weekly ‘political updates’ were held in all 
state institutions, factories, universities, schools and farms. Voluntary sur-
veillance groups were established everywhere, in addition to combat teams, 
to be activated in case of  invasion. All correspondence, especially all letters 
addressed to relatives living abroad were screened by the security services. 
The mail could go through only after a special clearance was issued by 
a special office. The lack of  means of  communication (personal computers, 
private or public phones, private cars, etc.) prevented citizens from access-
ing information from the outside world. That made official propaganda the 
only access point for the information coming in from outside the Albanian 
communist bubble.
At present post-communist Albania can only draw on a limited number of  
studies of  the communist period, and even less so regarding the system of  
control through fear of  that time. Presiding over a small country with a tiny 
population, highly incriminated by long years of  collusion with the com-
munist regime, Albania’s elite choose to adopt a conciliatory approach best 
described by its new slogan: ‘everyone suffered – everyone was guilty.’ This 
served to ease the tensions between the victims and their persecutors. There 
exist highly diverging views regarding the nature of  the communist regimes 
around the world, and to the concepts laid out by Arendt and Huntington 
in this regard. It can be maintained that the definition of  the key feature of  
a personal dictatorship as ‘the system that locates the source of  power in the 
vicinity to the leader and to those having his trust and support’ is well suited 
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for Albania (Huntington 2011, 72). Nonetheless, most researchers describe 
the Albanian system as an advanced model of  totalitarian rule, by arguing 
that the key to totalitarianism is to be found in fear rather than in brute 
force’ (Danaj 2012). The Albanian version of  20th-century totalitarianism 
is best seen as a violent political regime of  a single political party incapable 
and unwilling to accept any form of  organized opposition and/or dissent, 
whereby the state controls the totality of  societal space.
Old tyrannies only succeeded in destroying the political and organizational 
capacities of  their opponents; they were not able to seek and destroy the 
networks of  personal and private relationships. They did not invalidate the 
‘personal self ’, in the sense of  the personality of  each individual, which is 
exactly what happened under the totalitarian experience. Arendt’s description 
is evocative of  another rendering of  the Albanian model of  totalitarianism, 
under which the party fully identified with the state ‘as a demon that numbed 
the minds and souls of  the people, by convincing them that it would never 
leave. It stretched over everything, took control of  the remote corners of  
private lives, through surveillance and pressure, through tension and fear 
that reached out to everyone’ (Ngjela 2013, 21).
‘The enemy’ as an obstacle to reform
Albania was the only European country that refused to sign the Helsinki Final 
Act of  1975 because of  its constant guard against the Western and Eastern 
‘enemy’. Back in 1948 Albania had refused to publish the UN Human Rights 
Charter of  1948 for its citizens. Not until 1991 did Albania became a member 
of  the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), sign 
the Helsinki Final Act and publish the UN Human Rights Charter.
As the continent’s only atheist and anti-religious country, Albania adopted 
a system of  propaganda that denigrated each and every element, symbol and 
memory of  religious association. A very striking example is the treatment 
Albania reserved for Mother Teresa. Albanians inside Albania only learned 
about her winning the Nobel Peace Prize in 1979 in the late 1980s. She was 
considered persona non grata by the regime because she belonged to a Christian 
denomination, wore religious dress and was supported by governments on 
unfriendly terms with the Albanian communist regime. At the close of  the 
1980s Albania’s political agenda remained the same, despite the initiation 
of  several Euro-Atlantic processes aimed at changing the economies and 
politics of  the countries of  the Eastern Bloc. The endeavours of  some 
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Western European countries to re-establish relations with Albania were 
met by an opaque wall of  hostility of  communist officials, who argued that 
the country’s constitution prohibited political and economic relations with 
the enemy.
The fall of  the Berlin Wall amplified the pressure felt by the Tirana gov-
ernment. Nonetheless it continued not to confront the inevitability of  the 
change to come. Its best alibi continued as before: ‘the external enemy’, the 
danger to which Albania would be exposed if  it were to open itself, even 
partially, to the wider world. The regime held Albania to be ‘the world’s 
only truly free country, independent of  US imperialism and Soviet social-
imperialism, free from the Treaty of  Warsaw and free from NATO ... so 
we should continue to be watchful so as to retain and protect our victories’ 
(Alia 2010). The regime considered any demand for political pluralism as 
a hostile act. It described pluralism as a threat to the state and to its iden-
tity, since ‘Albania’s independence and freedom are perpetually threatened. 
Hence, the difference of  opinion and opinions directed against those of  
the Labour Party threaten the future of  the motherland, its very freedom 
and independence’ (Alia 2010, 364).
In a meeting held with Albanian intellectuals only four months prior to the 
change of  the political regime, the communist leader Ramiz Alia reiter-
ated that Albania was ‘a special case’, compared to other Eastern Europe 
countries. He precluded the request for the introduction of  changes in the 
system, by maintaining this to be a demand stemming from the enemies 
of  Albania.
Conclusion
Control through fear, resulting in systematically applied pressure made up 
of  continuous threats stood at the very foundation of  communist regime 
in Albania. Two generations of  Albanians were the helpless victims of  an 
arbitrary despotic system that considered human life as state property. The 
system of  control through fear managed to eradicate all potential for inter-
nal resistance. Through total self-isolation it avoided any possible external 
influences. Differently from the rest of  the Eastern European countries, 
especially from the East German system of  ‘the exchange of  prisoners 
for hard currency’, or the Polish model of  religious faith and Solidarity, 
the Albanian model constitutes the most extreme model of  isolation and 
state violence.
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Class struggle, a war against God, the fight against external influences 
and isolation from the possible permanent dangers coming from West-
ern, and then later Eastern, enemies triggered a psychosis for survival 
among Albanians, exposed to the permanent struggle against the ‘enemy 
at the gates’. This study refers to the constitution, the legal framework 
of  Albania’s communist era and to the most typical traits of  the political 
decision-making of  the regime to argue that the concept of  the enemy 
was instrumentalized to legitimize a highly personalized type of  one-man, 
one-party rule, highly hostile to the very idea of  openness towards the 
outside world.
The ‘enemy at the gates’ and the ‘enemy inside us’ were prime instruments 
of  psychological terror – they were primary mechanisms of  control and 
also the means for providing alibies to eliminate all potential criticism to-
wards the party and its leading clique. These concepts dominated political 
discourse and guided the deliberations of  official propaganda. They were 
the primary source of  reference for the slogans crafted for wide public dis-
semination and instrumental in distorting the people’s collective historical 
memory. When Albanians parted ways with communism, they also parted 
ways with the system of  control through fear.
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1  The Labour Party of Albania was, as enshrined in the Constitution, ‘the only leading 
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ary of Contemporary Albanian Language, Tirana, Albania.
3  Joint Declaration of the Central Committee of the People’s Labour Party and of 
the Council of Ministers of the Peoples’ Republic of Albania, 29 April 1967.
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ABSTRACT
The violent break-up of Yugoslavia, which began in the early 1990s, was undoubt-
edly influenced by the war propaganda aimed towards the nationalistic goals of all 
the sides involved. This article is focused on the analysis and comparison of one 
specific aspect of propaganda employed by the main pro-regime media in Serbia 
and Croatia, whose conflict marked the beginning of Yugoslavia’s dissolution: 
that is of the misuse of children as a warmongering instrument. The research 
examines different ways in which the manipulation of children as victims was 
used in Croatian and Serbian media and also its consequences, especially the 
role it played in shaping the actions of the warring parties. While Serbian media 
focused on the past by emphasizing the genocidal nature of Croats in the Second 
World War and the need to avenge Serb victims, especially children, Croatian 
media presented Croatian children as personifications and ambassadors of the 
‘newly born’ Croatian collective national body, which was suffering from Serbian 
aggression. While standard histories of ethnic conflicts, nationalism and post-war 
transitions focus mainly on adult actors, this project seeks to shed light on the 
importance of children as both subjects and agents in the conflict-ridden areas 
of the Balkans, including their centrality to the transition from communism to 
democracy, to the wars that marked that shift, and to post-communist nation 
building, which remains contentious and in a state of flux to this day.
As future leaders of  the nation, children have undoubtedly been a group 
of  immense importance for political elites as part of  the modern nation-
building process. This was particularly the case in the former Socialist Federal 
Republic of  Yugoslavia, whose statesmen and peoples took pride in the fact 
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that they liberated the country from the Axis through the communist-led, 
popularly supported Partisan movement in the Second World War. Further-
more, Yugoslavia soon became the only communist state in Europe to break 
with the Soviet Union and establish itself  as neutral. The official socialist 
Yugoslav line presented the country as an ideal model of  multi-ethnicity, 
with six ethnic groups (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Slavic Mus-
lims and Montenegrins), five official languages (Serbo-Croatian, Slovenian, 
Macedonian, Magyar and Albanian) and three official religions (Catholi-
cism, Orthodoxy and Islam). Therefore, the leaders of  the state knew it 
was important to mobilize young generations for support of  specific goals 
and ideals of  the Yugoslav socialist federation and for nurturing interethnic 
tolerance among its different ethnic and religious groups.
In 1991, however, with the fall of  communism in Eastern Europe, a violent 
ethnic war erupted between Croatia and insurgent Croatian Serbs sup-
ported by Serb-dominated Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA). It began to tear 
the country apart. Within a decade, a series of  conflicts resulted in seven 
independent states.1 From the very beginning, the pro-regime media in the 
countries involved played an essential part in shaping public opinion on the 
war (Thompson 1994, 1). Even though the communist regime in Yugosla-
via was not as restrictive as in Eastern Bloc countries when it came to the 
notion of  media freedom, by the time the dissolution of  Yugoslavia had 
begun, the media in Croatia and Serbia were already firmly controlled by the 
conservative right-wing political elites who embraced exclusive ethnonational 
political programmes. One element that made the Yugoslav Wars unique is 
the fact that they took place on the brink of  the 21st century, the age that 
saw mass media culture thrive in Southeastern Europe. Given the extent of  
media coverage and ordinary citizens’ access to television, newspapers and 
radio, viewers could literally follow its day-to-day course, and were exposed 
to gruesome scenes from the war in a way unseen before in Southeastern 
Europe. In addition to this, ‘patriotic journalism’ and war propaganda con-
tributed to the state-of-war psychosis in which it was extremely difficult to 
differentiate between fact and misinformation.
How do we define propaganda? According to Professors of  Communica-
tions Garth Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell, it is ‘the deliberate, systematic 
attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior 
to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of  the propagandist’ 
(Jowett and O’Donnell 2012, 7). They further subclassify propaganda into 
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white (acknowledged source, accurate information), grey (source and/or 
information may or may not be verified) and black (false or conceived 
source, incorrect information) (Jowett and O’Donnell 2012, 17–20). These 
classifications will be of  importance for this study when comparing the 
media in Serbia and Croatia, the two largest and most regionally dominant 
of  the former Yugoslav states, and two of  the parties most deeply engaged 
in ethnic conflict during these wars.
The research proposed here will demonstrate how children were used to 
justify ethnic warfare and the notion of  ethnic exclusivity, one of  the most 
important strategies of  nation building in post-Yugoslav Croatia and Serbia. 
The evidence indicates that both Croatian and Serbian pro-nationalist media 
overexaggerated the role of  children as victims and, through manipulation 
and misinformation, sought to enhance the overall public sentiment of  
animosity and rancour towards the ‘other side’. Nevertheless, the message 
conveyed in such a way differs slightly in its purpose. Serbian media, while 
mainly resorting to grey and black propaganda, constantly overemphasized 
the genocidal nature of  the Croats and the parallelism with their crimes 
committed during the Second World War against Serbs and their children. 
On the other hand, Croatian media used children to a lesser extent through 
white propaganda, and with a predisposition towards centring on the pres-
ent; Croatian children were seen as critical and representative of  the ‘finally 
united’ Croatian collective national body (referring to the establishment of  
the independent nation-state in 1991), which fell victim to Serbian aggres-
sion and needed international recognition.
The connection between ideology and childhood indoctrination has recently 
been receiving more scholarly attention, especially among scholars work-
ing on topics concerning the processes of  nation building and political 
culture in the late 19th- and 20th-century. However, most of  these works 
deal with Western Europe, the United States, the former Soviet Union and 
Latin America, places where the nation-building process, when compared 
to Southeastern Europe at least, seems better established and successful.2 
As for Southeastern Europe, and the region of  the former Yugoslavia 
specifically, one notices the predominance of  one type of  approach that 
has left us with, at best, only a very incomplete understanding of  children’s 
central place in the cultural, social and political upheaval that marked the 
region. Recent historiography has produced numerous child-centred stud-
ies covering the period of  the Yugoslav Wars (1991–95). However, such 
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works focus exclusively on the problems of  children’s war trauma and the 
process of  rehabilitation.3 The contribution of  my project lies precisely in 
its different approach: instead of  looking at the more familiar subject of  
the after-the-fact personal experiences of  children who suffered through 
the war, I am turning to the new question of  how those who had taken 
control of  post-Yugoslav societies in Croatia and Serbia after the collapse 
of  communism used that suffering to manipulate the masses and motivate 
them to enthusiastically participate in the warfare.
The study revolves around selected themes and concepts crucial to the un-
derstanding of  the methods and effect of  utilizing children as propaganda 
tools by Serbian and Croatian media. The first one focuses on Serbian me-
dia, while also providing an overview of  the general situation regarding its 
tendencies of  communicating information to the Serbian public from 1991 
to 1995. The second section is equally structured, but it offers an insight 
into the problem from the Croatian media’s perspective. Finally, the two 
sides are compared, with a special emphasis on similarities and differences 
when it comes to the intentions and techniques behind the employment of  
such propaganda and its consequences on the relationship between the two 
countries and their position within the European community.
War for the sake of Serb children
The Yugoslav Wars, marked by the worst atrocities and war crimes seen in 
Europe since the Second World War, were initiated by Serbia and its ultra-
radical nationalist leader Slobodan Milošević, who took over the Serbian 
Communist Party in 1987. With the enormous military power of  the Yugo-
slav People’s Army, Milošević proclaimed himself  to be the representative 
of  the largest ethnic group in Yugoslavia (Thompson 1994, 51). The aim 
was to reunite all ethnic Serbs in one state, and this inevitably included the 
‘liberation’ of  large territories of  Croatia and Bosnia where Serbs represented 
the majority or the significant minority, and also expel non-Serbs in order to 
annex those territories to ‘historical Serbia’ (Brosse 2003, 14–15). Serbian 
media contributed to the Yugoslav disintegration more than any other state 
in the federation; Serbian leadership and the insurgent Serbs in Croatia did 
not accept the Croatian declaration of  independence in June 1991, and the 
war was to be fought only if  the public embraced the idea that it was done 
to preserve the very existence of  all Serbs, and was therefore a justified and 
divine mission (Thompson 1994, 51).
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During the 1990s, Radio Television Serbia (RTS) and newspapers Politika 
[Politics], Politika express [Political Express] and Večernje novosti [Evening 
News] became the main organs of  pro-regime propaganda in the state. 
In order to control the media institutions and their managers and staff  
and eliminate the possibility of  any critique of  the regime, those in power 
introduced heavy taxes for printing and the distribution of  independent 
newspapers, and refused to issue broadcasting licences for television and 
radio channels outside Milošević’s influence. Journalists who refused to 
practice the official, ‘patriotic’ style of  reporting were openly labelled as 
traitors, and publicly intimidated by death threats and pressure to resign 
their posts (Thompson 1994; Brosse 2003; Vekarić 2011).
One aspect of  propaganda to which the media in Serbia undoubtedly intro-
duced a new dimension during the war in Croatia (and later Bosnia) was the 
manipulation and (re)invention of  myths related to Serbian people’s history 
and national identity. The most prominent were those connected to the 
genocidal crimes committed against the Serbs by the extremist groups of  
Croats during the Second World War, as well as the defeat by the Ottoman 
Turks at the Battle of  Kosovo in 1389. Therefore, the resurrected Serbian 
identity was endangered by the ‘other’ identities that had suppressed it in 
the past: Croatian, Bosnian (refers to Muslims, in relation to Turks) and 
Albanian (given the demands of  Albanians for autonomy in Kosovo). The 
public was constantly reminded about those bloody episodes, which resulted 
in the collective spread of  animosity and prejudices towards the denomi-
nated ‘others’, and the children’s role was crucial in accomplishing this goal.
Starting from 1990, Serbian media were filled with reports about exhuma-
tions and reburials of  Serb victims killed in Croatia and Bosnia by the 
members of  the Croatian Ustasha (Ustaša) movement in the Independent 
State of  Croatia during the Second World War.4 For instance, in August 
1991, RTS broadcast a lengthy report concerning the exhumation of  the 
Serb ‘martyrs’ from a mass grave discovered in Prebilovci, a small village 
in the south of  Herzegovina. According to the report, those victims were 
ruthlessly executed by the Ustashas, and the viewers could see their remains 
being transferred to coffins and buried properly. A separate part of  the 
report consists of  a landscape that shows a pile of  very small, children’s 
skulls, which are then zoomed in on so as to leave the viewers no room 
for doubt about to whom they belonged. Dramatic music accompanying 
the video clip contributes to the heavy atmosphere, while the speech of  
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Dobrica Ćosić, one of  the most prominent Serb intellectuals at the time, 
reminded viewers of  the ‘unbearable burden of  the tragedy of  the Serbian 
people’ (RTS 1991).
Establishing parallels between the Croatian political leadership in the 1990s 
and that of  the pro-fascist Croatian state, led by Ante Pavelić in collabora-
tion with Adolf  Hitler in the Second World War, was one of  the widely 
used strategies of  intimidating the Serbian ethnic community and ‘inducing’ 
the desired attitude and sentiment towards the ‘enemies’. Croats began to 
be collectively called ‘Ustashas’ in the Serbian media, and what needed to 
become ingrained in people’s minds is the fact that history repeats itself  and 
that the genocidal nature of  the Croats was about to be manifested again 
by reiterating all those monstrous actions from the past. More importantly, 
the message of  the above-mentioned television report was supposed to 
convince the Serbs that even their offspring would not be spared by the 
Croats’ newly awakened thirst for blood (Denich 1994).
In this context, it was the Serb children who emerged as symbols of  the 
collective Serbian trauma and represent the ‘Holy Crusade’ for the Serbian 
‘Promised Land’. Extremely morbid accounts of  alleged atrocities against 
them were perpetually served to the public in Serbia, and were not restricted 
to reports on commemorations and reburials only. For instance, the regional 
newspaper Otadžbina [Homeland], published within the territory of  the 
Republic of  Serbian Krajina,5 contained a separate section entitled ‘Geno-
cide Against Serbs (1941–45)’. On 13 May 1995, the poem ‘The Memory 
of  Little Milena’ by Mirko Rakić appeared on the page of  this section. It 
laments the death of  a Serbian girl who was ‘impaled by the Ustasha cut-
throats’. A picture of  a baby girl is added to the text to make the readers’ 
reaction even more emotionally driven. Numerous similar testimonies of  
Serb children’s sufferings under the Ustasha regime found their place on 
television or in the press, and very explicit and suggestive language like the 
one in Rakić’s poem helped in creating specific symbolic narratives that 
glorified the sacrifice and the collective woes of  the Serb peoples. The goal 
of  such messages was to mobilize as many volunteers as possible for the 
war cause, and the personal motivation for many of  the recruits joining 
Serbian troops frequently had to do with their children’s well-being and the 
fear they might suffer the same fate as Serb children forty-five years earlier 
(RTS 1991).6 ‘Liberation’ was at the centre of  the political vocabulary of  
Serbian leaders, who knew how to play the role of  liberators. They would 
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visit schools and orphanages in Croatia and promise to protect Serb chil-
dren from the rampaging Croats, and their speeches would be broadcast 
and closely analysed.7 Therefore, even though burying past crimes was part 
of  maintaining interethnic harmony in the multiethnic Yugoslav federation, 
as socialist Yugoslavia disintegrated, the Serbian and Croatian nationalist 
movements based on ethnic exclusivity returned these episodes to their 
centre-stage position (Denich 1994; Pavlaković 2013).
The case that best illustrates the extent and consequences of  Serbian 
black propaganda unravelled in the Croatian city of  Vukovar in November 
1991, when Croatian forces surrendered and the YPA and other Serbian 
paramilitary units established control over the city. On 20 November the 
inter national news agency Reuters released information that the massacred 
bodies of  forty-one Serbian children between five and seven years of  age 
had been found in an elementary school basement. The news came from 
a Serbian freelance photographer Goran Mikić, allegedly a witness to the 
crime. The case became the focal point of  the RTS evening news on that 
same day. Invited as the guest speaker, Mikić claimed he had seen the dead 
children’s bodies, but brought no additional evidence (Brosse 2003, 7–8). 
Consequently, a special forensic team consisting of  medical experts from 
Belgrade was sent to Vukovar to look for evidence. They ransacked houses, 
schools, basement shelters and kindergartens, but found no traces of  dead 
children (Baljak and Hedl 2006).
A public retraction from the YPA and Reuters was made on 21 November 
in the RTS evening news programme in which, ironically, war analysts dis-
cussed the connection of  the murders of  children in Vukovar with those by 
the Ustashas in the Second World War, forcing the presenter to apologise 
to the viewers. Serbia’s ‘most credible’ paper Politika also published the 
rebuttal on 23 November, but merely as a succinct statement in the back 
of  the issue (Brosse 2003, 8).
Although the story was quickly retracted, the timing of  its release and its 
widespread coverage in the Serbian media inevitably played a part in sub-
sequent retaliations against Croats. The Ovčara massacre, considered one 
of  the worst atrocities in Europe after the Second World War, is especially 
relevant in this context. Between 20 and 21 November, at a dairy farm in 
Ovčara near Vukovar, more than 260 people (mostly war prisoners and 
patients and staff  from the Vukovar hospital) were executed by members 
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of  the Serb militia (Nazor 2011; Ingrao and Emmert 2012). Renaud de la 
Brosse, an expert on political communication, considers this a case of  not 
only black but also unlawful propaganda that violates human rights and 
international law for political purposes (Brosse 2003, 11–12). Also, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia acknowledged 
the testimony of  Vesna Bosanac, the head of  the Vukovar hospital, who 
believed that the news about the children massacre was deliberately released 
to justify the Ovčara crime and subsequent retaliations (Bosanac 1998).
Unverified information involving children was also often disseminated by 
personalities who enjoyed a high reputation among the Serbian public. In 
the second half  of  1991, RTS broadcast a speech of  the Serbian bishop 
Filaret, who appears behind a table on which lies a small skull, and acquaints 
the viewers with ‘one more instance of  the Ustashas’ ruthlessness’.
The Ustashas came to a Serbian village near Kukuruzari and 
captured a small [Serbian boy] Ilija and forced his mother to 
watch his throat being cut ... The mother ran after them and 
begged for her dead child, but they refused, and instead car-
ried him away and burned him. This skull is all that’s left ... 
(Lalić 1999)
It was no secret that bishop Filaret was a passionate supporter of  Milošević’s 
political programme. He was not only actively engaged in helping Serbs in 
Croatia and Bosnia, but he also assisted Serbian military and paramilitary 
troops (Ognjević 2004). Despite the fact that the authenticity of  this story 
was never acknowledged, he, himself, was supposed to represent a ‘credible’ 
and ‘sacred’ mouthpiece of  the Serbian nation. Involving children provoked 
strong emotional reactions and dehumanized the foe as much as possible.
Media lynching and extortion were one of  the most frequently employed 
strategies of  patriotic journalists in Serbia and including crimes against 
children guaranteed their ‘success’. One of  the most notorious such cases 
concerned Davor Markobašić, a Croatian guardsman who was accused 
by the Serbian press of  butchering Serb children in Vukovar and making 
necklaces out of  their fingers, although there was no evidence except for 
hearsay (Vekarić 2011, 193–202). His name and address were published in the 
press, and his wife was killed on an Ovčara farm by gunshots to the stomach 
and vagina; she was pregnant, and was murdered because of  the rumours 
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that stigmatized her husband as a slaughterer and rapist of  Serb children 
(Došen 1998). There are numerous other examples of  openly denouncing 
individuals for purportedly committing crimes against children. In his book, 
Deputy War Crimes Prosecutor in Serbia Bruno Vekarić mentions the tes-
timony of  one of  the prisoners in the Serbian internment camp: Begejci. 
On his internment, Serbian soldiers removed a knife from his pocket that 
they considered was the weapon with which he supposedly killed five or 
more Serb children who were later said to be found in his bathtub. He was 
labelled a murderer of  children (Vučenić 2003, cited in Vekarić 2011, 223).
Cases like this indicate the psychological influence of  child-centred propa-
ganda on the minds and actions of  those directly engaged in warfare and 
treatment of  the enemy. Even though in most cases it was not possible to 
confirm the credibility of  the information in any way, the manner in which 
these messages were conveyed had a tremendous impact on the Serbian 
public, especially troops on the Croatian fronts, and it served the purpose 
of  favouring Milošević regime’s warmongering agenda.
‘My father is a Croatian Guardsman’
In May of  1990 the Croatian Democratic Union (CDU), a new conservative 
right-wing party led by Franjo Tuđman, won the elections in the Socialist 
Republic of  Croatia (at the time still part of  Yugoslavia) with a surprisingly 
large number of  votes. It based its programme on ‘the right of  the Croatian 
people for self-determination and state sovereignty’ (Nova Hrvatska 1990, 
9–11, cited in Denich 1994, 377). More importantly, the new Croatian 
nationalism excluded Serbs as one of  the ‘constituent nations’ of  Croatia 
(which was the case during the Titoist regime) and changed its status to that 
of  a ‘minority’. Although the Croatian constitution from 1990 granted na-
tional minorities the right to assert their nationality and linguistic and cultural 
autonomy, the coexistence of  Serbs and Croats was looked on as abnormal. 
Also, the extreme Serbian nationalism that resonated with the large number 
of  Serbs in Croatia only intensified Croatian nationalist impulses that had 
been suppressed for a long time (Denich, 1994, 377–83).
Croatian nationalism, just like Serbian, had its roots and ‘justifications’ in 
myth and history. The new government’s rhetoric rested on the narrative 
that Croatia had been oppressed under foreign monarchs for too many cen-
turies, and that Croatian people almost always were forced to sacrifice their 
identity and faith. The definition of  war was very straightforward: Croatia 
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had at last achieved independence and had to defend its national body and 
protect its territory and freedom against the aggressor (Thompson 1994).
Up until 1990, Croatian media were known for their objectivity and multi-
perspectivity, which is not surprising given the country’s different regional 
identities. When the CDU came to power, however, it seized the monopoly 
over the main television and press headquarters. Croatian National Television 
(CRT) and newspapers Večernji list [Evening Courier] and Vjesnik [Herald] 
became the most important CDU mouthpieces. ‘Patriotic journalism’ in 
Croatia actually mirrored that of  Serbia: loyal CDU people (all of  them 
being Croats) ascended to the chief  positions of  the state apparatus as well 
as the main pro-regime media headquarters. Journalists who criticized the 
new government (and the majority of  Serb journalists) were intimidated 
or instantly replaced with those ready to go along the ‘patriotic’ line, and 
independent or private media were continuously sabotaged and forced to 
stop their broadcasting or distribution (Thompson 1994; Kurspahić 2003, 
Malović and Selnow 2001).
In the eyes of  the CDU leaders, children occupied a very important role in 
the process of  nation building. Unlike Serbian media that used children, first 
and foremost, to remind the public about crimes from the past, children 
in Croatian propaganda assumed a very present role. They personified the 
victimhood of  the national corpus suffering from Serbian aggression and 
also acted as ambassadors and future leaders of  the new country on the 
European political map that sought recognition from Europe and the world.
To begin with, children represented one of  the crucial ‘pillars’ of  the CDU’s 
political campaign. Apart from being victims in need of  protection, they 
also symbolized the future or, better yet, young citizenry who deserved to 
grow up in an independent Croatia, one which would not ‘suffer for Yugo-
slav and Serbian interests’. As the generation of  vital importance for nation 
building, they appeared in political campaign speeches, videos, concerts and 
posters, while President Franjo Tuđman acted as the nation’s ‘fatherly figure’ 
and protector. One of  the electoral campaign posters from 1990 shows the 
president carrying two little girls in his arms, while the message says ‘The 
Safe Future of  Croatia’.8 In another interesting pre-election video from 1992, 
Tuđman explains to a young boy that, throughout his life, he was punished 
for his political views (referring to his imprisonment for advocating Croa-
tian autonomy and independence from Yugoslavia and, more importantly, 
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against Serbian expansionism). The young boy answers by acknowledging the 
role of  the president in the achievement of  a free and independent Croatia 
and stating that he knows they [Croats] need to liberate the country from 
the occupier, and that his dad is also contributing by fighting on the front 
(Globus 1992, 18, 39, cited in Senjković 2002, 140–41). Hence, he represents 
both the newly established state and its future endangered by the occupiers.
Indeed, by the end of  1991, when nearly one-third of  Croatian territory was 
occupied by the rebel Serbs and YPA, victimhood and suffering became the 
central themes of  Croatia’s political vocabulary. As quintessential war vic-
tims, children fit this concept well, and their hardships were ‘usable’ for two 
purposes: openly denouncing the enemy and appealing to the international 
community to recognize Croatian independence and its ‘suffering body’. 
The media, when it came to children, relied on visual imagery much more 
than the written word. Countless reports centred on the hazards Croatian 
children had to confront in the war zones, and newspapers were filled with 
images of  youngsters hiding in shelters or saying goodbye to their fathers 
heading to the fronts, ready to put their lives on the line for their sons and 
daughters’ well-being. As with Serbian media, texts of  this kind frequently 
referred to those responsible for children’s tragedies and trauma and, in doing 
so, journalists continually overgeneralized and exaggerated. For example, on 
12 May 1991 the newspaper Vjesnik published an article by Marijan Vogrinec 
who in his political commentary wondered:
How to understand that today, on the verge of  the 21st cen-
tury, in the country we thought was a homeland of  civilized 
people, Croatian mothers ... do not let their children go to 
school, because they ... might get hurt ... or kidnapped and 
held hostage by horrifying beardos? (Vjesnik 4)
The derogatory term at the end refers to the members of  Serbian para-
military units called Chetniks, notorious for having long beards, and who, as 
in this case, were literally portrayed as monsters. Some of  the other common 
terms used to denominate the other side were, for instance, ‘Serbs’, ‘Chet-
niks’, ‘monsters’, ‘bands of  savages’, ‘Yugo-communists’, ‘non-humans’ and 
‘pure evil’. This was especially effective during the interviews of  refugee chil-
dren on national television during the second half  of  1991, when reporters 
asked the children who they thought caused their hardships. The collective 
stigmatization of  the enemy was present in both Serbian and Croatian media.
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The period between 1991 and 1995 was also marked by the production of  
numerous patriotic song collections, performed by many prominent artists 
and perpetually broadcast on national television and radio. Children were 
one of  the most frequent ‘elements’ of  such songs, and their mention or 
appearance incited viewers’ emotions and maternal instincts. One of  the 
most famous war songs was ‘Hrvatine’ [Croats] by Đuka Čaić. In the music 
video, one of  the song lines, ‘Čuvaj oče majčicu, ognjište i sestricu’ [Father, 
protect mother, home and little sister], is depicted by the scene of  a mother 
and child hidden in a shelter, and then a Croatian soldier carrying a baby 
in his lap (saving its life). However, ‘Hrvatine’ never reached the popularity 
of  ‘Stop the War in Croatia’ by Tomislav Ivčić, a singer actively engaged in 
supporting the CDU Party, whose anti-war song became a symbol of  Croa-
tia’s victimhood worldwide. Accompanied by a children’s choir, he is asking 
Europe (in English) to ‘stop the war in the name of  children’, but also to 
‘let Croatia be one of  Europe’s stars’. If  we look at children in this context, 
besides appealing to Europe to act in the name of  the younger generation, 
they also take on the responsibility of  ambassadors of  their young, new-
born country, and therefore assume an active participatory role rather than 
only being passive victims. This need to demonstrate the Europeanness of  
Croatia was one of  the crucial goals of  the political elites in the early 1990s, 
and the international audience could hardly be left indifferent to the plight 
of  Croatian children.
To accomplish the desired effect, exhibitions like those of  children’s drawings 
(usually depicting YPA tanks and fighter aircraft with red stars destroying 
homes with Croatian flags or other national symbols, and crying parents and 
children) were staged not only in Croatian museums but, more importantly, 
abroad, in countries like Germany, Switzerland or Austria.9 Since these were 
often organized and/or financed by the Croatian Ministry of  Education 
and other state institutions, reports of  such events as well as charity and 
humanitarian concerts for children funded from abroad were reviewed 
in the press and shown on television. Furthermore, these drawings were 
also printed on postcards or food boxes intended for Croatian guardsmen 
on the fronts, where they were received with great enthusiasm (Šigir 1993, 
46–47; Senjković 2002, 35, 45–46). Croatian war posters included images 
of  inconsolable mothers and children in exile, and the message on them 
was very clear-cut: the aggressor was ‘Serbia and the Yugo-communist army’ 
(Reljanović 2010).
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Figure 1 
Poster ‘My father 
is a Croatian 
Guardsman too’. 
This image is 
reproduced with 
the kind permission 
of the Croatian
History Museum.
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One of  the most conspicuous posters (Figure 1) shows a small boy fully 
dressed in dark green Croatian military uniform and wearing a headband 
decorated with the Croatian coat of  arms (chessboard emblem); he is stand-
ing with his right arm raised while his fingers form the internationally 
recognized V for victory sign (Reljanović 2010, 244–245). The message 
reads: ‘I moj tata je hrvatski vojnik’ [My father is a Croatian Guardsman too]. 
The concept behind this poster resembles that of  the famous British war 
poster from the First World War: ‘Daddy, what did YOU do in the Great 
War?’ by Savile Lumley.
Although the poster designers claimed they were ‘not produced as a result 
of  a programme within the scope of  a powerful and organized propaganda 
machine’ (Reljanović 2012, 19), its primary purpose was to contribute to 
enhancing war mobilization. Interestingly, connecting children to Croatian 
national symbols, such as a coat of  arms, flags or military uniforms and 
insignia worn by Croatian fighters (see boy on poster), was a very popular 
tendency in the pro-regime press and television, particularly in communi-
cating with an audience beyond the state itself. By portraying a child who, 
again, stands for the universal war victim as well as a young citizen and 
patriot aware of  his country’s struggle for freedom, it managed to bridge 
the two dimensions that Croatian political elites needed to do to promote 
the Croatian cause, both locally and internationally.
Conclusion
This study has shown that the use of  children as an instrument of  war 
 propaganda represented one of  the main strategies of  the ‘most produc-
tive’ pro-regime media in Serbia and Croatia during their conflict between 
1991 and 1995. Both incorporated children into the victim-centred war 
propaganda; their nationalist political leaders claimed the right of  their 
states to victory by reiterating notions of  victimhood, defence and protec-
tion, ingrained in different mythological and historical explanations and 
justifications.
A dominant view of  Serbian history that emerged after 1986 was that of  
a ‘heroic, long-suffering nation, struggling for centuries against invaders 
and annihilation’; this specifically referred to the Ottoman Turks and the 
massive extermination of  Serbs by members of  the Croatian Ustasha move-
ment in the Second World War. Therefore, engagement in the war against 
secessionist Croatia became a chance for Serbian revenge. On the other 
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hand, Croatian nationalism was very much fuelled by the contemporary 
expansionist ‘Greater Serbian threat’ posed by Milošević, even though it 
was also rooted in the ‘long-time oppression by foreign rulers’. The aim of  
the propaganda was to convince the public that Croatia must be defended 
from Serbian aggression and, more importantly, aided by the European 
powers who would recognize its independence. Hence, while Serbia and 
its parastate the Republic of  Serbian Krajina found itself  isolated in the at-
tempt to create Greater Serbia, Croatia turned to Europe, claiming its right 
to become a fully fledged member of  the European Union (UE).
Both Serbian and Croatian media exaggerated and overgeneralized children’s 
victimhood to gain the sympathies of  the public by depicting the children’s 
vulnerability and helplessness. In-depth analysis highlights the three com-
mon ‘functions’ of  children in both cases. First, children’s suffering was an 
effective instigator of  war mobilization. Secondly, both propaganda systems 
used children as an embodiment of  the nation and its peoples’ ‘sacrifice for 
the long-awaited freedom and reaffirmation’. Lastly, even though children do 
personify the future of  a particular nation (if  we look at this idea from the 
perspective of  a natural course of  the life cycle), this notion was constantly 
overstated in the midst of  the war atmosphere to the point that its real mean-
ing became distorted by the propaganda. The three aspects mentioned are 
by no means a novelty in the history of  modern war propaganda; since the 
First and, notably, the Second World War, children have played a vital part 
in the mass propaganda machinery. Nevertheless, the priority was mostly 
given to their role as soldiers or members of  massive children’s organizations 
such as Hitler Youth or Komsomol (All-Union Leninist Communist League 
of  Youth). This was not the case in post-Yugoslav Croatia and Serbia, the 
leaders of  which created their own nationalist agendas within the turbulent 
fall of  communism and new European geopolitical reality.
When it comes to methods of  dissemination through visual, audio and 
printed media, such as videos, photographs, war posters, war songs and 
newspaper articles, Serbian propaganda involving children was notorious for 
its unscrupulousness. It consisted of  techniques such as extortion, media-
lynching, spreading false information, the falsification of  sources and/
or a general lack of  credible sources. Many of  the cases described can 
therefore be considered unlawful and/or a combination of  grey and black 
propaganda. Croatian child-focused propaganda was not as transparent 
as Serbian, but rather subtly infiltrated into white propaganda machinery 
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organized to maintain the status of  the ‘victim of  aggression’ that ‘pays the 
price for its independence’. Croatian media relied more on visual images 
than the written word, and connected children in contexts related to their 
inextricable connection to national Croatian political and military symbols. 
Consequently, their role as ambassadors of  the newly independent state 
was much more active than that of  Serbian children, who were treated 
exclusively as passive victims.
The consequences of  such well-elaborated and widespread child-centred 
propaganda were no less fatal for Serbian and Croatian societies than the 
war itself. The psychological element at the core of  this mechanism of  
propaganda led many to embrace the concept of  war as existential and 
interethnic. The often exaggerated victimization of  children no doubt in-
tensified during the war. It remains a burning issue to this day; one of  the 
barriers that still prevents the normalization of  relations between Croatia 
and Serbia has to do with education and textbooks, and the way in which 
the two sides interpret this conflict and who the victims are. Ultimately, it 
all has to do with educating the younger generations and future leaders of  
these nations.
Finally, the development of  their national identities in the 1990s, and es-
pecially the role of  children in it, helps us better understand the current 
positions of  Croatia and Serbia in the contemporary European order, with 
the former being the newest member of  the European Union, and the lat-
ter, because of  its isolation, finding itself  wavering between an EU–NATO 
partnership and its traditional ally, Russia. This project is also significant to 
the understanding of  the workings of  ethnicity and nationalism in Europe 
as a whole, where recent events, such as those in Ukraine or the European 
reactions to the refugee crisis, have shown us that ethnonational exclusivities, 
once thought to be disappearing in the face of  the European Union, are 
only becoming more important with the rise of  an ethnonational right wing. 
Finally, the project has a global significance, as it explores the potential of  
media and new communication technologies for both using and indoctrinat-
ing children in the service of  nationalism, patriotism, chauvinism and other 
regime-driven political purposes.
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ENDNOTES
1  The term Yugoslav Wars refers to a series of conflicts: Ten-Day War in Slovenia 
(May-June 1991), Croatian War of Independence (1991–95), Bosnian (1992–95), Croat-
Bosniak (1992–94), and Serbia-Kosovo (1998–99) conflict.
2  See Katriona Kelly, Children’s World: Growing Up in Russia, 1890–1991 (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 2007); Anna Saunders, Honecker’s Children: Youth and Patriotism 
in Eastern Germany, 1979–2002 (New York: Manchester University Press, 2007); Tara 
Zahra, Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands, 
1900–1948 (London: Cornell University Press, 2008).
3  See Joseph Kerrigan and William Novick, eds., Healing the Heart of Croatia (New 
York and Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1998); Vjekoslav Šaravanja, 10,000 djece bez roditelja 
u Domovinskom ratu [10,000 Parentless Children of the Homeland War] (Slavonski Brod: 
Obiteljski centar župe Duha Svetoga, 2001); Neven Šikić, Miomir Žužul and Ivan Fattorini, 
eds, Stradanja djece u domovinskom ratu [Suffering of children in the homeland war] (Jastre-
barsko, Zagreb: Naklada Slap and Klinika za dječje bolesti Zagreb, 1994).
4  The term Ustasha (Ustaša) refers to the members of the pro-Fascist organization ac-
tive before and during WWII in Croatia, which supported the establishment of the  Independent 
State of Croatia (1941–45) as a Nazi satellite state (encompassed Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
part of Serbia and modern day Croatia). As part of creating ethnically pure Croatia, hun-
dreds of thousands of people were executed or expelled, particulary Serbs, Jews and Roma.
5  The Republic of Serbian Krajina existed from 1991 to 1995 as a Serbian state within 
the territorial boundaries of the Republic of Croatia, but it was never recognized internationally.
6  See, for instance, interviews by RTS from August 1991.
7  See, for example, issues of Politika between 1991 and 1992.
8  Available at the Institute of Ethnology and Folklore Research in Zagreb.
9  See, for instance, Djeca u ratu i poslije rata: izložba dječjih likovnih radova [Chil-
dren during and after the war: exhibition of children’s art works] (Osijek: Galerija likovnih 
umjetnosti, 1992); Ich Habe Angst: Ausstellung der Zeichnungen der Kroatischen kinder [I am 
afraid: exhibition of Croatian children’s drawings] (Zagreb: Hrvatski školski muzej, 1992); 
Papir, boje, kist i rat: izložba likovnih iskaza hrvatske djece o Domovinskom ratu [Paper, colours, 
brush and war: exhibition of Croatian children’s artistic expressions about the homeland war] 
(Zagreb: Hrvatski školski muzej, 1992); Sanjam o miru / I Dream of Peace (Zagreb: UNICEF 
and Croatian School Museum, 1992/93).
10  Square brackets in the reference list and endnotes contain author’s translations 
of titles originally written in other languages, mostly Croatian or Serbian.
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ABSTRACT
The article examines how memory of past violence is remediated online and how 
its remediation interacts with contemporary collective traumas in post-socialist 
countries. For this purpose, it examines how a single episode of the Second World 
War – the Battle of Kyiv of 1943 – is represented and interacted with on Wiki-
pedia. Using web content analysis, the article traces the evolution of narratives 
of past violence in different language versions of the encyclopedia and explores 
how the current conflict in Ukraine affects the refashioning of Second World 
War memory in digital media.
Remediating violence: Second World War memory on Wikipedia
The impact of  remediation – that is, the process of  refashioning existing 
media formats in new media (Bolter and Grusin 1999, 45) – on individual 
and collective remembrance is one of  the trending subjects in the field of  
memory studies.1 Mass media play a key role in representation of  the pres-
ent and the past alike, as the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann noted 
(Luhmann 2000, 102). Instead of  being ‘passive and transparent conveyors 
of  information’ (Erll 2008, 3), they set the agenda for current and future 
acts of  remembrance and determine how the past is represented and under-
stood. Consequently, the transition of  memories between different media 
has significant impact on the dynamics of  remembrance, which, as memory 
scholars Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney note, is increasingly dependent on media 
technologies and circulation of  media products (Erll and Rigney 2009, 3).
The growing interest towards remediation of  memory has resulted in a num-
ber of  academic works that examine interactions between digital media and 
traumatic memories in the post-socialist states.2 The importance of  this 
particular area is related to the disproportionate politicization of  cultural 
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remembrance that leads to frequent ‘memory wars’ (Blacker, Etkind and 
Fedor 2013) among the regional actors as well as the significant impact of  
digital media on transformation of  the local memory landscape (Rutten and 
Zvereva 2013). Remediation of  the traumatic past – in particular, Second 
World War memory – has also became intertwined with media coverage of  
the Ukraine crisis, which started in 2013 with anti-government protests in 
Kyiv that led to the ousting of  President Viktor Yanukovych in 2014, fol-
lowed by the annexation of  Crimea by Russia and the conflict between the 
Ukrainian government and pro-Russian insurgents in Eastern Ukraine, often 
known as the war in Donbass. A number of  scholars (Gaufman 2015; Siddi 
2017) note extensive use of  Second World War memory for explaining and 
interpreting the crisis on mainstream and digital media. However, until now 
the impact of  current collective traumas, such as the war in Donbass, on 
the remediation of  past violence in the region remains remains a pressing 
but understudied subject.
The article addresses this shortcoming by examining how a single Second 
World War episode – the Battle of  Kyiv of  1943 – is represented and inter-
acted with on Wikipedia. Not only is this episode an important milestone in 
the Second World War, it is also a recurring source of  historical controversy 
between Ukraine and Russia. By exploring how traumatic memories of  this 
event are conveyed on Wikipedia, which is both the world’s largest online 
encyclopedia and one of  the most popular websites in the post-socialist 
space,3 this article strives to trace the evolution of  narratives of  past vio-
lence online and to explore how the current conflict in Ukraine affects the 
remediation of  Second World War memory in the post-socialist countries.
Wikipedia and cultural memory: literature review
Remediation of  war memories is not a recent phenomenon and can be 
traced back at least to the middle of  the 19th century, when the media cov-
erage of  wars and conflicts was increasingly adapted for mass consumption 
(Keller 2001, 251). The development of  information and communication 
technologies led to the intensification of  this process in 1960s and 1970s, 
when it brought a ‘memory boom’ (Winter 2011) that transformed Second 
World War memory, in particular Holocaust remembrance. A few decades 
later, as media scholars Andrew Hoskins and Ben O’Loughlin argue, the 
distribution of  digital technologies resulted in a new memory boom that 
radically changed the remembrance of  contemporary conflicts (Hoskins and 
O’Loughlin 2010, 131). Not only did they enable ‘a far greater intensive and 
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extensive connectivity’ between the forms, agents and discourses of  memory 
(Hoskins 2009, 40), but they also opened up new possibilities for memory 
production and circulation, distinguished by low costs and a potentially high 
impact (de Cesari and Rigney 2014, 12).
The digital memory boom affected not only recent traumatic memories, but 
also the ones that have already experienced the process of  memorialization 
in the pre-digital time. A number of  studies suggest that the distribution 
of  digital commemorative practices has had a significant impact on the re-
membrance of  conflicts, such as the Second World War.4 The consequences 
of  the remediation of  older memories of  violence through digital media 
remain, however, a subject of  scholarly debate. The existing works offer 
contrasting assessments that vary from the formation of  more inclusive 
narratives of  conflicts that challenge hegemonic interpretations of  the past 
(Trubina 2010) to the propagation of  mutually exclusive interpretations 
of  traumatic historical episodes that ignite disagreements between their 
adherents (Nikiporets-Takigawa 2013).
Wikipedia is one of  the digital platforms, the impact of  which on collec-
tive remembrance is widely recognized both in post-socialist countries and 
worldwide. Christian Pentzold, a German communication scholar, argues 
that production of  Wikipedia articles can be viewed as process of  the 
‘discursive construction of  the past’, which involves a transition from com-
municative memory that is debated on the encyclopedia’s discussion pages 
to cultural memory that takes the form of  encyclopedia’s articles (Pentzold 
2009, 264). A number of  studies argue that the platform can be viewed 
as a transnational space that facilitates the production of  a fundamentally 
pluralistic historical knowledge (Hardy 2007), or as a digital forum that 
sustains consensus-building vis-à-vis contentious pasts (Dounaevsky 2013). 
Yet others theorize the site as an online platform that enforces hegemonic 
memory narratives (Luyt 2011) or a mnemonic battleground on which dif-
ferent views of  the past clash (Rogers and Sendijarevic 2012).
The interactions between Wikipedia and Second World War memory in the 
post-socialist space has attracted significant scholarly attention in the recent 
years;5 however, the existing assessments of  the encyclopedia’s impact on 
war remembrance in the area paint different pictures. Helene Dounaevsky, 
a communication scholar, argues that Wikipedia facilitates creation of  ‘a spe-
cial type of  historical knowledge’ which is characterized by uncertainty 
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and polyphonism that challenge hegemonic interpretations of  the Second 
World War (Dounaevsky 2013). By contrast, an interdisciplinary team of  
researchers demonstrates in their study of  Stepan Bandera, a leader of  the 
Ukrainian nationalist movement in 1940s and 1950s, that different versions 
of  the encyclopedia tend to transmit local narratives of  Second World War 
(Fredheim, Howanitz and Makhortykh 2014), thus promoting a ‘linguistic 
point of  view’ of  the past (Massa and Scrinzi 2013). The current study at-
tempts to investigate further the platform’s impact on the complex memory 
landscape of  the region and examine how its interaction with Second World 
War memory is affected by the ongoing Ukraine crisis.
Battle of Kyiv: historical background
In autumn 1943, Soviet troops approached Kyiv, the former capital of  Soviet 
Ukraine, which was seized by the Germans two years earlier. At the end 
of  September, Soviet units managed to capture a number of  bridgeheads 
on the German-controlled right bank of  the River Dnieper; the largest of  
those were the Lyutezh and Bukrin bridgeheads. In the weeks that followed, 
the Red Army made several attempts to seize the city; however, none of  
them were successful, due to the heavy losses sustained while crossing the 
River Dnieper and the difficult terrain on the right bank. Soviet losses were 
particularly high at the Bukrin bridgehead, originally envisioned as a primary 
bridgehead for capturing Kyiv.
The unsuccessful October operations led the Soviet High Command to 
relocate Soviet forces to the Lyutezh bridgehead, from where a massive 
offensive was staged on 3 November. This operation was preceded by an-
other attack from the Bukrin bridgehead on 1–2 November; according to 
the Ukrainian historian Victor Korol, this distracting manoeuvre resulted 
in huge losses among Soviet ranks (Korol 2003). The rapid advancement 
of  the Soviet troops from the Lyutezh bridgehead, however, proved to be 
unexpected for the German command and on the morning of  6 November – 
the anniversary of  the October Revolution and the most important state 
holiday in the Soviet Union – Soviet forces recaptured the Ukrainian capital.
The successful actions of  the Red Army during the Battle of  Kyiv had 
a profound impact on the course of  the war. The capture of  Kyiv led to 
the destabilization of  the German front and a rapid Soviet advance in 1944; 
furthermore, it had great ideological significance, and was used to the fullest 
by Soviet propaganda (Shulzhenko and Tykhonenko 2013). The propaganda, 
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however, omitted the high losses suffered by the Red Army, estimations of  
which vary from 133,000 (Gorelov and Grutsyk 2013) to 270,000 (Levitas 
2012) dead and wounded. Today, however, a number of  Ukrainian schol-
ars argue that the high death toll was a consequence of  the Soviet High 
Command’s intent to liberate Kyiv for the anniversary date of  the October 
Revolution (Korol 2005, 22), which spurred the massive mobilization of  
Ukrainian men who were often sent to battle unprepared and – according 
to a few testimonies – insufficiently armed (Koval 1999, 95–96).
After the end of  the war, the Battle of  Kyiv quickly became an integral part 
of  the Great Patriotic War myth, which would later be instrumental in the 
creation of  a common public identity in the Soviet Union. During the Khru-
shchev period, 6 November became an official holiday – the Day of  the Libe-
ration of  Kyiv – and the actions of  the Red Army were unequivocally praised 
in Soviet historiography (Hrynevych 2005). A number of  monuments com-
memorating the battle appeared in Kyiv in the post-war period; however, the 
majority of  them were dedicated to the Soviet High Command, whereas the 
sacrifices of  rank-and-file soldiers remained largely ignored. While in the late 
1970s a few monuments dedicated to ordinary soldiers appeared in the Ukrai-
nian capital, these monuments usually commemorated soldiers who were 
fighting at the Lyutezh bridgehead; in contrast, the Bukrin bridgehead, where 
the bloodiest clashes took place, remained forgotten (Makhortykh 2014).
While in Ukraine the annual Soviet-style celebration of  the liberation of  Kyiv 
continued after the dissolution of  the Soviet Union, a number of  Ukrainian 
scholars (Ginda 2010; Korol 2003; Koval 1999) started questioning existing 
interpretations of  the event. The revision of  the Soviet narrative made it 
possible to integrate those traumatic memories that had been left out of  the 
glorious story of  the liberation into the public discourse of  the Second World 
War; yet, a number of  scholars note that the rewriting of  history in Ukraine 
led to the formation of  new myths, which emphasized the martyrdom of  
the Ukrainian people (Jilge 2008; Portnov and Portnova 2010). In the case 
of  the Battle of  Kyiv, this shift toward ‘competing victimhood’ (Jilge 2008) 
resulted in the deglorification of  the event and the propagation of  a view 
of  the battle as a Soviet crime against the Ukrainian people (Korol 2005) 
or even an instance of  genocide (Ginda 2010).
These radical revisions of  the existing narrative of  the glorious lib-
eration turned the Battle of  Kyiv into one of  the problematic issues in 
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Ukrainian–Russian memory relations. Despite significant challenges to the 
Great Patriotic War narrative in early 1990s, the cultural memory of  Sec-
ond World War in Russia experienced significantly fewer changes than in 
Ukraine. The revival of  the Soviet war narrative in Russia in the beginning 
of  the 2000s further contributed to the rise of  memory wars between the 
two countries, especially concerning the question of  Soviet war crimes. This 
memory warfare was not limited to academic historiographies and, instead, 
became increasingly present in political debates in Ukraine and Russia; these 
debates became more intense during the Ukraine crisis, when the Battle of  
Kyiv was referenced as a predecessor of  the Russian aggression against 
Ukraine (Fed’ko 2017; Lebid’ 2017).
Sections, edits, and posts: methodology
In order to investigate how Wikipedia is used for remediating past violence, 
I examined articles that deal with the capture of  Kyiv in Ukrainian (‘Bytva 
za Kyiv (1943)’), Russian (‘Kievskaia Nastupatelnaia Operatsiia’), Polish 
(‘Bitwa o Kijów (1943)’) and English (‘Battle of  Kiev (1943)’) versions of  
Wikipedia. The former three versions are the largest Eastern European 
versions of  the encyclopedia (‘List of  Wikipedias’) and are of  particular 
relevance for the process of  remediation of  the past in the region (Fred-
heim, Howanitz and Makhortykh 2014; Makhortykh 2017). The reason the 
English version is included is that it relates to its unique position as a global 
memory platform that hosts the most diverse community of  editors (Rogers 
and Sendijarevic 2012).
For the implementation of  my analysis, I used versions of  all the articles as 
retrieved on 1 December 2017: I started by comparing the ways both histori-
cal episodes are framed in different language versions of  Wikipedia. Similarly 
to earlier studies (Rogers and Sendijarevic 2012; Božović, Bošković and 
Trifunović 2014; Fredheim, Howanitz and Makhortykh 2014), I conducted 
a web content analysis of  selected components of  the Wikipedia articles: 
titles, tables of  content, images and categories. These components are not 
only concise enough to be easily compared, but they also provide a brief  
summary of  the article’s content (titles and images), clarify the structure of  
the article’s narrative (table of  contents) and reveal the article’s position in 
the larger Wikipedia structure (categories).
Having compared how the Battle of  Kyiv is represented in Wikipedia, 
I then explored how the encyclopedia’s users interact with those patterns. 
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While many of  earlier studies (Ferron and Massa, 2011; Keegan, Gergle 
and Contractor 2011) rely mostly on passive forms of  user interaction (that 
is, viewings), I focused on active forms of  interaction, such as edits and 
comments on the articles’ ‘Talk’ pages, that have higher interpretative value 
(Rogers and Sendijarevic 2012; Luyt 2015). Based on these data, I compared 
the dynamics of  interactions with the articles in different language versions 
in order to examine how contemporary collective traumas – such as the 
conflict in Eastern Ukraine – influence interactions with Second World War 
memory in post-socialist countries.
Battle of Kyiv on Wikipedia: findings
Representation
Titles. All Wikipedia articles have a title that describes the main subject of  
that article and distinguishes one article from another (‘Wikipedia: Article 
Titles’). It would seem reasonable to assume that different language versions 
of  Wikipedia would use the same name for articles on the same subject: 
however, as also in an earlier studies of  the memory of  the Srebrenica mas-
sacre in Wikipedia (Rogers and Sendijarevic 2012) and the Second World 
War in Ukraine (Makhortykh 2017), a comparison of  the respective titles 
for the Battle of  Kyiv articles – translated into English – pointed to the 
existence of  certain variations, as shown in Table 1.
Table 1. The titles of articles in different language versions of Wikipedia
Version English Polish Russian Ukrainian
Title Battle of Kiev (1943)




Battle for Kyiv 
(1943)
Three out of  four articles used the title ‘Battle of/for Kyiv’, the informal 
name for the Kyiv offensive operation that took place between 3 and 13 
November 1943. The official name – ‘Kyiv offensive operation’ – was used 
for the Russian version of  the article, whereas in the other three languages the 
informal name was preferred, with the additional indicator of  ‘1943’ used to 
distinguish it from the article about the Battle of  Kyiv of  1941. While these 
distinctions were not as significant as in other cases – such as, the capture of  
Lviv by Germans in 1941 (Makhortykh 2017) – the presence of  disagree-
ments on such a basic level can be the first indicator of  the differences in the 
representation of  the Battle of  Kyiv between the various language versions.
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Table of  contents. The tables of  contents in Wikipedia consist of  article head-
ings that clarify and organize that article’s content better (‘Wikipedia: Writing 
Better Articles’). Each heading points to a particular topic that is discussed 
in the article: therefore, the table of  contents can be used as a source of  
semantic information, which, as media scholars Richard Rogers and Emina 
Sendijarevic note, can be particularly useful for investigating differences in 
representation of  the same event across different versions of  the encyclo-
pedia (Rogers and Sendijarevic 2012).
A comparison of  the tables of  contents from the Battle of  Kyiv articles 
showed that the Ukrainian and Russian versions had a similar structure, 
consisting of  three parts: an introduction/background to the battle, how 
it played out and the battle’s aftermath. The English and Polish articles, 
instead, elaborated on the course of  the battle by dividing it into several 
stages – for example, the preparatory stage, the capture of  Kyiv and the 
Rauss counterattacks – and assigned independent sections for each of  these 
stages. Unlike the former two articles, the structure of  the English/Polish 
articles implied that the seizure of  Kyiv consisted of  several stages, and 
that Soviet troops encountered heavy resistance from the Germans. These 
differences can be explained both by the variations in the articles’ scope 
(with the Russian/Ukrainian articles being focused exclusively on the Kyiv 
offensive operation) and the focus on successful Soviet operations in the 
Russian/Ukrainian versions that ignored the subsequent Soviet defeats in 
the course of  the German counterattacks.
However, despite similarities in structuring the narrative, the Russian/Ukrai-
nian and English/Polish versions often allotted different meanings to the 
same sections. For instance, the section about the battle’s course in the Ukrai-
nian article mentioned several unsuccessful Soviet attacks from the Bukrin 
bridgehead, whereas the Russian Wikipedia ignored them by focusing on 
the successful actions at the Lutezh bridgehead. The focus on the glorious 
aspects of  the battle in the Russian article was supplemented with a detailed 
discussion of  the losses incurred by the German side. Such a discussion was 
absent from the Ukrainian article; in contrast, it alone noted that German 
forces burned down parts of  Kyiv before their retreat, describing how Soviet 
troops captured the ‘almost empty and burning city’ (‘Bytva za Kyiv (1943)’).
The discrepancy between the narratives of  military victory and human 
suffering was also traced in the case of  the English and Polish articles. 
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The ‘Soviet preparations’ section in the English article briefly mentioned 
‘serious trouble’ (‘Battle of  Kiev (1943)’) encountered by the Red Army at 
the Bukrin bridgehead before switching to the successful operations at the 
Lutezh bridgehead. Similarly, despite mentioning the successful German 
counterattacks, the English article emphasized the glorious achievements 
of  the Soviet side in the Battle of  Kyiv. In contrast, the Polish article dedi-
cated significant attention to the failed operations of  the Red Army at the 
Bukrin bridgehead and mentioned the high death toll among the Soviet 
soldiers. This feature connects the Polish article with the Ukrainian one: 
both dedicated significant attention to the price of  the Soviet victory in the 
Battle of  Kyiv.
Images. In her work on visual images and 9/11, Kari Anden-Papadopoulus, 
a communication scholar from Sweden, notes that the pictorial turn in to-
day’s culture increasingly affects the way traumatic memories are represented 
(Anden-Papadopoulus 2003, 101). The articles on the Battle of  Kyiv were 
also accompanied by a selection of  images, even while these images were 
not numerous and presented little variety. The largest number of  images – 
eight – was found in the Polish article, whereas the Ukrainian and English 
articles included three images each and the Russian article included only 
two images. Some of  these images were recurrent across several articles: 
for instance, the photo of  victorious Soviet soldiers marching across ru-
ined Khreschatyk was used in all versions except the Ukrainian one. Other 
common images included an image of  Soviet troops before the battle (the 
Ukrainian and Polish articles) and German tanks preparing for the coun-
terattack (the English and Polish articles).
The use of  individual images followed the patterns of  representation men-
tioned in the earlier section on the articles’ table of  contents. In addition 
to the image of  victorious Soviet soldiers, the Russian article showed an 
image of  the Soviet military reward that was introduced to mark the cap-
ture of  the Ukrainian capital; the central position of  this image promoted 
the interpretation of  the event as a Soviet triumph and put the main em-
phasis on the glorious aspects of  the battle. A similar stance was observed 
in the English article, which used the image of  Soviet military plans for 
the article’s opening; together with the images of  Soviet soldiers in post-
battle Kyiv and German tanks in Zhytomyr, it emphasized the military 
aspects of  the Battle of  Kyiv and promoted its interpretation in line with 
the  Soviet  narrative.
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By contrast, the Ukrainian and Polish articles featured the image of  So-
viet troops preparing for the Battle of  Kyiv. The black-and-white photo 
showed Soviet soldiers building rafts to cross the River Dnieper; a wooden 
sign displaying the words ‘Daesh’ Kiev!’ [For Kyiv!] in the background pro-
vided the context for the image. Unlike the visuals used in the other two 
versions, this image showed exhausted-looking men, photographed in the 
midst of  combat preparations, thus instilling a sense of  uncertainty in the 
reader and directing attention to the less glorious aspects of  the Battle 
of  Kyiv. This purpose was further advanced with images of  a post-war 
 memorial and a mass Soviet grave at the Bukrin bridgehead that promoted 
the interpretation of  the battle as a episode of  collective suffering. The 
Polish article did not include images of  Soviet graves; instead, in addi-
tion to the above mentioned image of  combat preparations, it showed 
a selection of  images made during the battle, including the ones of  So-
viet soldiers crossing the Dnieper. Such a broad selection of  images not 
only made the Polish article more informative, but also expanded its fo-
cus beyond the Soviet victory-centred narrative of  the Russian and Eng-
lish  articles.
Categories. According to Wikipedia’s own definition, ‘[t]he central goal of  
the category system is to provide navigational links to all Wikipedia pages 
in a hierarchy of  categories which readers ... can browse and quickly find 
sets of  pages on topics that are defined by those characteristics’ (‘Wikipedia: 
Categorization’). Wikipedia categories allow for the grouping of  existing 
articles into thematic sets, on the basis of  the essential characteristics of  
their subjects; consequently, categories constitute an important source of  
lexical and semantic information in Wikipedia (Zesch, Gurevych and Müh-
lhäuser 2007) that can provide a perspective on the differences pertaining 
to a particular event across various language versions.
I have grouped the existing categories into two sets, based on their semantics, 
as shown in Table 2. The first set – temporal indicators – includes categories 
related to the chronological attribution of  the event, whereas the second set – 
thematic indicators – includes categories related to the actual description of  
the event. This division allows us to differentiate between categories that 
are of  lesser importance for subject exploration (based on the assumption 
that the use of  time categories only marginally affects representations of  
the Second World War) and more semantically relevant, thematic categories, 
that are of  particular interest for the current analysis.
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Table 2. Categories in Wikipedia articles
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The examination of  thematic categories points to certain differences be-
tween language versions. The Russian article was the only one to use the 
‘Great Patriotic War’ category in classifying the article: this subjective defi-
nition, which is steeped in Soviet war mythology, was much less neutral 
than the ‘Soviet–German War’ or ‘Second World War’ categories used in 
other articles. By contrast, the other articles used less biased and more 
informative categories. The English version was particularly extensive in 
its selection of  categories and attempted to give due recognition to all the 
parties involved in the battle: besides the Red Army and the Germans, 
which were mentioned in the other articles, it added Czechoslovakia, by 
referring to Ludvík Svoboda’s brigade, which participated in the battle on 
the Soviet side.
Together with the analysis of  other elements of  Wikipedia articles, the 
study of  categories indicated a number of  differences between the various 
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language versions. The differences were particularly pronounced in the 
case of  the Russian and Ukrainian articles: the former presented the Bat-
tle of  Kyiv in line with the glorious Soviet narrative, whereas the latter 
put greater emphasis on the suffering of  Soviet soldiers during the battle. 
The English and Polish articles with their more pronounced encyclope-
dic stance were located in-between these two poles with the English ver-
sion aligning itself  with the Soviet victory narrative and the Polish one 
being closer to the revisionist Ukrainian version. While the existence of  
such divergent views of  the past is well recognized in public memories 
of  post-socialist states, their transfer to digital space questions the validity 
of  claims about the positive transformation of  conflicted memories into 
more inclusive discourses of  the past through digital media (Trubina 2010; 
 Dounaevsky 2013).
Interaction
General dynamics. As mentioned earlier, edits and discussion posts are the 
major indicators of  user activity in Wikipedia. Editing is the most basic 
feature of  Wikipedia, and, arguably, the most important one. The term 
covers a wide range of  user activities: from correcting mistakes to making 
useful additions and improving articles in numerous other ways (‘Wiki-
pedia: Tutorial/Editing’). Similarly to edits, discussion posts are usually 
produced by editors, who communicate with each other through ‘Talk’ 
pages. The ‘Talk’ pages are intended to facilitate communication among 
editors who want to discuss certain changes to an article. Large amounts 
of  posts can serve as an indicator of  controversies related to the article in 
question – in particular, disagreement among editors on references or on 
the neutrality of  other editors (‘Wikipedia: A Researcher’s Guide to Discus-
sion Pages’).
As Table 3 demonstrates, different versions of  Wikipedia showed different 
dynamics relating to user interaction. In contrast to the Wikipedia articles 
about recent traumatic events such as mass protests (Ferron and Massa 2011) 
or terrorist attacks (Pentzold 2009), the articles about the Battle of  Kyiv 
indicated a limited amount of  active participation on the part of  users. The 
English article included the largest number of  edits and discussion posts, 
followed by the Russian one. The Ukrainian and Polish articles were the 
least edited and had the fewest comments; a discussion page was actually 
absent for the Ukrainian article.
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Table 3. Numerical summaries of user interactions with Wikipedia articles
English Polish Russian Ukrainian
Edits 311 73 108 78
Posts 33 1 7 0
One possible explanation for these distinctions between representation of  
more recent (for example, the Arab Spring) and less recent (for example, the 
Second World War) traumatic memories on Wikipedia is the lack of  real-
time memorialization in the latter cases. Unlike memories of  recent events, 
which are converted into Wikipedia articles ‘within minutes’ (‘Wikipedia: 
About’) of  their occurrence, Second World War memories do not appear 
spontaneously, but are documented according to existing sources. In the case 
of  the Battle of  Kyiv, the transition between communicative and cultural 
memory has already taken place; this, however, does not mean that various 
online communities will interpret it in the same way. The lack of  discussion 
and minimal amount of  edits in the Ukrainian Wikipedia may be taken as 
an indicator of  a consensus on this particular episode of  the past, originat-
ing from a greater familiarity with the history of  the Second World War in 
Ukraine. The opposite situation can be found in the English Wikipedia, 
where users are less familiar – and less burdened – with that particular past 
and, therefore, feel freer to explore and discuss it.
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The examination of  temporal dynamics of  editing activity points out 
a number of  similarities between the Wikipedia articles on the battle. As 
Figure 1 demonstrates, the process of  editing for all versions was the most 
intensive in the period of  two to three years following the creation of  the 
respective article. After this time, the user activity tends to drop; the oc-
casional peaks of  activity were usually related to the event’s anniversaries. 
Examples of  such peaks include 2013, when the seventieth anniversary 
of  the Battle of  Kyiv was celebrated in Ukraine and Russia, and 2015, 
when the seventieth anniversary of  the end of  the Second World War was 
commemorated. Both events attracted significant attention of  mainstream 
media in post-socialist countries, in particular Russia; by contrast, the lesser 
attention towards these events in Anglophone mainstream media can ex-
plain the lack of  significant changes in user interaction patterns in the 
English  article.
The dynamics of  editing also shows the impact of  the contemporary trau-
mas on the remediation of  Second World War memory on Wikipedia. The 
beginning of  the conflict in Eastern Ukraine in 2014 marked the decrease 
in editing activity in all versions; such an effect can be explained by the 
switch of  user attention towards the ongoing conflict that overshadowed 
earlier traumatic memories (in particular, its ‘hot’ phase in summer 2014). In 
the following years, the scope of  editing activity approached the pre-2014 
level; however, the majority of  edits made in this period were the minor 
ones. The only exception was observed in the Ukrainian article, when in 
2016 an attempt was made to add a detailed description of  the battle’s 
background, including additional information about the Soviet losses at the 
Bukrin bridgehead. These observations indicate that the Wikipedia narra-
tives of  Second World War largely remained stable throughout the Ukraine 
crisis and that the influx of  contemporary collective traumas could have 
a conserving effect on them.
Verbal interactions. The ‘Talk’ pages in Wikipedia offer ‘the ability to discuss 
articles and other issues with other Wikipedians’ (‘Wikipedia: Tutorial/Talk 
Pages’); consequently, the use of  these pages often facilitates communication 
among editors who want to discuss changes to specific articles. As already 
noted in the earlier section, the amount of  verbal interactions in relation to 
the Battle of  Kyiv was not found to be significant. Furthermore, it is worth 
noting that the majority of  verbal interactions occurred before the begin-
ning of  the Ukraine crisis in 2013: the Russian article on Kyiv was most 
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actively discussed in November 2013, but a few weeks before the outbreak 
of  the crisis, in relation to the seventieth anniversary of  the seizure of  city 
by the Red Army.
The analysis of  the ‘Talk’ pages indicated a number of  differences in the 
narrative strategies employed in the different Wikipedia versions in deal-
ing with historical controversies. In the case of  the Russian and English 
articles, these controversies mostly relate to counting the fatalities on both 
the Soviet and German sides. In the Russian article, a number of  editors 
expressed dissatisfaction with the article’s tally of  fallen Soviet soldiers, which 
they considered too high. For instance, an anonymous editor who called 
himself  Andrey left the following comment on 3 December 2012: ‘So, that 
means the Germans lost 389 soldiers in the Battle for Kyiv? It is just non-
sense, sorry. As always, we heighten our losses and decrease theirs ... How 
did they lose then?’ (‘Obsuzhdenie: Kievskaia Nastupatelnaia Operatsiia’). 
Similarly, another user, D2306, criticized in a post from 3 July 2013, the use 
of  German sources for estimating casualties on the German side: ‘There 
are some smartasses who found a website with ten-day casualty reports for 
Wermachts and now think that is it, so they cite those reports everywhere 
as an ironclad fact. They do not care to compare their theories with actual 
facts’ (‘Obsuzhdenie: Kievskaia Nastupatelnaia Operatsiia’).
This kind of  emotional response to the Russian article was contrasted with 
the more reserved reactions in the English article. While there, too, the 
question of  fatalities, as well as of  the decisiveness of  the battle, ignited 
discussions, these were approached differently. For instance, the user Coun-
terstrike69 initiated a discussion on the matter by posting the following 
question on 8 March 2007: ‘Any ideas on the casualties on both side?’ (‘Talk: 
Battle of  Kiev [1943]’). Such a formulation contrasted with more subjective 
statements by editors of  the Russian version, who were less interested in 
the number of  casualties per se than why the encyclopedia presented Soviet 
fatalities as greater than those from the German side. Similarly, the discus-
sion of  the decisiveness of  the battle initiated by the user Kurt opened with 
a call for ‘civilized discussion’ able to clarify whether or not the Battle of  
Kyiv should be referenced as a decisive combat operation (‘Talk: Battle of  
Kiev [1943]’).
These differences in the way the same episode was approached in various 
Wikipedia versions had immediate consequences for the interactions between 
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editors. In the Russian article, the majority of  comments left on the ‘Talk’ 
page were strong statements leaving little space for discussion; consequently, 
instead of  dialogue, the Russian ‘Talk’ page mostly hosted a collection of  
isolated monologues. Under these circumstances, the idea of  a collaborative 
production of  the past seems dubious; instead, the content of  the article 
itself  seemed to be more dependent on the decisions of  a few editors who 
were not particularly interested in debating their views on the event with 
others. By contrast, the English ‘Talk’ page actually hosted some discussions 
that included attempts to accommodate different points of  view and reach 
a degree of  consensus in relation to the traumatic past.
Conclusions
My observations suggest that the evolution of  narratives of  past violence 
in different language versions of  Wikipedia are largely driven by existing 
cultural constructs – first and foremost, by the specific national memories 
of  wars and conflicts. The presence of  profound differences in the ways 
the Second World War is remembered in post-socialist states, in particular 
Ukraine and Russia, translates into rather divergent representations of  the 
Battle of  Kyiv. The Russian Wikipedia, for instance, promotes an interpreta-
tion that is steeped in the narrative of  the Great Patriotic War; by contrast, 
the Ukrainian and, to a certain extent the Polish versions, rely on more revi-
sionist trends in war historiography. These differences permeate Wikipedia 
narratives on different levels, varying from visual images deployed in the 
articles to descriptive categories that bring different parts of  the encyclopedia 
into an interconnected whole; together, these elements promote images of  
the past that indicate significant differences in the ways the Second World 
War is remembered.
The patterns of  interaction with the Wikipedia articles point to the com-
plex interplay between public remembrance and digital media in post- 
socialist countries. The rise of  interest in Second World War narratives on 
Wikipedia, coinciding with the anniversaries of  the respective historical 
episodes, can be viewed as evidence that today the line between offline 
and online developments is increasingly blurred. Similarly, the post-2014 
changes in the interaction with Second World War memory on Wikipedia 
can be explained by the impact of  the ongoing Ukraine crisis as Wiki pedia 
users’ attention turned from memories of  past violence to the on going 
collective traumas. Under these conditions, the Wikipedia narratives of  
the Battle of  Kyiv demonstrated a degree of  stability that contrasted with 
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recurrent instrumentalization of  Second World War memories in main-
stream media in the course of  the Ukraine crisis; the latter observation 
suggests that online memory cultures can be less volatile and  susceptible 
to change than might have been expected from ever-changing  digital 
 environ ments.
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ABSTRACT
In an attempt to explore the different historiographical and pedagogical 
 approaches to the Armenian Genocide, from denial to recognition, from context-
ualization to historicism, from nationalism to human rights, this paper focuses 
on the national history curriculums of three countries (Turkey, Armenia and 
France). These three countries were selected in order to demonstrate the variety 
of historiographies according to the different socio-political and ideological con-
texts. In this sense, there exist two levels of comparison: i) the general approach 
towards history education, along with human rights education, framing the 
national history curriculum, the publications and instructions of the Ministry of 
Education determining its implementation; ii) peculiarities concerning the case 
of the Armenian Genocide (1915–16), involving the given historical context, its 
ideological position and interpretation, and its dis/connection to the claimed 
stance. By this comparative analysis, the paper aims to revisit the problems of 
the divergence concerning the education of history, particularly in the case of 
crimes against humanity.
Introduction
The link between the nation-states and the education of  history has been 
one of  the much-discussed issues. From nationalist ideologies to political 
expediencies, from the consolidation of  national identity to the formation 
of  ideal citizens, from grand historical narratives to pedagogies of  moral 
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values, the nation-states are often criticized for controlling and influencing 
the education of  history in line with their interests. Within this frame of  ref-
erence, the instruction of  contested and sensitive historical events represents 
one of  the essential controversies, revealing the political intentions behind 
educational practices. In an attempt to comparatively analyse the different 
approaches to the Armenian Genocide, this paper explores the different his-
torical narratives, contextualizations and political stances of  three countries 
(Turkey, Armenia and France), through their national history curriculums, 
as well as their history teaching plans and exemplary history textbooks. For 
this purpose, the paper consists of  three sections. First, a brief  overview of  
the curriculums of  each country is presented regarding their development 
and transformation, along with the intentions affecting their regulation and 
implementation. Second, the position of  the Armenian Genocide within the 
national curriculums and history teaching plans is illustrated, accompanied 
by the political stances of  each country towards the issue. Last but not least, 
the way the Armenian Genocide is taught in history textbooks is compara-
tively analysed in relation to their explanation of  the causes and conditions 
resulting in the decision of  deportation and its implementation, as well as 
the consequences and long-term effects that can be traced up to the present.
History education and the curriculum
The curriculum is the core of  education: it consists of  guidelines responding 
to questions such as ‘what should be taught, to whom, under what circum-
stances, how, and with what end in mind’ (Null 2011, 5). Curriculum is what 
signifies i) aims and objectives of  education, ii) subjects, iii) their distribution 
at different levels of  education, iv) educational materials and their content, 
v) teaching methods. In this regard, school curriculums are of  the utmost 
importance in the formation of  ‘ideal’ citizens, their apprehension of  certain 
moral values, civic rights and duties, fundamental knowledge and, naturally, 
the history of  their nation.1
History first appeared in the national curriculums in the 19th century when 
public education systems were more or less established in many countries – 
almost at the same time that history became a modern academic discipline. 
This early inception within the educational system also showed the signifi-
cance of  history in terms of  the formation of  future citizens (Carretero 
and Bermudez 2012, 634). Concerning the role of  history in relation to the 
construction of  national identity, there are three different approaches: the 
‘romantic’ promotes social cohesion, the ‘empirical’ stresses the transmission 
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of  historical knowledge, and the ‘civic’ concentrates on the development 
of  civic competence (Carretero, Asensio and Rodríguez-Moneo 2012, 4). 
To give an individual a sense of  belonging to a nation and to promote his 
or her self-identification as a citizen of  that nation and the awareness of  
the responsibilities it enforces, historical knowledge and a consciousness of  
a common past plays an essential part.
As it is the curriculum-makers who determine which subjects should be 
emphasized and which should be excluded or ignored, how to represent 
historical events, people, facts and in which context, the curriculum is also 
a reflection of  what constructs the national unity of  a particular ‘pres-
ent’ (Brehm 2014, 319). The national curriculum consolidates a uniform 
identity administered to all students and leads to the quest of  establish-
ing a single ‘grand narrative’ that would eliminate alternative narratives 
and compel the teaching of  a precise interpretation of  the past (Ahonen 
2001, 190). However, since the circumstances that define the national unity 
tend to change given the politics of  a certain time, so does the curriculum. 
Therefore, the history curriculum is one of  the most unstable components 
of  education, continuously altered depending on the transformations that 
occur in the  socio-cultural and historical-political conditions of  a specific 
country ( Brauch 2017, 597). Consequently, a comparison of  national history 
 curriculums in Turkey, Armenia and France requires taking into account the 
country-specific circumstances and their transformation over time.
Approaches to national histories: comparing curriculums
To start with, in Turkey, the national history curriculum has undergone 
several major reforms that are mostly invoked by three political stances: 
nationalism, Islamism and a democratic initiative. Nationalism, as the first 
and foremost, contains ideological shifts and escalations that are marked by 
the socio-political context of  the era. The 1930s witnessed the establishment 
of  nationalist ideology of  Kemalism, which introduced a series of  reforms 
to depart from the Ottoman legacy, in particular its religious character, in 
order to embrace Western values, based on six founding principles of  the 
Turkish Republic: populism, secularism, revolutionism, nationalism, repub-
licanism and statism (Zürcher 2005, 181). In this period, as an extension of  
the efforts to demolish the claims of  other nations over national territory, the 
‘Turkish History Thesis’ claimed the roots of  the Turkish nation were deeply 
established in Anatolia, where its early civilizations and inhabitants were 
originally Turk (Akpınar et al. 2017, 14). By the 1960s, as the first military 
148      REMEMBRANCE AND SOLIDARITY
TEACHING THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE ...
coup in the history of  the Republic took place, the nationalist tone of  its 
history education was principally influenced by a political attempt to balance 
Islam and modernization, that is, the emerging ‘Turkish-Islam synthesis’, 
and the main objective of  national education was identified as a means of  
forming ‘self-sacrificing and virtuous citizens who are loyal to their family, 
nation, country, Turkish revolutions and ideals’ (Akdağ and Kaymakçı 2011, 
858). After the 1980 coup, the ‘Turkish-Islam synthesis’ became the domi-
nant ideology in educational practices. As a result, the life and principles of  
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938), the founder of  the Turkish Republic, 
were integrated into the curriculum, along with religion – that is, Sunnite 
Islam – becoming a compulsory subject in order to educate moral values; 
it reflected an attempt to reconcile Kemalism with Islam, by stripping it of  
its traditional connotations, particularly that of  secularism (Nohl 2008, 36). 
From this perspective, it can be argued that the second political stance, that 
of  Islamism, eroded the emphasis on secularity that had been perceived as 
one of  the pillars of  national education in Turkey. Hence, the Islamization 
of  education constitutes one of  the central disputes that can be traced back 
to the 1950s, a period marked by the emergence of  Imam Hatip schools that 
specialized in religious education and the training of  imams (Kafadar 2002, 
354). This political stance is particularly enhanced by the many educational 
reforms in the 2000s, initiated by the governments formed by the AKP (Jus-
tice and Development Party), the conservative political party that has been in 
power since 2002. Aside from the consolidation of  many existing religious 
aspects of  the national curriculum and the introduction of  new elective 
courses, such as Kur’an-ı Kerim [Qur’an], Hz. Muhammed’in Hayatı [Prophet 
Muhammad’s Life] and Temel Dinî Bilgiler [Fundamentals of  Religion], these 
reforms also seek to establish an Islamized approach to citizen formation 
(Kaya 2015, 58). One significant example would be the association of  moral 
values with religious content, explaining ‘tolerance’ with ‘Muhammad’s “tol-
erant attitude” towards the Christians of  Yemen’ or ‘human rights’ with the 
‘farewell sermon [khutba] of  the prophet’, followed by the argument that hu-
man rights are integral to and guaranteed by Islam (Türkmen 2009, 391, 395). 
Though currently replaced by an Islamized context, the introduction of  
global citizenship and the education of  universal values was actually an 
extension of  Turkey’s drive for membership to the European Union (EU), 
and therefore the educational reforms at the beginning of  2000s prescribed 
a transformation of  the overall system to adhere to EU standards. The 
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democratic initiative simultaneously has marked this period and has been 
mirrored in education as well. As the long-ignored minorities of  Turkey – 
Kurds, Armenians, Assyrians, Alevis, etc., as well as oppressed groups such 
as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, transsexuals and intersexuals (LGBTIs) – have 
started to voice their demands for equality and recognition, elective courses 
in several local languages have been introduced, textbooks have been par-
tially cleared of  discriminatory statements, and subjects concerning human 
rights and democracy have been added to the curriculum (Çayır 2014, 2–5; 
Akdağ and Kaymakçı 2011, 860–61). Despite these developments, a certain 
Islamized version of  the Kemalist nationalism still persists, and thus, the 
curriculums and the textbooks ‘still portray Turkey as a country that is ho-
mogenous, monolingual, and mono-religious’ (Çayır 2014, 115).
For Armenia, the conditions leading to the educational reforms can be cat-
egorized not in the sense of  the chronological transformations in political 
stances, but rather in terms of  extending existing approaches towards educa-
tional policy: that is, of  constructing a post-Soviet national identity through 
creating a sense of  citizenship, aligning with international educational stan-
dards and the educating the diasporic communities. In the 1990s, with the 
collapse of  the Soviet Union and the emergence of  an independent Republic 
of  Armenia, the reforms bore a twofold objective in shaping the curriculum: 
to remove Soviet ideology from education and to redefine what it meant 
to be Armenian. However, this did not necessarily mean that the legacy of  
Soviet Armenian education was excluded from the history education of  the 
newly independent Republic. On the contrary, though ‘stripped of  commu-
nist internationalism and saturated with nationalism’, the historical narrative 
more or less remained similar: ‘starting with ethno-genesis, followed by the 
struggle for national liberation and culminating, this time, in independent 
nationhood’, instead of  the development of  class consciousness directed 
towards communism as it was during the Soviet period (Akpınar 2017, 43). 
It is also important to stress that, as asserted by the historian Ronald Suny, 
Armenian nationalist thinking has had a complex evolution that can be dated 
back to the late 18th century. It persisted even during the Soviet period, when 
Armenian historians successfully fought against the denationalization of  their 
history. The nationalist tone of  the historical narrative was contextualized 
and consolidated by using repetitive themes such as the antiquity of  the Ar-
menian people, the continuous occupation of  its indigenous ‘homeland’ and 
the perpetual struggle for survival and freedom despite betrayals, invasions 
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and being abandoned by the Great Powers (Suny 2001, 885–87). Neverthe-
less, the attempt to construct a post-Soviet Armenian identity and the desired 
rupture from Armenia’s Soviet past required concrete strategies, which were 
founded in the transition to Western/European educational standards that 
would introduce the concept of  global citizenship. The hopes of  gaining 
acceptance to European Union, along with guidance and support of  multiple 
international organizations, extensively influenced the educational reforms 
of  the post-Soviet transition process by including democratic values such as 
tolerance, human rights and openness into the national curriculum (Terzian 
2010, 166). Nonetheless, these global and national contexts surrounding 
the educational system have resulted in the development of  a dual policy: 
the primordial myths of  Armenian History, such as the Armenian Church, 
coexist with concepts of  tolerance and civic practice (Terzian 2010, 169).
One final link that also intersects the global and national dimensions in the 
Armenian context would be the diaspora. Since the Armenian Genocide 
caused the Armenian people to be dispersed to all over the world, maintain-
ing Armenian heritage has been a primary concern for both the diasporic 
institutions (political organizations, churches, schools, etc.) as well as the 
newly founded independent Armenian state. On an emotional level, after 
the collapse of  the Soviet Union, the Armenian diaspora has hoped to 
reunite with the homeland, and support its transition to an independent 
nation-state. Nonetheless, the Armenian governments’ policies towards the 
diaspora, the disagreements on national priorities and the definition of  the 
nation itself  have complicated the situation and raised concerns (Ishkanian 
2005, 138–39). Instead, at the beginning of  the 2000s, the notion of  nation 
was redefined in terms that exceeded the political and territorial frontiers 
of  the state, and accordingly, merged the diaspora and the state into one 
nation: national unity was re-established as Armenia became a trans-nation 
(Barseghyan 2007, 294). This was also echoed in the educational reforms 
with regards to the ‘preservation of  national identity’; as described in the 
State Programme for Education of  2011–15: ‘the educational system of  
the Republic of  Armenia is bound to support the activities of  educational 
centres of  the Armenian Diaspora [...] thereby creating conditions for unit-
ing the globally dispersed Armenian potential’ (Government of  Armenia 
2011, 16), and as suggested by the Ministry of  Education and Science, his-
tory textbooks in several foreign languages were produced for the Sunday 
schools of  the diaspora, in order to ensure that the national identity could 
be preserved through Armenian education (Movsissyan 2016, 3).
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In France, where the national education is arguably excessively centralized 
(Baqués 2006, 105; Egéa-Kuehne 2003, 329), the educational system contains 
a tension caused by two polarized points of  view: on the one end, there is 
the 19th-century heritage of  a national identity and republican values, on 
the other, there is European identity and citizenship. In the course of  the 
19th century, France was one of  the ‘historical nations’ whose history was 
documented in archives, causing a ‘revolution’ in historiography whereby 
writing history depended on archival documents. Thus, at the beginning, it 
was their history that was written and taught (Wallerstein 2004, 5). Education, 
deemed ‘secular, compulsory, and free’ was an essential part of  the French 
Republican tradition, with a national curriculum enforced on every future 
citizen, no matter what their social class or where they lived.
As one of  the national priorities, education had – and is still argued to have – 
a critical role in transmitting both historical knowledge and a sense of  being 
French (Corbett 1996, 5). From this perspective, from the 19th century 
onwards, the teaching of  history has been a tool for political socialization, 
creating French citizens by inculcating them with the republican values of  de-
mocracy, freedom and equality, but at the same time imposing respect for the 
established order and their glorious ancestors (Lantheaume 2003, 125). As 
of  the beginning of  the 21st century, the French curriculum still put a great 
emphasis on national identity, and social cohesion is perceived as loyalty to 
essential principles of  the Republic, especially that of  human rights, high-
lighting the intolerance of  racism and discrimination (Osler and Starkey 2001, 
287–301). Be that as it may, since the 1980s, the reforms to the French cur-
riculum have increasingly encouraged a sense of  European identity (Baqués 
2006, 106). With the institutional formation of  the European Union in the 
last decades of  the 20th century, the tendency to Europeanize the educational 
systems and develop the European dimension in education has resulted in 
a reevaluation of  European history throughout the century with the aim of  
emerging a European consciousness. Yet, this approach has not necessarily 
lead to the abandonment of  a nationalist perspective; instead, in the case of  
France, it has meant a reinterpretation of  national identity as an open concept 
compatible with European identity. Hence, as Europe became the focus of  
French national education, the curriculum reforms then cultivated a sense of  
dual citizenship, that of  both national and European (Legris 2010, 139–43).
What is striking in three of  the cases is the compliance to a trend that 
appeared in the second half  of  the 20th century, whereby international 
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educational standards were adopted and a global citizenship perspective 
developed.2 However, as illustrated in this section, in spite of  the reforms 
enacted in order to meet with these criteria, a certain inclination to uphold 
the national values and national identity as the fundamental basis of  citizen 
formation still persists in Turkey and Armenia, as well as in France, which re-
sults in a duality of  national and global policies towards educational systems.
The Armenian Genocide in the educational frame: 
a brief comparison of history textbooks
One of  the important outcomes of  the evolution in educational systems in 
the second half  of  the 20th century can be pinpointed to the appearance 
of  the history of  the present, relying upon a disciplinary knowledge of  
the contemporary world, most particularly that relating to memory. Since 
the Second World War there has been an immense rise in human rights 
issues triggering memory activism, fuelled by the duty to remember and 
to ensure that a crime against humanity, such as the Shoah, would ‘never 
again’ be possible. From the 1970s, despite the enduring nationalist element 
in educational policies, human rights education became a principal theme, 
along with the memories of  victims (Meyer, Bromley and Ramirez 2010, 
113). Even though, from a neutral point of  view, teaching the Armenian 
Genocide would fit into this picture, the curriculums and textbooks of  each 
country imply that it remains much more problematic and does not easily 
fit into the political agendas of  Turkey, Armenia and France.
In terms of  curriculum design, both Turkey and Armenia have official 
decrees on the Armenian Genocide. In the case of  Turkey, as an extension 
of  the struggle against the ‘alleged genocides’, on 14 June 2002 the Board 
of  Education and Instruction ordered different grades at primary and sec-
ondary schools to be taught about all the issues concerning the claims of  
the Armenians, along with those of  the Greeks and the Assyrians, through 
the terms set out by the Ministry of  National Education in decrees 272–73 
(Ministry of  National Education 2002). The teaching plans for the history 
courses for the tenth grade (that is, at the age of  fifteen) show that the 
issue is taught thematically, including but not limited to, the treatment of  
non-Muslim minorities in Ottoman Empire, Armenian revolts and atrocities, 
the role and intentions of  the Great Powers in these revolts, the necessity 
of  the decision to expel Armenians, intentions behind the terrorist acts 
of  Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of  Armenia (ASALA), the 
definition of  the concept of  genocide and its comparison with Armenian 
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claims (Ministry of  National Education 2011, I–VI). The history textbooks, 
produced or approved by the Ministry, present the issue exactly as it has 
been regulated by these decrees, as a subject of  ‘the Ottoman Empire in 
the First World War’, under the subchapter ‘the Caucasian Front’, hence 
providing a detailed picture of  the ‘Turkish thesis’3 (Tüysüz 2017, 201–8).
In the case of  Armenia, with the order N925 A/C, approved by the Ministry 
of  Education and Science on 9 July 2013, the optional course entitled ‘His-
tory of  the Armenian Question’ was regulated for eleventh grade (that is, at 
the age of  sixteen) as an introductory course on the subject. As  explained in 
the appendix of  the order, the aim of  this course is to teach the Armenian 
Question, that is, ‘the national liberation struggle of  the Armenian people 
for the sake of  restoring the national statehood in its historical homeland and 
creating a free, independent, and united Armenia’, which also includes the 
Armenian Genocide as a subject (Ministry of  Education and Science 2013, 
3). According to the standards and teaching plans of  history in secondary 
education, the Armenian Genocide is taught in the eleventh grade as a part 
of  the compulsory Armenian History courses. The teaching plan traces 
the Armenian Genocide chronologically: starting with the mass murders 
in Western Armenia at the end of  19th century, escalating to the Young 
Turks’ policy in line with the Hamidian programme of  the destruction of  
Armenians, and reaching to a total act of  genocide in 1915, during the First 
World War. The themes also include the role of  the Great Powers, the trial 
and punishment of  those responsible, the Armenian’s ‘heroic’ self-defence 
and the process of  recognition of  the Armenian Genocide (Ministry of  
Education and Science Centre for Educational Programmes 2008, 17–18). 
This approach is evident in the history textbooks of  the eleventh grade, 
particularly under the chapter ‘Armenia and the Armenian People dur-
ing the Years of  the First World War’ (Melkonyan et al. 2015, 246–68).
In the case of  France, a law that recognized the Armenian Genocide was 
enacted in 2001, therefore increasing its visibility in history education (Falaize 
and Mériaux 2006, 12). The French curriculum does not contain any direct 
reference to the Genocide, except from one phrase appearing in the History/
Geography programme for the third class of  the fourth cycle (correspond-
ing to ninth grade in a twelve-year education system, that is, at the age of  
fourteen) concerning the First World War during which ‘combatants and 
civilians suffer extreme violence, as witnessed particularly by the genocide 
of  the Armenians in 1915’ (Ministry of  National Education 2015, 315). 
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The history textbooks of  this grade dedicate two pages to the Armenian 
Genocide under the title ‘Europe, a Major Front of  Total Wars (1914–1945)’, 
within the context of  ‘the brutalization of  society’ during the First World 
War (Blanchard and Mercier 2016, 46–47).
The secondary-education history textbooks of  all three countries that cover 
the First World War discuss the Armenian Genocide to some extent, yet 
with a different narration of  the historical events. Within the framework 
of  this paper, in order to provide an accessible comparison, the different 
ways of  teaching the Armenian Genocide is primarily discussed through 
the previously cited history textbooks.4
Escalation of events
An important subject preceding the Genocide narration is Armenian– 
Ottoman relations. To be precise, before the chapters concerning the First 
World War, history textbooks of  both Turkey and Armenia briefly examine 
the situation of  the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, yet with different 
interpretations. The Turkish history textbook explains that, during the 
empire, the Armenians had flourished in every possible way – economi-
cally, socially, culturally, if  not politically – thanks to the Ottoman policies 
towards non-Muslim minorities, particularly emphasizing the ‘harmony’ 
of  Armenian–Ottoman relations, treating the Armenians as loyal subjects 
[millet-i sadıka] (Tüysüz 2017, 72–73). Whereas the Armenian history text-
book does not accept any possibility of  coexistence, instead reviewing 
Armenian–Ottoman relations in terms of  discrimination, oppression and 
the occupation of  Western Armenia, while showing the Ottoman efforts 
as attempts to deceive Armenians. Describing the Ottoman Empire as 
‘backward’, the narration accentuates the necessity of  a liberation movement, 
with a certain stress on the destiny awaiting the Armenians (Melkonyan et 
al. 2015, 182–205). In the French history textbook, there is no reference to 
the conditions of  the Armenians, with only one phrase expressing that they 
were living as a minority in the Eastern parts of  the empire (Blanchard and 
Mercier 2016, 46).
Regarding the Armenian involvement in warfare, the central subject con-
sists of  Armenian political movements and their actions during the First 
World War. Both the Armenian and Turkish textbooks confirm that the 
Armenians of  the Caucasus sided with the Russians. In the Armenian case, 
participation is presented as a ‘voluntary movement’, whereby the support 
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of  Russian military forces would bring about the liberation of  Western Ar-
menia. Though there existed different political positions amongst Armenians 
towards the war and the voluntary movement,5 the comprehensive interpre-
tation of  the textbook suggests that the movement stands as a triumphant 
part of  the history of  the Armenian struggle for liberation (Melkonyan et al. 
2015, 250–53). From the perspective of  the Turkish textbook, the Armenian 
actions are depicted as ‘separatist revolts’ against the Ottoman Empire, aided 
by the Entente Powers with the aim of  expelling the Ottomans from the 
war. Therefore the Armenians, who were ‘backstabbing’ the Ottoman army, 
are accused of  becoming one of  the reasons for the empire’s failure on the 
Caucasian Front (Tüysüz 2017, 201). The French history textbook, once 
again, does not mention the Armenian involvement in the war, however, 
but it does remark on the military defeats of  Ottomans and the tensions 
within the governance of  the empire as the reasons for genocide (Blanchard 
and Mercier 2016, 46).
Decision, implementation and consequences
The narration of  the genocidal process can be compared from this sequence 
of  events: the decision of  deportation, the stages of  implementation and 
the consequences. From the perspective of  the Turkish history textbook, 
because of  the Armenian revolts and treachery, the Ottoman ruling elite 
had to take the decision to ‘deport’6 only after every other measure – such 
as the enactment of  martial law or the arrests of  separatist Armenians – had 
failed to provide a satisfactory outcome. Demonstrating the four articles of  
the deportation law, the decision was justified by only targeting those who 
had disturbed peace, who has fought with weapons and rebelled against the 
authorities, and who had conspired or betrayed the country. Moreover, the 
textbook also criticizes the representation of  the deportation in Western 
media, followed by a long explanation about the measures adopted for the 
protection of  the deportees (Tüysüz 2017, 203–4). The French history text-
book chooses to show the decision to deport with a communiqué of  Talaat 
Pasha, then minister of  the interior, ordering the deportation of  Armenians 
with the exception of  the sick and the disabled, and the arrest of  those who 
disobeyed. The communiqué presented also cites the prohibition of  Arme-
nians to sell their property and real estate, as their exile is only temporary7 
(Blanchard and Mercier 2016, 46). The Armenian history textbook recounts 
a more politicized picture of  the Genocide, concentrating principally on the 
Young Turk policies towards Armenians. According to this perspective, the 
political aspect of  the Genocide was a consequence of  Sultan Abdülhamid 
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II’s plan, devised long before the war,8 to build a new homeland for the 
Turks that territorially involved Western Armenia. The economic factor 
at play was the confiscation of  Armenian wealth and property in order to 
provide capital for the state (Melkonyan et al. 2015, 255–56).
Concerning the stages of  implementation, all three history textbooks dem-
onstrate a certain timeframe for the beginning, development and conclusion 
of  the event. In the Turkish textbook, the precautions against Armenian 
uprisings start in April 1915 with the arrests of  those involved, intensify 
with the enactment and exercise of  the deportation law and conclude in Oc-
tober 1915, when the state decided to suspend the deportations, convinced 
that the objective had been achieved (Tüysüz 2017, 203–5). The French 
textbook, with a small timeline and a map illustrating the acts of  violence 
against Armenians, presents the start of  the Genocide with the arrests of  
Armenians in April 1915, followed by two waves of  deportations, the first 
between May and July 1915 and the second between the end of  1915 and 
the summer of  19169 (Blanchard and Mercier 2016, 46). The Armenian 
textbook also acknowledges the commencement of  the process with the 
arrests of  the Armenian leaders, however on a different date, October 1914. 
Following the entry of  the Ottoman Empire into the First World War, able 
Armenian men were first recruited into the Ottoman army to be ultimately 
eliminated, and then the Armenians on the Caucasian Front were massacred. 
By April 1915, the arrested Armenians had been hung, signifying the begin-
ning of  massacres in every region. The Armenian response to the planned 
massacres was self-defence, which extended the genocidal process until the 
end of  1916 (Melkonyan et al. 2015, 258–9).
As for the consequences, the Turkish history textbook offers plenty of  
numbers, as a matter of  fact, it almost resembles a balance sheet. According 
to the textbook, out of  1.3 million Armenians living in Ottoman territory, 
413,067 were deported, 400,000 to 500,000 were not, 383,000 deportees 
reached the final destination, 350,000 to 500,000 voluntarily ‘immigrated’ 
to the Caucasus, thus estimating a ‘casualty’ of  57,000 Armenians during 
the overall process (Tüysüz 2017, 205). In the French textbook, for which 
the main objective seems to be demonstrate the suffering of  Armenians, 
the number of  murdered Armenians is estimated between 1.2 and 1.5 mil-
lion, without any reference to the total number of  Armenians living under 
the Ottoman Empire, nor to the other consequences of  the Genocide 
(Blanchard and Mercier 2016, 46). In the Armenian textbook, the narrative 
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about regional massacres and self-defensive actions gives precise numbers. 
However, the number is eventually rounded up to 1.5 million victims out 
of  2.5 million, which also signifies the official claim. Furthermore, the 
textbook examines the consequences of  the Genocide in a much broader 
sense: the destruction of  Western Armenian civilization, which is portrayed 
as a great loss not only for Armenians but also for the whole world; the 
continuation of  economic and cultural genocide, that is, the annihilation 
of  Armenian cultural heritage, a process that continues up to the pres-
ent day, not only in Turkey but also in Azerbaijan; the emergence of  the 
Armenian diaspora and the destiny of  the survivors, including those who 
were forced to convert to Islam; and the effects of  the Genocide on the 
following generations of  the Armenian nation (Melkonyan et al. 2015, 259, 
262–63).
















Failure on the  
Caucasian Front 






Military defeats of 
Ottomans, tensions 
within the state












on the Caucasian Front






First wave of 
deportations
Second wave of 
deportations
Period April 1915 to October 1915
October 1914 to 
end of 1916




57,000 casualties  
out of 1.3 million  
Armenians
1.5 million  
Armenians victimized 
out of 2.5 million
1.2 to 1.5 million 
Armenians murdered
158      REMEMBRANCE AND SOLIDARITY
TEACHING THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE ...
Claims and Genocide definition
The aftermath of  the Genocide constitutes an important interruption of  
the chronological narrative in both the Armenian and Turkish textbooks; 
rather they continue with different stages of  recognition and/or denial, 
with conflicts lasting up until the present.10 The Turkish textbook jumps 
to the conclusion of  the First World War and the treaties signed in order 
to establish the present territorial boundaries – a topic that is actually ex-
amined elaborately in the succeeding chapter – as means to demonstrate 
the irrelevance of  the Armenian claims over territory, particularly accord-
ing to the internationally acknowledged Treaty of  Lausanne. Moreover, 
the textbook argues that the Armenians developed their scheme against 
Turkey as a strategy to protect national consciousness and prevent further 
the assimilation of  Armenians in the diaspora. In this context, a four-stage 
plan was introduced to enforce the recognition of  the Genocide, leading 
to monetary compensation and territorial restitution. For this purpose, Ar-
menians founded terrorist organizations, such as Armenian Secret Army 
for the Liberation of  Armenia (ASALA), to attract international attention 
to the Armenian cause by killing Turkish diplomats and their families. Af-
ter the independence of  Armenia, the conflicts became an issue for the 
foreign policies of  both countries, this time marked by the attempts of  
the Armenian lobby to influence the international community (Tüysüz 
2017, 205–8).
The Armenian textbook pursues another route towards the recognition 
process. The aftermath of  the Genocide is discussed through international 
reactions towards the issue, including testimonies, publications, journals, 
reports and condemnations of  the massacres by political figures. As the first 
step to recognition, the textbook notices the trials of  Young Turks in 1919 
by Turkish court-martials, which sentenced the perpetrators to death for 
their crimes against Armenians. Yet, the textbook implies, since the perpe-
trators had already fled the country, the punishment was not carried out by 
Turkish authorities or the Entente Powers, but by self-sacrificing Armenians 
with operation ‘Nemesis’, inspired from the Greek mythological goddess 
of  retribution, which sought the assassinations of  all those responsible for 
the Armenian Genocide. Stating that the recognition process has entered 
a new phase after the Second World War, the textbook affirms the rise of  
international recognition of  the Genocide and the persistence of  Turkey’s 
denial, an aspect that still, after a hundred years, determines political rela-
tions between two countries (Melkonyan et al. 2015, 262–67).
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Since all three textbooks provide a definition of  ‘genocide’, one convenient 
comparison would be the purpose behind the introduction of  the concept. 
For the Turkish and the Armenian cases, the objective seems quite obvious: 
the former to denounce the claims of  genocide and the latter to proclaim 
it. The Turkish textbook, citing the definition from the UN Convention, 
asserts that the deportation did not aim at Armenians per se, rather those 
who threatened the security on the Caucasian Front, adding the fact that 
the intention was not their extermination, because if  it were the case, then 
the Ottoman ‘state’ would not have made the effort to deport them, but 
just would have murdered the Armenians where they were (Tüysüz 2017, 
208). In the Armenian textbook, the invention of  the concept by Raphael 
Lemkin (1900–59) is explained by his overview of  the Armenian case, and 
a full legal description of  the concept is cited, along with five acts defining 
an event as genocide. Since the Turks carried out all of  the five actions, 
the textbook declares the legitimacy to address the events as ‘genocide’ in 
accordance with the UN Convention (Melkonyan et al. 2015, 264–65). For 
the French textbook, however, the objective remains ambiguous, since the 
definition appears as an exercise in words, and the self-evaluation question-
naire demands students to count three factors that justify the events to be 
described as an ‘extermination’ rather than a ‘genocide’11 (Blanchard and 
Mercier 2016, 46–47).
Conclusion
The comparison of  different approaches to teaching the Armenian Genocide 
clearly shows that history education continues to be exposed to political 
influence. In the cases of  Armenia and Turkey, the instruction of  the Ar-
menian Genocide confirms the countries’ political stances towards the issue: 
Turkey, in denial, attempts to construct an interpretation of  the historical 
events that refutes the claims of  genocidal intentions, whereas Armenia 
interprets the historical significance of  the Genocide in their struggle for 
national independence. That being said, it is important to remember that, 
within the framework of  history education in Armenia, the Genocide holds 
a fundamental part of  the centuries-long battle against foreign occupa-
tion and the national struggle for liberation, which persists as the central 
theme in the national history curriculum (Akpınar et al. 2017, 45). While 
in the case of  Turkey, the historical significance of  the Genocide cannot 
be viewed without considering contemporary conflicts, hence its historical 
contextualization contains only the elements that affirm the official thesis. 
Additionally, given the fact that the Turkish stance tends to alter over time 
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depending on the political state of  affairs or the allegations, the historical 
narrative evolves accordingly.
The French approach towards teaching the Armenian Genocide might ap-
pear intriguing in respect to the historical neutrality of  the country. However, 
the French position seems to involve a lot of  political, historiographical and 
pedagogical confusions. It is political because the position tends to fluctuate 
according to political influence and international diplomatic relations, as 
demonstrated in the comparisons of  the 2012 and 2016 editions of  the same 
history textbook. Historiographical because, as ascertained by Sophie Ferh-
adjian in her analysis of  how to teach the Armenian Genocide, the attempt 
is to explain the issue without addressing the essential historical context such 
as the history of  the Armenians, the rise of  nationalism in the 19th century 
or the Eastern Question as well as the Armenian Question (2006, 4–5). 
Pedagogical because, as stated by Falaize and Mériaux, multiple constraints 
characterize its instruction: the authors of  the textbooks do not have a com-
prehensive knowledge of  the issue; the time and place devoted to it within 
teaching plans are very limited; it lacks documentation to prove it as ‘geno-
cide’, and thus the civic aim of  introducing such ‘brutalization’ of  society is 
in vain (Falaize and Mériaux 2006, 13). In this regard, including the Armenian 
Genocide in the French history curriculum does not seem to have any inten-
tion other than to illustrate an example of  mass violence preceding the Shoah.
Briefly, the comparison of  national history curriculums and history textbooks 
of  the aforementioned countries suggest that the teaching of  disputable and 
sensitive historical events still remains problematic. The primary concern 
appears not to teach about this crime against humanity in order to raise 
consciousness and responsibility, but to use it either to consolidate national 
identity as in case of  Armenia, or to confirm a political position as in case 
of  Turkey, or to reaffirm republican values with a de-contextualized example 
of  mass violence as is the case of  France.
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ENDNOTES
1  According to Anderson, nation is an imagined community in the sense that i) its 
members lack face-to-face interaction with most of the other members, ii) and yet it assumes 
a horizontal comradeship amongst its subjects, iii) these communities are distinguished from 
one another depending on the manner they are imagined, iv) thus, the limits of a nation define 
the boundaries of where one nation ends and another begins (Anderson 2006, 6–7). In this 
regard, Anderson asserts that nationalism indeed accords with the evolution of educational 
systems, since schools and universities (re)produce the most preeminent imagination of 
a national community (Anderson 2006, 71).
2  It is essential to underline the fact that in the context of French education what 
is perceived to be ‘European’ citizenship corresponds to ‘global’ citizenship in the contexts 
of Turkey and Armenia. However, in the case of France, since the values of the republic are 
considered as ‘universal’, this duality is assumed to be complementary instead of conflictual. 
Nevertheless, this does not absolve French education from its nationalist tendencies, espe-
cially regarding the colonial past and confrontation with it (Lantheaume 2003, 138).
3  According to Gürpınar, the ‘Turkish Thesis’ on the Armenian Genocide constitutes 
a complex combination of three distinct approaches: a right-wing version, a left-wing version 
and a centrist version. Diverging in their justification of Ottoman response to Armenian 
militancy, the three versions also follow a concurrent path in the development of the official 
thesis. The right-wing version contextualizes the issue in terms of ethnic conflicts and nation-
alist movements, accusing Armenians of treachery and savagery, while the left-wing version 
emphasizes the imperialist hegemony of the era, targeting Armenian separatism through its 
collaboration with the Great Powers, and thus becoming the servant of imperialism. Finally, 
the centrist version claims a state-centric argument, denouncing the Armenian revolts as 
disobedience to state sovereignty (Gürpınar 2016, 221).
4  It is also important, at this point, to point out the fact that each country has a dif-
ferent policy towards textbook production. In Turkey, textbooks are produced either directly 
by the Ministry of National Education or by private publishers, also the Ministry can set up 
an independent commission to write a draft or order the purchase of existing textbooks. In 
any case, the textbooks are subjected to inspection and approval of the Ministry of National 
Education before being circulated (Akpınar et al. 2017, 19). In France, however, the produc-
tion of textbooks is highly regulated by a very competitive market whose primary actors are 
private publishers where the only constraint is to follow the national programmes (Baquès 
2007, 127). Armenia stands somewhere in between, having both the market-oriented system 
and the central commission for the selection of textbooks. In this regard, the textbooks are 
produced by the private publishing houses to be enlisted for the competition held by the 
Ministry of Education and Science, and the results are declared as the authorized textbooks 
of the following academic year (Zolyan and Tigran 2008, 17).
5  The textbook dedicates a whole page for the four positions apropos the voluntary 
movement. According to the textbook, Hunchakians, linking Armenian’s autonomy to victory, 
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VIOLENCE IN THE 20TH CENTURY
Michel Wieviorka
School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences, Paris
This is a lightly edited transcript of a lecture given at the symposium ‘Violence in 
20th-century Europe: Commemorating, Documenting, Educating’ in Brussels, 
Belgium on 6 June 2017.
I am a sociologist. I am not an historian. But I consider that social science 
should be multidisciplinary and that sociologists should not be too distant 
from history nor historians too far from sociology. We are dealing today with 
the 20th century, but we cannot begin such a meeting without mentioning 
what happened in England recently, that is, the terrorist attack in London 
on 3 June 2017. It is not only the 20th century that has had to deal with 
violence, terrorism and so on, so I would like to say something about this.
Let me start with the word violence. Although it is one of  the main and 
constant issues in social science, I do not know of  any scientific definition 
that really sums up a concept that we can all accept. Many definitions have 
been proposed. The same word for violence along with other words that 
describe many other issues are used in social science and in daily life, the 
media and politics. When one uses the same vocabulary in two different 
contexts – the world of  social science and the world of  daily life – there are 
always problems and some ambivalence because one never knows exactly 
what is at stake.
So to be more precise I will not deal with all forms of  violence: I will fo-
cus mainly on physical violence, when violence clearly aims to modify the 
physical integrity as well as the intellectual or moral integrity of  a person 
or a group. Sociologists and political scientists are well acquainted with the 
famous statement by the German sociologist Max Weber about the state hav-
ing a monopoly on the legitimate use of  violence. However, here I will not 
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deal with state violence. Nor will I deal with another interesting issue, which 
is what some social scientists call ‘symbolic violence’. No, I will focus on the 
physical and the concrete, with an emphasis on political forms of  violence.
There are many different ways to analyse violence and we can distinguish 
three main approaches.
There is an academic and intellectual tradition that considers violence to 
be a reaction to a situation, as an expression, a modality of  a crisis. When, 
for instance, workers lose their jobs suddenly because a factory is going to 
close down, they may shoot at car tyres, attack the managers and so on. It 
is a reaction to a crisis. When peasants say, ‘We do not want to pay’ or ‘We 
cannot pay more taxes and will become violent’, it is a reaction to a crisis or 
to a change in their situation. Experts sometimes call this ‘relative deprivation’ 
as it depends on certain frustrations that may lead to violence.
The political thinker and sociologist Alexis de Tocqueville was an advocate 
of  such a philosophical or sociological theory. When Tocqueville analysed 
the French Revolution, he noticed that the majority of  the people participat-
ing in it were not poor and were far removed from power. However, those 
in the thick of  the situation where large changes were occurring felt a deep 
sense of  crisis. The crisis could be economic, social, political or cultural. 
In the 1960s and 1970s this kind of  approach was very important in the 
literature of  political science but it soon became clear that the concept of  
relative privation was not that useful.
At this point a second approach became popular. Violence is not a reaction 
to a crisis caused by a change in a situation and that it is, on the contrary, 
a tool, a resource, which participators use, in order to achieve certain goals. 
In this kind of  analysis, violence is instrumental. For example, ‘I kill you 
because I want your money’ is very rational. So some analysts insist on 
this instrumentality with the idea that violence can be individual, but also – 
which is much more interesting – by insisting on the collective dimension 
of  this kind of  phenomenon. Instrumental violence, for instance, appears 
when a social movement tries to become a political actor in order to enter 
a political system. Charles Tilly, the founding father of  the so-called ‘re-
source mobilization theory’, is a well-known name in the fields of  history 
and sociology. He shows how violence is a resource that is mobilized by an 
individual or a collective of  actors in order to achieve certain goals. There 
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can be different goals, but in literature you will mainly find analysis that 
describes political goals.
Let me give you a personal example of  this way of  dealing with violence. 
I was living in Washington, DC, in the mid-1980s and I was looking into the 
way American specialists proposed anti-terrorist measures. Anti-terrorism 
was big business in Washington, DC, and the people we were working with 
were proposing many different possibilities and possible hypotheses based on 
intelligent ideas on what instrumental decisions could be taken by terrorists. 
They were trying to envisage biological terrorism, chemical terrorism, nuclear 
terrorism and so on. And then one day terrorists outthought them, getting 
on planes with business class tickets, wearing very respectable clothes and 
carrying some small knives and this was September 11th. A very instrumental 
way of  acting, and the experts who were trying to eliminate violence were 
not able to imagine the way terrorists could define their strategies. I give 
this example to illustrate the point that these violent perpetrators were 
partly rational. They were not crazy people. Sometimes you may be able to 
find some pathology or craziness, but terrorists are more calculating and 
strategic in their goals than we might expect. So at that stage we have two 
very different and opposing ways of  thinking. On the one hand, violence is 
reactive and, on the other hand, it is calculating, strategic and instrumental.
The third approach is very different. It considers that violence has something 
to do with culture and with personality. In order to understand why people 
act violently, one must know something about their historical background: 
about the general culture into which they were born, about their family and 
their childhood. A famous example is given in The Authoritarian Personality, 
a classic book written by the philosopher Theodor Adorno, who during 
Nazism left Germany for the United States. Adorno and his colleagues 
claimed that if  you wanted to understand how anti-Semitism could lead 
to extreme violence, you had to know about the way people were brought 
up. You had to know about education and you had to know about primary 
socialization. This is the idea: some cultures, educational systems and family 
influences prepare some personalities to be more violent than others. And, 
of  course, this idea can be used in order to understand Nazism.
This approach is not that easy to use for analysing violence for a very simple 
reason. If  you deal with young people who were born in the later years of  
the 19th century and if  you want to understand Nazism, anti-Semitism and 
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the extermination of  Jews forty or fifty years after that, you have to forget 
all that happened between the time when these young people were living 
with their parents, and the moment when they act, half  a century later. You 
jump and you forget history, politics and so many other factors that have 
changed society in the meantime. Another limit in this kind of  approach 
is that it presumes that everything is more or less decided when people are 
young, and that people cannot change or avoid becoming violent.
So this kind of  cultural approach focusing on personality has limited use. 
At this stage let me summarize my first remarks on three main classical 
approaches in social science. Each of  them can be useful but each has its 
limits. It is not necessarily frustration that makes people act, nor is it neces-
sarily a strategic or instrumental way of  thinking that makes people act. You 
cannot say people who commit suicide act in a very rational way, it is more 
complex than that. And it is not only family, education and so on that make 
people violent. These are useful explanations but not enough to complete 
a general analysis of  violence.
Now let me be a bit provocative: I would like to compare conflict with vio-
lence. Usually when one reads or hears the word conflict, violence springs 
to mind. Some people speak of  ‘armed conflicts’ or ‘violent conflict’ in 
order to deal with war, civil war or guerilla warfare. The idea of  conflict is 
usually connected with the idea of  violence, so that people have come to 
talk about ‘conflict resolution’. Conflict resolution means bringing violence 
to an end. So while the idea of  conflict is usually connected with the no-
tion of  violence, I would like to distinguish, and maybe contrast, these two 
ideas. In my vocabulary at least, when I say ‘conflict’, I mean a conflictual 
relationship between actors – a relationship that can at one moment become 
institutionalized or lead to some negotiation. So if  conflict means making 
way for a relationship where negotiation is possible, where institutionaliza-
tion is possible, then maybe conflict can counteract violence.
I mean here that I do not think that there is an end to violence when there 
is no more use of  force. There is an end to violence when people say: ‘now 
we can debate and we can negotiate and we can institutionalize the differ-
ences between your point of  view and my point of  view.’ It is a huge thing, 
which I will not deal with here. It is true that in many cases you may find 
conflict and violence at the same time. These are, for instance, situations 
where actors who could become partners in negotiation use violence instead. 
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But generally speaking, and I will give one or two examples, the more people 
are able to transform violence into negotiation, institutionalization, debate 
and conflictualization without violence, the better.
My first example is taken from the history of  the working class movement 
in a number of  countries. Let me select the French case. It sometimes 
started with violence, from the workers and sometimes from the masters 
of  industry or from state opponents. And violence stops when you have 
a strong movement, able to negotiate. In the French case there was anarchist 
terrorism at the end of  the 19th century; people were killing, planting bombs 
and so on, in the name of  the poor and the excluded. Some time in 1894 
or 1895 it stopped exactly when the first main trade union was created – la 
Confédération générale du travail – when the first Bourses du travail [labour 
exchanges], places where people could organize trade unions, were created. 
Why? Because trade unions firmly say that violence is not good, they prefer to 
exert strong pressure in order to achieve certain goals, such as transforming 
the conditions of  workers. This case is absolutely clear: when the working 
class movement became strong and was able to negotiate and discuss, there 
was no more terrorism. I do not say violence stopped, of  course, but there 
was no longer the need for such extremism.
A second historical example demonstrates the opposite: the end of  the work-
ing class movement. The case of  left-wing Italian terrorism appeared when 
the working class movement was in decline and no longer able to negotiate 
and transform its demands into debates. At that moment violence intensi-
fied and terrorism became more prevalent. I should be more precise but 
my general idea is that if  we want to prevent this kind of  violence, we must 
take into account the possibility, or not, of  conflict in a society. When the 
working class movement was collapsing, more room was made for tensions.
Now I would like to make some remarks about the history of  social science 
during the later years of  the 20th century. Generally speaking, in the 1960s 
and 1970s, social science was dominated by what we could call structuralism: 
the idea being that what was important were abstract mechanisms – structures 
that organize collective life – rather than the subjectivity of  the people. But in 
the 1980s and 1990s new ideas – and these are very important for violence – 
appeared explaining that we have to deal with subjectivity and not only with 
abstract mechanisms, structures and all this vocabulary. I will quote two world 
famous authors, both French: historian and philosopher Michel Foucault 
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and sociologist Alain Touraine. Both, starting from very different perspec-
tives, said that we have to take into serious account the notion of  subject.
What does this mean? Its meaning is a little bit different for both of  these 
two intellectuals – but they share the belief  that the subject more or less has 
the capacity to act. Being a subject is being able to transform oneself  into 
an actor. A subject is the opposite of  an abstract mechanism. These great 
intellectuals and many others after them introduced the notion of  subjectivity 
to social science, including when dealing with violence. Maybe Foucault’s or 
Touraine’s subjects are romantic people, wonderful people, who transform 
themselves into actors. They build their own life, a very wonderful life. But 
subjectivity does not mean only a wonderful life, subjectivity may lead also 
to the polar opposite, to the dark side of  an individual or collective life. If  
we introduce the notion of  subjectivity in order to analyse violence, we must 
admit that subjectivity can lead to dark and eventually cruel behaviours and 
not only to positive romantic forms of  action.
The second point is that we must avoid what social scientists called natu-
ralization or essentialization of  social behaviours. Subjectivity is not nature, 
it is not an essence that is better than using the notion of  subject. We 
should be interested in processes of  subjectivation – the fact that people 
are  increasingly able to build their own lives – and processes of  desubjec-
tivation – the fact that often people who are less and less able to build their 
own lives are going to be increasingly destructive.
And here begins a fourth approach in the analysis of  violence, taking into 
account the processes through which individuals and groups learn more 
to be subjects or on the contrary to be anti-subjects, to destroy, to kill and 
to stand on the dark side of  collective life. In some cases there is not such 
a big gap between subjectivity and action and violence, for instance when 
people live in neighbourhoods where they become violent because they are 
not master of  their own lives and cannot become actors. But there are other 
cases where subjectivity is absolutely different. Some people, who I call anti-
subjects, use violence for pleasure; violence here is connected with nothing 
more than the pleasure sadistic cruelty can give them.
If  we want to analyse violence today we must seriously take into account 
the idea that in some cases it is caused by the process in which people lose 
contact with what I call positive subjectivity and increasingly find themselves 
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on the other side to the point where they kill, destroying other people or/
and themselves.
This kind of  approach was not so prevalent during the 20th century; it begins 
to be more influential in social sciences during the later years of  the 20th 
century. The new interest in the notion of  subjectivity, for the processes of  
subjectivity and the appearance of  deradicalization, for instance, appeared 
when it became obvious that in order to fight against radicalization, it was 
necessary to introduce policies of  ‘deradicalization’ that seriously took into 
account the subjectivity of  the individuals. This kind of  vocabulary is close 
to the notion of  subject. Radicalization means a new form of  subjectivity, 
and deradicalization is supposed to introduce new elements, new dimen-
sions in the subjectivity of  these individuals, in their way of  thinking and 
in their consciousness.
This is possible since during the last thirty or forty years of  the 20th century 
there was an important development: the idea that violence was not only 
the problem of  the state of  order, it was not only a problem of  a system, 
it was also the problem of  the victims and of  those people who suffer 
from violence. If  we want to understand why there is such an emphasis 
on violence connected with the idea of  subjectivity, it is because we are 
entering an era where victims are recognized, which was not so much the 
case before.
Victims have recently said, ‘I’ve been destroyed’ or ‘my group has been 
destroyed’, ‘my culture has been destroyed’, ‘my family has been destroyed’. 
When this is a discourse that people can hear, that politicians listen to, that 
the media echoes, then this changes the way people think. During the past 
forty years, we have come to recognize that victims exist. And as victims 
exist, we must take into account their subjectivity. And if  we consider the 
subjectivity of  the victims, we must also take into account the subjectiv-
ity of  those people that perpetrate violence. I do not say that they are not 
responsible, my aim is to understand how people become violent.
This leads me to my conclusion. Entering an era with victims also means 
a period of  ‘memory and remembrance’. Because the family, friends and 
neighbours of  victims want justice and recognition, they want the violence 
suffered to be recognized. Victims have memories. Memory is not history, as 
we all know. Memory is what one remembers and what the family remembers, 
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it is not necessarily what one finds in history books. And a problem has 
appeared: is it possible to pass from memory to history?
It is not so obvious, and in some cases it takes time but is possible. In my 
country, for instance, there was no room for Jews in the general memory 
and in school history books for twenty or twenty-five years after the Second 
World War. But some Jews, some intellectuals, some great historians, Michael 
R. Marrus and Robert O. Paxton for instance, authors of  the famous book 
Vichy France and the Jews (1981), decided to mobilize themselves in order to 
make memory participate in the public debate and after some years, memory 
became history. Today you can open any kind of  school book on the history 
of  France and it will dwell on the French state during the Second World 
War, the story of  Jews in France and so on, which was not the case before.
In some cases it is more difficult. It may be because different memories 
conflict with one another. Let me take a French example, the memory in 
France of  the Algerian War. Some people are the sons of  members of  the 
National Liberation Front (FLN), while others are sons of  Harki, native 
Algerian Muslims who either decided to fight with the French army or were 
obliged to fight with the French army. Some people were white French, the 
so-called Pieds-Noirs, who were obliged to return to France. Others were 
Jews from Algeria. All these people have different memories that conflict 
and sometimes they hate each other. So how can you come to a common 
understanding of  the past when so many memories conflict? It is not so easy.
Sometimes the conflict is not within nation-state but at the international level. 
It is very interesting, for instance, to know that some committees have been 
proposed during recent years in order to work on a common history for 
children living in Germany and France, with the aim of  publishing a book 
that would be accepted in both countries, which meant being able to deal 
with points on which the national narrative in both countries could disagree. 
It is not always so easy and sometimes memory can be an obstacle to history.
As you can see, I passed from time to time from analysing violence to the 
idea that we must put an end to violence. For instance, passing from memory 
to history helps to end violence. I think that the 20th century obliges us – 
speaking as a social scientist – to analyse violence. Maybe the 21st century 
will be the century where we build a new field – the end of  violence. Let us 
study how people move from violence and how European Remembrance 
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works. You could be a wonderful actor but you could also be a wonderful 
object of  analysis! Why do you exist now? You did not exist fifty years ago. 
What does this mean? What does this bring? I think that there will be more 
and more work in the future with the aim of  understanding violence and 
offer more analysis of  how to eliminate it.
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Europe is still suffering from consequences of  the First and Second World 
Wars, which almost resulted in Europe destroying itself. Both wars, the 
‘Thirty Years’ War’ of  the 20th century, resulted in many millions of  killed or 
heavily wounded soldiers and many millions of  widows and orphans. There 
were almost sixteen million deaths during the First World War and at least 
sixty million deaths during the Second World War. This included genocides 
against the Jews, Armenians, Poles, Roma and Sinti as well as Chechens-
Ingush and Crimean Tatars. There were more than thirty-five million expel-
lees and refugees (Germans, Jews, Poles, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Lithuanians, 
Latvians, Estonians, Finns, Slovaks, Magyars, Romanians, Bulgarians, Greeks, 
Serbs, Croats, Slovenes and Italians). Economies and societies were destroyed 
and we still feel the consequences of  this destruction up until the present 
day. On the one hand, after both wars the ‘victors’ made mistaken and ill-
judged political, economic and social decisions that undermined peaceful 
developments, particularly in Eastern Europe. On the other, both wars 
created remembrances that still strongly divide many European nations.1
In the First World War Germany lost 4 per cent of  its inhabitants; Russia 
(without the civil war) 3 per cent; France 5 per cent; Britain 3 per cent; 
and Italy 4 per cent; but Serbia suffered the death of  almost 15 per cent; 
Romania 5 per cent; and the new Republic of  Austria 4 per cent. The war 
left three million widows, as many as ten million orphans and millions of  
grieving parents, brothers, sisters, lovers and friends. The names of  the dead 
were listed on tens of  thousands of  monuments built throughout Europe 
after the war. In the 1920s and 1930s, Europeans remembered the war in 
ceremonies that emphasized sacrifice, grief  and mourning. A number of  
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remarkable novels and memoirs began to appear about ten years after the 
armistice (Sheehan 2008, 100–104).
The demographic disaster of  the Second World War was even worse, literally 
the most disastrous in modern history. Rough estimates of  military losses 
and civilian deaths arising from wartime policies, including the Nazi exter-
mination of  the Jews and other war-related causes, particularly aerial warfare, 
expulsions and forced resettlements, gave a different picture. Germany (of  
1937) lost more than 10 per cent of  its inhabitants, the Soviet Union 15 per 
cent, Poland even 20 per cent, Yugoslavia 7 per cent, Austria (of  1937) 5.5 
per cent. In comparison, Italy suffered ‘only’ 2 per cent, France 1 per cent, 
Britain even less. In the Nazi ‘Final Solution’ almost six million Jews were 
murdered, half  of  them in the Nazi extermination camps in occupied Poland, 
with more than a million by SS-Einsatzgruppen in the western parts of  the 
Soviet Union (Winter 1995, 289–92; Tomasevich 2001; Gilbert 1995, 364–71).
In comparison, Western Europe suffered more in the First World War than 
in the Second World War, Eastern Europe far more in the Second World 
War. No doubt, the Germans fought differently in the East and in the West, 
and Germany’s enemies did so too. From 1939, Eastern and Southeastern 
Europe were involved in a total war, and in 1944–45 Central Europe was too. 
In the First World War all the complex military machines had transformed 
civilians into soldiers. Citizen soldiers had to fight not through fear but 
through devotion to their country and commitment to their comrades. For 
many soldiers the battlefields in Western, Eastern and Southeastern Europe 
provided the first glimpses of  a world beyond their village. Winston Churchill 
realized very early that ‘this is no ordinary war, but a struggle between na-
tions for life and death’ (Sheehan 2008, 12–20, 55, 60, 73).
Between 1914 and 1918, neither side respected the Fourth Hague Inter-
national Convention of  1907. However, as the Allied armies hardly ever 
succeeded in penetrating German, Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian or Ottoman 
territory (not before late 1917), foreign occupation, collaboration, resistance, 
repression and retribution mainly occurred in territories that the Central 
Powers occupied in Belgium, northeastern France, Serbia, Montenegro, Ro-
mania, Italy and Russia. German troops started executing alleged francs-tireurs 
(snipers) in Belgium and France; Austro-Hungarians hanged thousands of  
Serbians and Ukrainian civilians, among them Orthodox priests, suspected 
of  spying for the enemy. Politically, the shootings and lootings benefited 
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mainly the Allies, whose media spread the news of  atrocities committed by 
the ‘Huns’ (Germans) and their allies. The issue of  collaboration with the 
enemy was less of  a public concern during the First World War, at least in 
Western Europe, than it would become during the Second World War. In the 
Ottoman Empire, the Young Turk government and the army high command 
suspected the Armenians of  siding with the invading Russian enemy and 
organized the expulsion and massacre of  perhaps a million Armenian fellow 
citizens, including women and children. This was the first true genocide in 
the 20th century (Naimark 2001, 17–42).
Europe in the 1920s and 1930s was divided along many fault lines –  between 
victors and losers, liberalism and radical nationalism, militarism and pacifism, 
democracy and dictatorship, capitalism and communism, right and left, ‘but 
the most important was between those who rejected and those who em-
braced political violence at home and abroad’. Major components of  the 
comprehensive crisis continued: (1) an explosion of  ethnic-racist nationalism; 
(2) bitter and irreconcilable demands for territorial revisionism; (3) acute class 
conflict – now provoked by the Bolshevik Revolution; and (4) a protracted 
crisis of  capitalism that culminated in the Great Depression. No doubt, 
nationalist conflicts and ethnic-racial tensions, greatly intensified by the Paris 
peace treaties played a much greater role in Eastern than in Western Europe. 
The alternative model of  a ‘dictatorship of  the proletariat’ with the elimina-
tion of  the capitalist class and a redistribution of  land provoked elements of  
the right to combine extreme nationalism with virulent anti-Bolshevism and 
to establish authoritarian governments. Often nationalist hatred singled out 
Jews as special scapegoats for resentment and social misery. At the beginning 
of  the 1930s, in many European countries the men who became presidents 
or prime ministers had fought in the trenches in the First World War and 
were more familiar with everyday violence than their predecessors. Violence 
was central particularly for fascism, National Socialism and communism 
(Steiner 2011, 167–80; Baberowski and Doering-Manteuffel 2006, 59–79).
Between 1939 and 1945, Europe under Nazi leadership experienced armed 
conflict, foreign occupation, aerial bombardments, persecution, shooting 
of  hostages, concentration and death camps, as well as ferocious civil and 
ethnic wars. In many places from the North Cape of  Norway to the Island 
of  Crete and from the French port of  Brest to the highest peaks of  the 
Caucasus, German soldiers, SS and policemen were numerous enough to rule 
the land but not plentiful enough to control every town, village and forest. 
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As a consequence, national governments, local authorities, native populations 
and diverse interest groups, as well as many individuals, were eager, for a myr-
iad of  reasons, to accommodate or collaborate with the ruling Germans or to 
resist them. Only one major group was not able to choose between collabora-
tion or resistance: that is, the Jews. Genocide and ‘ethnic cleansing’ on a gi-
gantic scale were an intrinsic part of  the meaning of  the war to the German 
leadership and to its subordinates in the military, police and bureaucracy who 
sought to implement racial policy (Mazower 2008, 259–93; Deák 2015, 1–13).
Although France, Belgium and the Netherlands had enough manpower and 
possessed immense colonial empires and could have created well-trained 
and well-equipped armies, they broke down within weeks of  the German 
onslaught from May to June 1940. They had drawn the wrong lessons from 
the First World War ignoring changes brought about by tanks and aeroplanes, 
and were caught in a defeatist attitude against Nazi Germany. The leaders 
of  the French army were, in the historian Marc Bloch’s words, ‘incapable of  
thinking in terms of  a new war’. However, the occupying German troops 
treated Dutchmen, Belgians, Frenchmen, as well as the Danes and the 
Norwegians, more gently than they did the Poles, the Yugoslavs, the Greeks, 
the Belarusians, the Ukrainians and the Russians. There existed some clear 
reasons: Hitler had no interest in colonizing the West and the North of  
Europe; the German war industry needed – and generally received – the 
willing cooperation of  the western and northern Europeans; last but not 
least, the willingness of  the local population and its leaders to cooperate 
corresponded with the German occupation policy of  accepting the race 
of  the inhabitants. The German Nazis were especially keen on seeing the 
Norwegians as ‘Nordic Aryans’, and therefore admirably suited for inter-
breeding as well as for participation in the Great Germanic Empire (Deák 
2015, 41–47; Sheehan 2008, 122).
After the capitulation of  France, the northern and western parts of  France 
and Belgium were ruled as occupied zones by the German military adminis-
tration. The new French government, settling in the resort town of  Vichy in 
the unoccupied zone, declared that moral decline spread by godless Marxists, 
liberals, Freemasons and especially the Jews had undermined France. Marshal 
Philippe Pétain proclaimed after his handshake with Hitler in October 1940: 
‘I enter, today, into the way of  collaboration.’ Aside from everyday business 
transactions with the German occupier, such as selling food or transporting 
them, contacts between the French and the Germans were mostly on the 
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level of  a relationship between a man and a woman. With more than two 
million French soldiers in captivity, German soldiers sometimes took their 
places in women’s lives; however, similar relationships occurred between 
German women and French prisoners of  war (POWs) in Germany. The 
Vichy regime also took anti-Jewish measures in advance of  German requests. 
Thousands of  Jewish refugees from Germany, Austria and the East were 
pushed back across the German border. Then, in 1941 and 1942, the French 
police arrested and deported many thousands of  Jews, many of  whom 
were born in France, to the death camps of  Germany (Deák 2015, 50–58).
While in Norway the local authorities and the population were in general 
uninterested in saving the lives of  most of  the country’s 1,700 Jewish citizens, 
in collaborationist Denmark the government and the population – as well 
as the local German occupation forces – succeeded in protecting the lives 
of  nearly all of  their 8,000 Jewish inhabitants. As Queen Wilhelmina and 
her government fled from the Netherlands to England, the Austrian lawyer 
Arthur Seyss-Inquart ran the country as Reichskommissar from his seat at 
Clingendael near The Hague. Among other things, the Germans found 
in the governmental offices accurate statistics on the country’s Jews, and 
Dutch exactness and reliability also infected the Jewish Council. Therefore, 
the Nazis deported 106,000 Dutch Jews, with only 20,000 remaining. The 
total value of  Dutch goods exported to Germany amounted to about 8.5 
billion guilders, at the time US $3 billion, of  which almost two-thirds was 
for military goods (Deák 2015, 48–50; Mazower 2008, 271, 397).
Resistance involved illegal activity, illegal not only in the eyes of  the German 
or other occupation forces but also according to international conventions 
and the laws of  one’s country. To fight the occupier, the resisters needed 
to seize arms from military garrisons. In western and northern European 
countries – unlike Poland, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Greece – only 
a small segment of  the population participated in the resistance; armed 
clashes were infrequent and people generally obeyed the rules set up by 
the country’s German-controlled national government. Nonetheless, re-
sistance groups set up underground newspapers, as in the case of  perhaps 
the most famous resistance group in France, Combat. The group published 
a sophisticated yet popular clandestine newspaper of  the same name, edited 
by Albert Camus. Although the Combat group never numbered more than 
a few hundred activists, their newspaper’s print run increased from 10,000 
in late 1941 to 250,000 in 1944. Listening to BBC broadcasts was considered 
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a grave crime; but millions of  Europeans – even Germans and Austrians – 
were able to hear its programmes (Dear and Foot 1995, 115–16).
Among the most controversial yet most effective resistance weapons of  the 
Second World War was the legendary Special Operations Executive (SOE), 
called into being in 1940 by Prime Minister Churchill and his Minister of  
Economics, whose goal was ‘to set Europe ablaze’. The SOE trained and 
sent agents to practically every European country with the aim of  gather-
ing intelligence, engaging in sabotage and setting up secret radio stations 
for transmitting information to Britain. Over the course of  the war, the 
SOE employed or directly controlled some 13,000 people and supplied 
another one million with money, food and weapons. Interestingly, there 
was no equivalent organization on the German side. However, thousands 
of  Europeans were executed for having helped the SOE men and women, 
and, in turn, hundreds of  SOE agents died because of  their own or their 
superiors’ negligence. Famously, the SOE employed many younger women, 
who could circulate more easily than men of  military age. But when the secret 
radio operators in the Netherlands were caught by the German intelligence 
service, and then ‘turned around’ to work for the Germans; flight after flight 
of  SOE agents, who were parachuted into the Netherlands, would first be 
followed and then arrested, tortured and either killed or also ‘turned around’ 
to work for the Germans (Dear and Foot 1995, 115–16).
SS-Hauptsturmführer Klaus Barbie was the head of  the Gestapo in Lyon 
from November 1942 to August 1944. In this period he tortured and mur-
dered members of  the French Resistance, such as Jean Moulin, the secret 
delegate of  General Charles de Gaulle in France. The circumstances of  
Moulin’s arrest and death have remained controversial and have typically 
led to endless speculations, especially with regard to the name of  the traitor. 
Though wanted as a war criminal, Barbie was employed by the US Counter 
Intelligence Corps in February 1947, which protected him from the French 
and then helped him reach Bolivia. He was extradited to France in 1983, 
found guilty of  war crimes and sentenced to life imprisonment in 1987. In 
1990, the aged Barbie pointed a finger at Raymond Aubrac, another famous 
resister, and his wife Lucie, the no-less-famous resistance heroine (Dear and 
Foot 1995, 113; Deák 2015, 121–23).
In Rome there was considerable anti-German resistance activity by three 
groups: the conservative monarchists (Badoglio), the moderates (Christian 
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Democrats, Social Democrats), and the communists and allied socialists. 
The first major partisan attack was planned and executed by the communists 
who had noticed that a German military police company marched through 
central Rome, specifically down the narrow via Rasella, every day and always 
at the same time. The military policemen were draftees from the South Tyrol, 
which was Austrian until 1919 and then Italian between 1919 and 1939, and 
then forced to be German from 1939. The German military police consisted 
of  two companies, totalling 400 men. On 23 March 1944, the partisans, 
disguised as sanitation workers, hid a bomb in a rubbish cart that killed 
thirty-three German military policemen and wounded hundreds when it ex-
ploded. All sixteen partisans escaped unharmed, and none were ever caught. 
Field-Marshal Albert Kesselring, commander-in-chief  in Italy, recommended 
that ten Italians be executed for every German soldier who had died. SS-
Obersturmbannführer Herbert Kappler, the SS head of  security in Rome, 
got the order to organize the execution. Kappler took prisoners who were 
under a death sentence, other political prisoners, common criminals, bystand-
ers from the via Rasella, Italian POWs and seventy-eight Jews. The Pope 
tried to help some individuals selected by the SS for execution, but for every 
one released another innocent person was arrested. In the end 335 Italians 
were killed in the Ardeatine Caves outside Rome by untrained, unprepared 
and drunken SS men. The question was raised whether the German action 
was legal. Hostage taking and hostage shooting as well as reprisals had been 
recognized as perfectly legal by The Hague Conventions and also, somewhat 
surprisingly, by one of  the US-led Nuremberg Tribunals in 1948. Kappler 
was sentenced to life in prison by an Italian court in 1948, but in 1977 his wife 
smuggled the then-terminally ill and very thin Kappler out of  jail in a large 
suitcase. She took him to Germany, where he soon died (Deák 2015, 166–71).
On 10 June 1944, four days after the beginning of  Operation Overlord, the 
Allied landing in Normandy, a company (120 men) of  the SS Panzer Division 
Das Reich passed through the historic province of  Limousin, in west-central 
France, on the way to the front. By then, the division had been subjected 
to guerilla attacks, including the torture and killing of  some forty captured 
German soldiers in the village of  Tulle, not far from Oradour-sur-Glane. For 
that outrage, the division had already taken revenge by torturing and killing 
ninety-seven Frenchmen in Tulle. Acting on the rumour that a Waffen-SS 
officer was being held captive by the French Resistance guerilla fighters, the 
SS company under Sturmbannführer Adolf  Diekmann entered Oradour and 
within a few hours killed all 642 inhabitants, including even the youngest 
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of  children, mostly by burning them alive. It is still unclear from whom the 
order to kill originated. The majority of  the SS killers at Oradour, including 
their commander, fell in battle a few weeks later. However, at the Bordeaux 
Trial in 1953 against some survivors of  the SS company, it turned out that 
fourteen of  the twenty-one defendants had once been French citizens; 
they all claimed in court to have been forcibly drafted into the Waffen-SS. 
Almost as a whole, people in Alsace-Lorraine bemoaned the tragic fate of  
the poor boys who had to kill so as not to be killed by their own superiors. 
Therefore, at the Bordeaux Trial the Alsatians were treated mildly (Deák 
2015, 171–73; Dear and Foot 1995, 113).
During the Ardennes Campaign, which involved the 6th Panzer Army com-
manded by Colonel-General of  the Waffen-SS, Sepp Dietrich, the founder 
of  the Leibstandarte SS Adolf  Hitler, SS-Standartenführer Joachim Peiper 
carried out, on 17 December 1944, a mass execution of  US POWs and lo-
cal civilians at Baugnez near Malmédy in the east of  Belgium. A number of  
similar incidents followed. There were forty-three American survivors, but 
eighty-six were killed. After the war, Dietrich and Peiper were incarcerated 
at Dachau. At the trial the prosecution admitted that confessions had been 
extracted by threatening execution, false witnesses and mock trials. Peiper 
and forty-two others were condemned to death; Dietrich was sentenced to 
life imprisonment. However, both were released after ten years of  imprison-
ment (Dear and Foot 1995, 713).
In 1946 Karl Jaspers discussed the problem in his book of  lectures called 
The Question of  German Guilt: ‘What wrongs did the German people commit?’ 
He established four categories of  responsibility: criminal guilt, followed by 
political, moral and metaphysical guilt. He found the seeds of  collective 
responsibility in the metaphysical category. But Jaspers was willing to talk 
only about individual culpability. Hannah Arendt’s series of  lectures entitled 
Some Questions of  Moral Philosophy, presented at the New School of  Social 
Research in New York three years after Adolf  Eichmann’s execution in 1962, 
raised questions as to the origins of  ‘evil’ and formulated the theory of  ‘the 
banality of  harm’. But the deputy prosecuting attorney at the Eichmann 
Trial in Jerusalem, Gabriel Bach, corrected Arendt: Eichmann had the 
‘dreadful inclination’ to destroy the Jews (Humler 2011; Bach 2011, 38–39; 
Deák 2015, 220). Meanwhile, judicial retribution and political purges were 
held elsewhere in Europe. The heads of  state or prime ministers who were 
executed after the war included those of  Italy, France, Norway, Slovakia, 
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Hungary, Romania, Serbia, Croatia and Bulgaria. The list of  non-German 
Europeans executed for treason, collaboration and war crimes included 
thousands of  generals, police chiefs, city mayors, politicians and journal-
ists. In France intellectuals had played a major role in both resistance and 
collaboration. Therefore, the debate over French wartime behaviour and 
the post-war purges has become a veritable national pastime. However, the 
number of  real or alleged collaborators shot, beaten to death or summarily 
executed reached almost 10,000. In the courts, the prosecutors tended to 
single out actors, actresses, cabaret singers, writers, poets and philosophers 
(Deák 2015, 200).
Amazingly, the harshest sentences were pronounced in Norway, Denmark 
and the Netherlands. In Norway more than 90,000 people were tried, nearly 
4 per cent of  the population; thirty were executed. Similar proportions ex-
isted in Denmark, while in the Netherlands 150,000 people were detained 
under the suspicion of  collaboration and treason. About 60,000 of  them 
were subsequently convicted, 152 condemned to death, and 40 were actually 
executed. Norwegian courts dealt harshly with women who had had sexual 
relations with German soldiers; worse even, the new laws denied citizenship 
to their children, which amounted to some thousands. In Belgium 53,000 
men and women were convicted of  collaboration; officials used the phrase 
‘la politique du moindre mal’ (the policy of  doing the least harm) to cover the 
ways in which they tried to accommodate German demands: giving way 
only when they had to. Although in Italy during the last months of  the war, 
or at the moment of  liberation, almost the same number as in France were 
lynched or shot; the courts were relatively mild (Deák 2015, 204–5).
Europe survived the second Thirty Years’ War between 1914 and 1948. Not 
since the Thirty Years’ War of  the 17th century had such a large proportion 
of  the European population suffered so much from the pains of  war. Many 
Europeans had acted badly – not only as politicians, officers and policemen, 
but also as economists, technicians, doctors, intellectuals, journalists and even 
priests. Under the conditions of  two world wars and their consequences, as 
well as the strong influence of  several ideologies, there was almost no barrier 
to violence against ‘the other’. Populist nationalism, nationalist and religious 
hatred and fighting against the imagined class enemy as well as inter-racial 
fighting led to a European-wide crisis in compassion and humanity. Not 
only were most Europeans indifferent to the fate of  their Jewish, Roma and 
other sectarian neighbours, but millions actually participated in manhunts or 
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at least profited from the disappearances and deaths of  the victims. There 
were many who risked their lives for the persecuted, especially priests, nuns, 
doctors and individuals who did not like to fit into ‘normal’ society. But 
too many accepted the witch hunts in many cities and towns as well as the 
deportation of  Jews, Roma and political opponents to concentration camps 
by cattle wagons.
In an address to the United Nations on 7 December 1988, Mikhail Gor-
bachev declared that ‘force and the threat of  force [...] should not be instru-
ments of  foreign policy’. Although the German ‘Re-Unification’ and the 
dissolution of  the Soviet Union occurred peacefully, violence diminished 
but did not disappear from European public life, as experienced in Northern 
Ireland, the Basque Province, in Cyprus, in Kosovo, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
and in Ukraine. So, the main challenge is continuing: how to run Europe 
without violence? (Cf. Mueller, Gehler and Suppan 2015).
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I am truly honoured to be invited for a presentation of  an ‘Eastern Euro-
pean’ perspective on violence in the 20th century. Nevertheless, I would 
like to begin with a caveat. It concerns the very concept of  juxtaposing 
‘Eastern European’ and ‘Western European’ perspectives. I think that it is 
worth remembering that most Eastern Europeans did not know that they 
were ‘Eastern Europeans’ until about the 19th century because this was the 
time the very name ‘Eastern Europe’ was invented – as presented by Larry 
Wolff  in his wonderful monograph – by French philosophers at the end of  
the 18th century (Wolff  1994). One can ask, for example, whether there are 
Eastern Belgians and Western Belgians? I know that there are Flemings and 
Walloons but what about Eastern Belgians and Western Belgians? This could 
be just an intellectual creation. It could be treated, however, as an element 
of  symbolic or civilizational violence that imposes names or categories and 
with them specific intellectual constructs onto given regions (peoples) from 
centres of  a self-given authority.
But let us try to do this: to presume and to discuss certain interesting 
 elements that enable us to speak meaningfully about the differences in 
experiences of  violence throughout the 20th century and, more generally, 
about the differences between Eastern and Western Europe.
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In order to introduce these differences, I would like to use two very power-
ful names: Marx and Lenin. First I would like to introduce not Groucho 
Marx, nor Karl Marx, but Anthony Marx, a political scientist from Colum-
bia University who published a very interesting book, Faith in Nation, some 
years ago. In that book he presented early modern processes of  nation 
building in Spain, France and England. All these early modern practices 
were extremely exclusionary and violent, organized around the exclusion of  
particular religions, for example, Catholics in England, Protestants in France 
or the exclusion of  specific groups of  people, such as the Jews, evicted 
from so-called Western Europe, who were forced to migrate to so-called 
Eastern Europe. These exclusionary practices, says Anthony Marx, formed 
an important and steep step on the road to nation statehood, and with that 
an advance in democracy and liberalism.
In Eastern Europe most societies did not make that step in the early mod-
ern period. So we may take into consideration that the nation-making and 
modern democracy-making (and with them the conflicts and violence con-
nected to these exclusionary practices), which had been already passed in 
some western parts of  Europe in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, would 
become part of  Eastern European experiences in the 19th and 20th cen-
turies. And many times, observed from a Western perspective in the 20th 
century, they were just perceived as not only ‘barbarous’, but also somehow 
typically Eastern European. I would like to quote a summary of  Anthony 
Marx’s argument:
The cohering effect of  exclusion and intolerance is still re-
flected in the West’s views of  the rest of  the world, denigrating 
others as the basis of  cohering us was not only central to the 
origins of  Western nationalism and then justifications of  co-
lonialism, it is also recapitulated in our current denigration of  
latecomers to nationalism. Ironically as Western Europe now 
begins to move beyond national solidarities, its own coherence 
as a developed bloc is again solidified by distinguishing itself  
as more consistently civic than those others still faithfully forg-
ing national unity. Thus the West is itself  distinguished and 
thereby given coherence by denigrating the rest – or Eastern 
Europe – and by pretending that our own past was somehow 
different, mimicking the pattern by which our own earlier 
national level solidarities were forged and then forgotten. The 
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West’s idealization of  its past has indeed gone hand-in-hand 
with denigration of  those who were encouraged, attempted 
and failed to live up to that noble standard. Western civic na-
tionalism has been contrasted with the ethnic or exclusionary 
forms later adapted by the East or the South (Marx 2003, 199).
So here you have a perception of  the West on the problems with national-
ism in Eastern Europe in the 20th century; nationalism is seen as the core, 
as the essence and as the source of  violence.
Now to Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. Exactly a hundred years ago, he published 
probably one of  his most incisive books: his analysis of  ‘Imperialism as the 
highest stage of  capitalism’. In that study he presented a concept accord-
ing to which most Western European countries existing at that time were 
able to diminish social and economic conflicts in their metropoles, due to 
the fact that they had and exploited, more or less brutally, huge colonial 
overseas possessions (Bocharov 2001, 497–532). One can add that there 
were Western European countries, nine countries within the contemporary 
European Union (Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Belgium, Hol-
land, Germany, Denmark), that had overseas colonies. And there were no 
countries of  Eastern Europe with such possessions (save Russia, which 
deserves a separate mention). Let us now do an intellectual experiment: we 
know that during the last decade of  the 19th century in a Central Africa 
colony ruled by the Belgian king five to ten million native dwellers perished 
in one of  the worst examples of  brutal colonialism. But how many people 
in the world connect Belgium with such a practice that could be compared 
to the most horrible crimes of  the 20th century? I dare suggest that very, 
very few. Let us imagine that such a colonial crime had been committed by 
one of  the countries of  Eastern Europe, Poland or Hungary, for example. 
I think that it would have been treated as an example of  a typical Eastern 
European act of  violence, as opposed to Western European civility. And it 
would have been known the world over, as well as an obligatory element of  
an all-European memory in the making. But it is not. And why is this? It is 
because the source of  the colonial crime was ‘here’ rather than ‘there’? Here 
in Belgium we can see public monuments to the real organizer of  the death 
of  these five to ten million Africans in the Congo. Could you imagine the 
pressure stemming from Brussels if  there had been monuments to perpe-
trators of  such gigantic colonial crimes in, shall we say, Warsaw, Budapest, 
Vilnius or Riga?
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I want to stress that most of  Western Europe exported much of  its violence 
(violent exploitation and conflicts) outside Europe, while most of  Eastern 
Europe was dominated throughout ‘the long 19th century’ (to use Eric 
Hobsbawm’s title) by three empires. I put certain stress on this word: these 
were empires, not national states. I mean here: the German Empire (the 
Second Reich), the Romanov/Russian Empire and the Habsburg Empire 
(with its imperial centre in Austria, and – after 1867 – another one, in Hun-
gary). These empires clashed finally in 1914.
This was the beginning of  a real experience of  differences in violence 
between Eastern and Western Europe. Why was this? To put it simply: 
because there was the Eastern Front and the Western Front. They pro-
vided, so to speak, slightly different experiences. There were devastating 
military campaigns and occupation regimes on both fronts of  the Great 
War. The occupation regimes existed, however, for a longer time and cov-
ered a much larger space in Eastern Europe, encompassing contemporary 
Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Serbia. What also 
made an important difference was the fact that Eastern Europe experienced 
mass migrations (usually forced and frequently violent) of  several millions 
of  people. These people were forced to leave their original dwellings and 
evacuated, as it was called, with ‘their’ imperial armies. Imperial Germany 
was usually successful here, so forced mass migration was predominantly the 
experience of  Austro-Hungarian, Russian and later also Romanian subjects. 
Probably the most important difference connected to the violence at that 
point in European history stemmed from the fact that the war meant 
 uprooting millions of  peasant soldiers. As regards peasant soldiers fighting 
also on the Western Front, most of  them had already identified themselves, 
even in the pre-war period, as Frenchmen, Germans or Englishmen, while 
on the Eastern Front most of  these millions of  peasants, many of  them 
illiterate, were objects of  nation-formation processes, of  imperial and anti-
imperial political agendas, as well as specific social goals that turned the war 
on that front into a war for their identities. And that made changes connected 
with the First World War probably even more disruptive. While in societies 
engaged on the Western Front, the results of  the war were relatively quickly 
seen as a mass suicide in the trenches, a completely absurd final conflict 
that brought nothing good, causing only tragedy. This experience marks the 
beginning of  an evolution in Western memories of  war that would concen-
trate its attention on the victims rather than on the heroes and would lead 
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towards pacifism. All of  this would finally come to fruition in the 1960s 
and 1970s.
The curve of  memorial changes stemming from the war was (or at least 
seems to be) different in Eastern Europe. Almost as many people were 
killed on the Eastern Front as on the Western one. However, there were 
numerous Poles, Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians, Finns, Czechs, Slovaks 
and ‘Yugoslavs’ – I have purposely grouped them together – that believed 
that the war would lead towards something good, that it opened the possibil-
ity of  forming or recreating their nation state, to reaffirm their cultural and 
political identities of  which they had been previously deprived. Many hoped 
that they would be able to build their own (to use the words of  Balfour’s 
memorandum on Jewish settlement in Palestine from 1917) ‘national home’ 
on the ruins of  the former empires: the Second Reich, Habsburg, Ottoman 
and Romanov. But there were also other experiences in Eastern Europe 
that influenced further developments in the problem of  mass violence in 
the 20th century in Eastern Europe. There were people who perceived 
themselves as nations who were on the losing side in the First World War, 
among them Hungarians, Bulgarians, Russians and Germans. With that 
new situation, there loomed dreams of  retaliation on the political horizon; 
the dream to avenge the losses, lost territories, lost greatness and to regain 
imperial domination over these ‘peripheries’, which now formed separate 
statehoods. There were also peoples that did not realize their national elites’ 
dreams of  independence (for example, Ukrainians or Belarusians), and 
there was a huge Jewish population which was – generally speaking – rather 
unsettled within the new boundaries, in which new statehoods, new legal 
systems and cultural-political frames of  existence created after 1918 replaced 
old empires. These politically very different, extremely divergent perceptions 
of  the results of  the First World War formed, dare I say, a very important 
factor in the development of  future mass violence in the region.
It also seems important to note the fact, or rather the interpretation, that 
within Eastern Europe there were many different cultures. They had been 
different in terms of  violence creation and violence reception, too. Vladimir 
Bocharov, an eminent Russian sociologist-anthropologist, wrote a fascinating 
book on a specific culture of  violence that developed throughout history in 
Russia. According to him, violence has been treated in that particular Russian 
political culture as an inherent attribute of  power. The authorities not only 
may but also must refer by tradition to violence if  they are to hold power 
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and this is violence against their subjects. For Bocharov such a phenomenon 
is quite typical of  non-Western societies in general. This internal violence 
is presented to the subject as a model of  parental authority; its task is to 
separate society from dark forces and ‘destabilizing agents’, of  course, by 
using violence. In such a case sacrifice was natural and socially acceptable. 
Bocharov analyses elements of  the said phenomenon in the history of  rela-
tions between Russian society and its authorities throughout the centuries 
until the horrors of  Stalin, after which period, he remarks, many victims 
were willing to excuse state violence post facto, saying: ‘such were the times’ 
(Bocharov 2001, 497–532).
Such broad generalizations made by this Russian anthropologist with regard 
to violence are obviously quite risky. If, however, one were to reject the gen-
eral term ‘non-Western societies’ and limit oneself  to an analysis of  trends 
dominant in the Russian political tradition, then Bocharov’s observation 
concerning some acceptance of  state violence in that particular tradition 
might be worth considering as a working hypothesis.
I would say that even if  this analysis is not totally accurate, it is important 
to note that there are different cultures of  violence and some of  them were 
or are exported to other countries by means of  imperial power. This was 
exactly the experience of  many societies that were subjugated to the Rus-
sian Empire throughout the 18th or 19th centuries and they either accepted 
some elements of  that particular state violence culture or fought against it. 
Through that fight, some of  them joined or formed a specific anti-state, anti-
Tsarist (or anti-imperial) violence culture within Russia itself  (Nowak 2009, 
59–82). Through this fight there developed exactly the phenomenon that 
we are so passionately discussing today, namely that of  terrorism. Of  course, 
the phenomenon was also developing in Southern and Western Europe, 
but it was especially well embedded in the Russian imperial state structure 
of  violence and rebellions against that state’s structure of  violence. One 
should recollect not only the names of  the anarchists Mikhail Bakunin or 
Peter Kropotkin but one should also recollect the names of  Józef  Piłsudski, 
as well as the second and the third President of  the Second Republic of  
Poland, Stanisław Wojciechowski and Ignacy Mościcki, respectively. They 
were all terrorists (or at least were helping them with their knowledge) at the 
beginning of  their careers; they used to prepare bombs and some of  them 
made attempts against the imperial powers of  Russia. And this is not only 
the Polish case, by any means. This was just one example of  the imperial 
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culture of  state violence transferred and transported to its peripheries, and 
its backlash on the imperial centres.
With that we can come back to Lenin and to his particular case that unites 
many levels of  analysing the problem of  mass violence in the 20th century, 
especially in Eastern Europe. One is at a personal level: it combines the 
experience of  state violence with a particular response by Lenin. His older 
brother was hanged for participating in an attempted coup against Tsar 
Alexander III. This example of  state terrorism (or counter-terrorism), or 
state violence, influenced Lenin personally. One can add the level of  specific 
traditions of  state violence to it, as suggested by Bocharov in the Russian 
case. That specific tradition engaged and influenced, as we have mentioned, 
different societies overtaken by the Russian Empire even before the 20th 
century, but it expanded further and much more brutally to other countries 
of  Central and Eastern Europe, which had never ‘belonged’ before to the 
Romanov Empire’s domain but would be attacked and attached to the Soviet 
bloc throughout the last century. But the mass violence there was not just 
connected to the new version of  traditional Russian imperialism. There 
was a third level formed by a specific ideology. Communism was obviously 
developing within Western Europe, but Lenin and Stalin developed it in 
a special way. In order to illustrate this I would like to use a quote from 
the first day Lenin came to power in November 1917. It was the moment 
when the Congress of  Soviets decided to abolish the death penalty for 
frontline deserters, which Kerensky had reintroduced in mid-1917. Lenin, 
busy elsewhere, missed that event and when he learned of  it he became 
utterly indignant, ‘Nonsense,’ he said, ‘how can you make a revolution with-
out executions? Do you expect to dispose of  your enemies by disarming 
yourself ? What other means of  repression are there, prisons? Who attaches 
significance to that during a civil war, when each side hopes to win? It is 
a mistake, impermissible weakness, pacifist illusion’ (Pipes 1990, 791).
We should mention not just individual quotes, but also the countless victims 
of  the new state mass violence and the physical consequences of  this kind of  
ideology. Building on the experience of  Western European colonial empires 
and their methods, one such development was the creation of  concentration 
camps. They had been introduced as a new means of  mass violence by the 
Bolshevik regime in 1918, but they were based on two previous examples, 
one American – in Cuba 1898 – and another one English – in South Africa 
in 1900–1901. The Marxist revolutionary, Leon Trotsky, who reinvented the 
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concept of  concentration camp for the sake of  Bolshevik power in 1918, 
was well aware that the concept had been tested elsewhere. He introduced 
it on the geographical fringes of  Europe – on the Volga River near Kazan. 
From those relatively modest beginnings, it later developed into the whole 
Gulag system, with tens of  millions of  inmates (in reality slaves) and mil-
lions of  deaths. Nazi Germany would go a step further, by organizing death 
camps during the Second World War.
So we can observe many different, as I called them, levels of  factors that 
made violence in Eastern Europe a specific phenomenon in the 20th cen-
tury. But this experience of  mass violence was not connected solely with 
the Russian version of  communism or with that combination of  the First 
World War experience of  mass killings and mass deportations that helped 
create a Bolshevik ‘synthesis’ of  violence. We also have to mention elements 
connected to nation building, and fighting for the foundation of  new na-
tions that created unstable and unclear boundaries and issues with ‘alien’ 
minorities (causing fights or persecution). This was the experience of  many 
Eastern Europe countries that found their way onto the political map after 
the First World War.
I would like to take three examples: Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. 
In all these countries we not only have a nation-state project, but there were 
imperial-like structures, sometimes with elements of  a federative idea, but at 
the same time it connected with efforts aimed at dominating minorities by 
the ‘core’ nation and turning from an imperial-like structure or federative 
structure to a nation-state structure. Were experiences in Poland, in Yugo-
slavia or in Czechoslovakia different? One is tempted to suggest at least part 
of  the answer by linking Poland to Russia’s political (violent) culture experi-
enced in the previous century. Most of  Poland created after the First World 
War was founded on the territories that experienced more than a hundred 
years of  Russian imperial influences, control and administrative practices. 
Rebellions against this culture somehow imitated some violent elements 
of  that culture. Yugoslavia bore the influences of  Turkish, Islamic imperial 
domination over large part of  its territories. Czechoslovakia was based on 
territories exclusively belonging to the Austro-Hungarian Habsburg Empire. 
It does not mean that the Habsburg Empire was ideal with no conflicts, 
nevertheless the political culture of  the Habsburg Empire in the late 19th 
century was evidently slightly different to the one developing in the Russian 
or Ottoman Empires. I am aware that it could be only partial and a very 
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provocative suggestion of  an answer for the development of  violent clashes 
between different national projects in these particular countries. There 
were other, probably more pressing, sources of  differences in ‘eruptions’ 
of  violence, too. For example, the fact that Ukrainian nationalization was 
not fully realized during or after the First World War somehow postponed 
the final clash of  that project (along with a specific culture of  violence that 
was involved there too) until the Second World War.
Other factors could be connected to the uneasy geopolitical, economic 
context (notably the Great Crisis of  the early 1930s) and the ideological 
attempts to peacefully solve the tensions that we have just mentioned: that 
is, the tensions between fulfilled and unfulfilled national aspirations, as well 
as different social projects during the interwar period in so-called ‘East-
Central Europe’, a term coined by Oskar Halecki (Halecki 1950;  Arnason 
and Doyle 2010; Troebst 2003, 293–321). These difficult conditions were 
created on the western side by acts of  German imperial revenge that soon 
loomed large after 1918. On the eastern side communist ideology became 
more widespread – it had already tried to take over all East-Central  Europe 
in 1920, but was stopped at the gates of  Warsaw and was forced to recede 
for the next twenty years. Throughout the 1930s Stalin turned that ideology 
to a large degree into another instrument of  Russian imperial revenge. There 
was an evident change when compared with the times of  Lenin, though not 
in terms of  the mass killings (because those also took place under Lenin’s 
regime), but in the ‘rationalization’ – if  one can use that word – for these 
mass killings. Stalin was reorganizing the Soviet state around the Russian 
imperial core in order to prepare it for the ‘new Great War’. That is, for 
example, the reason for one of  the least known, the least remembered expe-
riences of  mass violence in the 20th century. I mean here so-called national 
operations led by the NKVD security service in 1937–38. 
Most people asked what the Great Terror means, would answer: yes, of  
course – old Communist guards were executed, Lenin’s comrades were 
victims; others would probably answer that the Great Terror was one more 
tragic experience of  the Russian elites – seeing this tragedy through the prism 
of  artistic expressions such as Anna Akhmatova’s Requiem poem (depicting 
the fate of  Russian mothers asking for the release of  their sons imprisoned 
in the NKVD jails) or other literary testimonies. However, numerically 
speaking – and by numbers we should always mean individual people – the 
most numerous of  the Great Terror victims were those shot in so-called 
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national operations of  the NKVD. In 1937–38 there were almost 260,000 
such victims. By far the most targeted were the Poles: in a single ‘Polish’ 
operation, initiated in August 1937, 111,097 people were shot. Germans 
were the second; Finns, Koreans and other nations that Stalin’s imperial 
perspective perceived as a ‘potential danger’ followed the pattern. Norman 
Naimark (a professor at Stanford University) called the NKVD operation 
against the Poles ‘one of  the most unambiguous cases of  genocide in the 
history of  the twentieth century’ (Naimark 2010, 92: see also Snyder 2010; 
Kuomiya 2007; Martin 2001).
What came afterwards? The Second World War, of  course, instigated by 
the Hitler–Stalin agreement of  23 August 1939 to divide ‘Eastern Europe’ 
with a single act, signed in Moscow. Nazi Germany’s ideology that joined 
the imperial revenge of  the Deutsches Reich (this was the official and ap-
propriate name for Hitler’s state) over especially Slavic neighbours with the 
anti-Semitic core of  Hitler and his comrade’s worldview (Weltanschauung) led 
to the physical elimination of  almost all Jewry from East-Central Europe. 
It is necessary to stress that the particularly tragic experience of  the Second 
World War in that region stems from first the collaboration and then the 
clash of  two imperial projects – Russian/Soviet and German/Nazi. This 
was the essence of  the Molotov–Ribbentrop handshake: the totalitarian 
empires will to eliminate what was between these two empires in East-
Central Europe: to eliminate Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Finland, 
Moldova, to completely subjugate Belarus, Ukraine, and so on and so forth 
(Czechoslovakia had been already erased from the map, though, fortunately, 
with much less violence).
Most of  the above-mentioned countries and peoples inhabiting them (af-
ter the Holocaust eliminated the Jewish population from the region) were 
overtaken by the communist imperial expansion of  Stalin’s ‘Russified’ Soviet 
Union. This expansion reframed older imperial patterns of  domination and 
infused them with more mass violence than in the 19th century. The rest of  
the ‘shorter 20th century’ was perceived by many from that perspective as 
a fight or an experience of  waging more or less violently suppressed rebellion 
against this foreign occupation, against this imperial domination. From that 
very perspective annus mirabilis – that of  1989 – was seen by many (not by all, 
of  course) as liberation. The experience of  violence obtained a meaningful 
narrative of  a struggle for independence, a struggle for freedom, against ‘the 
evil empire’ (a reminder of  Ronald Reagan’s catchy metaphor from 1983). It 
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became similar to the narrative that followed the First World War in these 
Eastern European (or East-Central European) countries that gained or re-
gained their independence after 1918. For most people in Western European 
countries, the experience of  violence in the 20th century, beginning with the 
First World War, was not remembered as one of  heroic struggle, but rather, 
increasingly towards the end of  the century, it was remembered as one where 
innocent civilian victims were at the centre of  these horrors. Some (in fact, 
millions) of  the specific victims of  the horrors that happened in Eastern 
Europe during the same century, but stemmed from such an exotic (that 
is, not experienced by Western European societies) source of  violence as 
totalitarian Soviet/Russian imperialism, looked for the recognition of  which 
they had obviously been deprived before 1989. 
And yet they were deprived of  that recognition, at least on an official ‘all-
European’ level again after 1989. Their desire for recognition clashed with 
the new culture of  memory that had already matured in Western Europe 
based on the model developed in the Federal Republic of  Germany over the 
last five decades. There was no time for the many dramatic (different and 
conflicting) memories of  the inhabitants of  Eastern Europe, suppressed 
or marginalized before 1989, to find a place in the public space – unlike 
in Western Europe, where the Nazi-occupation horrors, collaboration and 
Holocaust supplanted previous more ‘heroic’ or individual national memorial 
narratives within only three to five decades. There was no time for many of  
the hundreds of  thousands of  victims (and living mourning communities 
of  these victims) to find recognition – and then graduate to the ‘healing’ 
stage. They were to be ‘healed’ without recognition. They faced the de-
mands of  a new centralizing memory politics, one which had come – once 
again – from ‘outside’, from Western Europe, whose memorial elites used 
their own model of  commemorating past violence. 
I have discussed that model elsewhere, perfectly summed up by a Ger-
man culturologist, Claus Leggewie, in his formula of  the ‘Seven Circles of  
European Memory’. He composed his model after the EU memorial elites 
decided also to include, symbolically, the Gulag experience, in about 2004. 
So, after the ‘Holocaust’ and the ‘Gulag’, there are five more circles, three 
of  them dealing with the traumatic experiences of  violence: ‘Expulsion 
as a Pan-European Trauma’, ‘War and Wartime Memory’, ‘Black Book of  
Colonialism’, ‘Europe as a Continent of  Immigration’ and ‘Europe’s Suc-
cess Story after 1945’ (Leggewie 2011, 123–24; Nowak 2015, 38–56). The 
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outstanding question in that list is connected with experiences of  colonial-
ism and its violence. Are they the same in Belgium and in other Western 
European former colonial metropoles – and in, let’s say, Slovakia, Bulgaria, 
Lithuania, Ukraine, or even Hungary and Poland (which have their own 
specific imperial histories)? Were these Eastern European societies perpetra-
tors of  colonial crimes committed outside Europe (predominantly in Africa 
and Asia) or rather victims of  imperial (according to some concepts – just 
colonial) violence exerted by such imperial centres as Germany, or Russia, 
or even a non-European, Islamic Empire (the Ottoman Empire that for 
centuries subjugated the populations of  Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary – 
to mention just contemporary members of  the EU)?
Now we can return to the beginning of  our commentaries. That violence that 
was ‘exported’ overseas throughout the 19th century by Western Europe to 
their colonies is coming back here. From an Eastern European perspective 
of  unrecognized, regional memories, there seems to arise an unfortunate 
temptation to look at this situation with some Schadenfreude: you Western 
Europeans looked at our problems with nation-making, with our Eastern 
European tragic experiences of  mass violence from the high point of  the 
acclaimed ‘Europe’s Success Story after 1945’. Most Eastern Europeans had 
to wait for the beginning of  their success, for their chance – only after 1989. 
When will we be ready to achieve success together? Probably only after we 
talk and listen attentively to each other, to all ‘sides’ of  European experiences 
and memories of  violence (and I believe there are many more of  these ‘sides’ 
than just ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’). Just as we do here, at this conference.
I would like to end with a short quotation from Joseph Brodsky, an Ameri-
can poet of  Russian-Jewish origin, and recipient of  the Nobel Prize for 
Literature in 1987. I want to present his poem that is entitled ‘Bosnia Tune’. 
It describes Eastern European anger with Western Europe’s lack of  real 
compassion, lack of  understanding of  the violence that is still happening 
in the East. I would now propose to reverse this meaning for a moment 
and read this poem as ‘London Tune’, ‘Brussels Tune’ or ‘Paris Tune’ and 
to address its moral pathos: Eastern Europeans now watch violence hap-
pening in the West. So let us listen, together:
As you pour yourself  a scotch, 
crush a roach, or check your watch, 
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as your hand adjusts your tie, 
people die.
In the towns with funny names, 
hit by bullets, caught in flames, 
by and large not knowing why, 
people die.
In small places you don’t know 
of, yet big for having no 
chance to scream or say good-bye, 
people die ...
We would never eliminate violence with simplistic formulas that stem only 
from our particular experiences. The experience of  a clash or rather of  
differences of  memories of  mass violence, of  different reasons for that 
mass violence in Western and in Eastern Europe should not lead to a lack 
of  solidarity. Only, just as Professor Wieviorka said, when we begin to ad-
dress our different experiences, can we find solidarity versus violence – our 
common enemy. Thank you.
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FROM THE MEMORY OF VIOLENCE 
TO THE VIOLENCE OF MEMORY
Jeffrey K. Olick
University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia
This is a lightly edited transcript of a lecture given at the symposium ‘Violence in 
20th-century Europe: Commemorating, Documenting, Educating’ in Brussels, 
Belgium on 6 June 2017.
While the topic of  memory is multifarious, covering many issues of  identity, 
belonging, pride and sorrow, the relationship between memory and violence 
clearly has a special significance. As a scholar of  memory, of  course, I am 
fascinated with the complexities of  memory in its many forms and many 
referents. This is thus a welcome opportunity to think more, and perhaps 
more directly, about the other side of  the equation. This invitation, then, 
has led me to think about the phenomenon – or more accurately phenom-
ena – of  violence in a more systematic and general fashion than memory 
scholars are sometimes inclined to do, just as it has perhaps led specialists 
on violence to think more about the complexities of  memory than they 
might otherwise do.
If  we are going to talk about a particular kind of  remembrance – namely 
the remembrance of  violence – we need to be clear exactly what it is we 
are talking about when we identify such an objective as a special one for 
remembrance. Like memory, however, violence is an exceptionally difficult 
concept to define in a robust way (so too is memory, which I will come back 
to later). Violence has at least two generic senses: the first refers to the very 
act, which is an exertion of  power of  force directed at an object. To be sure, 
we can exert violence over nature: we can blast through rock to build a tun-
nel, we can knock down a tree to clear a path (in the process destroying life, 
which gives a hint of  what is essential), and it is not inappropriate to talk 
about the violence of  nature or of  our violence towards nature. But what 
we are primarily talking about in the context of  the memory-violence nexus 
is the exertion of  force – coercive, damaging, destructive – by one person 
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or group of  people over another person or group. We should note that 
violence in the human realm – in contrast to the natural – only sometimes 
involves a physical dimension, such as bodily injury, brutality or even death. 
Violence can also be a single act, a repeated act, a condition or a pervasive 
order in a society.
We must remember at the beginning, moreover, that not every act of  violence 
is illegitimate. No one would dispute, for instance, that some violence is 
sometimes necessary: if  you want to build a house, you have to clear a place, 
sometimes with explosive force. Even more, reasonable people would not 
dispute, though they might be frightened by the fact, that we need some 
form of  policing to secure our social and physical security. Or the fact that 
when a terrorist attacks, the police come running and take him or her down 
by any means necessary. One may have concerns about the political con-
text, but in the moment when one person or group is committing violence 
against another, we legitimately look to others to protect us from that vio-
lence, which they do with further – this time hopefully justified – violence. 
So not all violence is illegitimate or unjustified (all scepticism about ‘just 
war’ notwithstanding). A world without violence is not, in the words of  the 
philosopher Gottfried Leibniz, the best of  all possible worlds. In reference 
to Sigmund Freud’s ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ – an enduringly relevant 
text for an understanding of  violence, of  memory and of  the relations 
between them – to wish for a world free of  violence is to wish for a world 
that is bland, inhuman, narcotized, an existence of  what would in fact be an 
order without meaning. We recall as well – as Professor Wieviorka already 
mentioned in his lecture on the first day of  this symposium – the socio-
logist Max Weber’s famous definition of  states as those agencies that have 
a monopoly on the legitimate use of  violence. So, again, not all violence is 
illegitimate. What qualities then, other than just the act, are we referring to 
when we are discussing violence?
The second sense of  violence is not just the generic sense of  violence as 
force – legitimate or illegitimate. Rather, the specific meaning that I think is 
at issue when we talk about violence in relation to memory – as I have been 
charged to do here – is violence that is the expression of  an etymologically 
related term, namely violation. Not all violence involves violation. When 
you go to the doctor and have to have surgery, there is clearly violence 
involved – the cutting into flesh – but because its goal is to help you and 
presumably you consent to it, such an act is not a violation, though you may 
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in fact feel it that way. In contrast, it seems to me, the violence that is at issue 
in our contemporary moral and political – and indeed memory – culture 
is that of  power that violates or transgresses norms, particularly norms of  
human inviolability, our sense of  order, of  appropriateness and of  integ-
rity, physical and moral. Here it is important to note that while Weber may 
have pointed out that states may have a monopoly on the legitimate use 
of  violence, that is not exactly the same thing as a monopoly on the use of  
legitimate violence. We know that much of  what states have done to each other 
and to their peoples and to other peoples was not legitimate violence, even 
if, with the power of  their armies and their control of  the streets they had 
a monopoly on its use. This is because their violence has violated rules and 
norms, integrity bodily and moral. And these kinds of  violence/violation 
create particular problems for memory.
Yet another issue to raise about violence in framing the question of  the 
relationship between violence and memory is that, like everything else, 
violence has a historical development. Recently, for instance, the cogni-
tive psychologist Steven Pinker, based to some extent on the ideas of  the 
socio logist Norbert Elias, has argued that despite the horrors of  illegitimate 
violence in the 20th century – effected particularly through our extraordinary 
means of  inflicting it on mass scale – the absolute amount of  violence in the 
world today has in fact been in steady decline. Whether or not one believes 
Pinker’s data or Elias’s argument about the so-called ‘civilizing process’, one 
thing is clear: our expectation of  violence and our tolerance for it, at least 
in public discourse, has indeed decreased (though of  course this decrease 
is not universal or evenly distributed). This too – the unexpectedness of  
violence/violation – contributes to its mnemonic challenges.
Just as an illustration – not in a manner that is going to prove anything to 
a rigorous social scientist – we might consider some ‘data’ from Google 
Ngram. If  one is to search the frequency of  the term ‘violence’ in the titles 
of  English language books from 1800 to the present, precisely at the time 
when there was the most shocking violence being perpetrated on a mass 
scale, we find that there was a substantial dip in the number of  mentions of  
violence, bottoming out in about 1917. The frequency then remains relatively 
steady up until about 1950, when uses of  and references to the concept of  
violence only then return to the level of  mentions in the early 1800s. Of  
course, one of  the things that has changed in this time is what exactly we 
meant by violence at the beginning of  the 1800s and what we mean by it in 
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the second half  of  the 20th century. In some ways, this is an indication of  
the changing presence of  a discourse about violence, though of  course we 
must recall that the term and its meanings do not strictly coincide and thus 
that frequency is a limited indicator. Whether or not this index of  uses of  
the term violence indicates a change in the amount of  violence, then, it at 
very least indicates something about the change in the way we think about 
(and remember) it.
Indeed, it is not the absolute amount of  violence in the 20th century that 
has caused the move from what has been called a culture of  monuments 
to a culture of  memorials, from one of  heroes to one of  victims, to one of  
national identity to one of  human rights. Rather, it is our moral universe 
that has changed, and it is this change that is indicated in the changing fre-
quency – and indeed nature – of  references to violence. This is not, however, 
to discount the very real changes that have taken place in the forms and 
contents of  the violent practices that have taken place in the contemporary 
world, for indeed there are new kinds of  violence and new conditions for 
knowing about them. So, for instance, the new violence of  the 20th century 
is not the violence of  nature or even the violence of  God against man – an 
earthquake, a catastrophe, a fire – but that of  man against man. But it is 
a different kind of  violence of  man against man. It is not a raiding tribe, 
an act of  vengeance or personal expiation, nor violence toward some end 
or for some purpose. Rather, it is mass violence, though it is important to 
remember that even mass violence – which depends on mass society – is 
itself  a diverse and multifaceted phenomenon.
One of  the most interesting features of  contemporary violence is not 
merely its mass nature, however, nor is it merely our preoccupation with 
it in our changed (by violence) moral culture. What we have seen in the 
late 19th and early 20th century, rather, is the emergence of  new forms of  
violence that are only enabled by changed conditions, namely the rise of  
mass society, but also of  industrialization. We use today quite glibly the term 
trauma in many contexts. And if  you were to ask many history students or 
ordinary people – not that history students are not ordinary people – what 
trauma means and where did it come from, they might make reference 
to the concept of  post-traumatic stress disorder that arose in the context 
of  the Vietnam War. And if  one were to ask historians, they would likely 
make reference to an earlier period, namely the First World War and the 
concept of  shell shock or war neurosis. But in fact the historiography of  
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trauma shows clearly that the concept emerged in an earlier period, namely 
the 1860s to the 1880s. What was happening in those years that gave rise 
to our contemporary concept of  trauma? One of  the things that happened 
was a great epidemiological expansion in the experience of  trauma. I do not 
mean that modern people suffer more or are more miserable than people 
before the modern industrial era. What I mean is that the ways in which we 
suffer have changed with mechanization.
In a marvellous book on the railway journey, the cultural historian Wolf-
gang Schivelbusch describes the radical novelty of  the experience of  rid-
ing in a railway car. If  you ride a horse or even a stagecoach, you are still 
in a direct connection to biological power – the power of  the horse. You 
experience the passage through space, the bumps of  the road, the curves, 
in a humanly comprehensible fashion. Once you experience the speed of  
the railway journey, you are taken into a radically new realm. One of  the 
things that happened with the advent of  railway journeys – although with 
railway journeys being only one example of  industrial experience – is the 
rise and spread of  accidents. To be sure, one could always fall off  a horse or 
have a stagecoach crash. But there was a categorical difference between the 
experience of  being injured through bio-power and being injured through 
an industrial mechanism, one that created existential ruptures. This is to 
some extent what the philosopher Martin Heidegger was addressing in his 
distinction between the windmill and the power plant: the former is still 
comprehensible to ordinary people, while the latter is beyond the compre-
hension of  most of  us. And these new experiences required new concepts 
for understanding. This is the birthplace of  the modern sense of  trauma.
While war neurosis was not new in the 19th century, its scale and severity 
were. And this is why the philosopher Walter Benjamin, for instance, diag-
nosed the experience of  the First World War as a civilizational rupture. In 
his famous essay on the ‘Storyteller’, Benjamin wrote, ‘Never has experience 
been contradicted more thoroughly than strategic experience by tactical 
warfare, economic experience by inflation, bodily experience by mechanical 
warfare, moral experience by those in power.’ So what has happened with 
the advent of  industrial warfare, marked most clearly by the First World War, 
although it has been tied up with industrialization more broadly, is the loss 
of  a direct human experience, a sense of  measure, a sense of  control. If  
you recall your US Civil War movies, you will remember the plan of  battle, 
in which two armies stand in lines facing each other, affix bayonets and 
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then walk towards each other until they meet. In US Westerns, the cliché 
is ‘don’t shoot until you see the whites of  their eyes’. The First World War 
was categorically different. There the average soldier grovelled in trenches, 
and the biggest threat was insidious: a gas one could not see and whose ef-
fects one could not fathom. In order to protect himself, the soldier donned 
a mask that turned him into an extra-terrestrial monster, the likes of  which 
medieval theology could not begin to understand.
Despite the importance of  the First World War – and industrialization more 
broadly – in our experience of  violence and in our ability to understand it, 
the Shoah was the second blow in the death on a human scale. The Shoah 
introduced us to what philosopher and survivor Emanuel Levinas so poi-
gnantly described in his work as ‘useless suffering’. What is Levinas getting 
at with this concept as an interpretive frame for the Holocaust? He is saying 
that the ‘events’ are in fact not ultimately interpretable or comprehensible. 
The framework in which Levinas addresses this is in fact a much older one – 
tracing back all the way to Leibniz, who I have already mentioned: namely 
that of  theodicy. Theodicy is the explanation of  evil and suffering. What 
meaning can we give to our miseries? In the period after Leibniz published 
his treatise on theodicy in 1710, Europe experienced a major crisis in the 
earthquake that hit Lisbon in the middle of  the 18th century. How could you 
explain, how could you defend God, or any notion of  his benevolence, when 
fires consumed children, innocents, civilians? This was not a phenomenon 
of  war, but a ‘natural’ event that seemed to have no purpose. This moral 
crisis begun in the middle of  the 18th century received exceptional clarity by 
the middle of  the 20th century, when Levinas posed it again, but in contrast 
to Leibniz, saw no possible answer to it. This is because the conditions for 
making meaning had changed along with the new forms of  suffering that 
demanded such meaning.
The question of  theodicy, of  course, is one that underwrites the entire history 
of  Western moral thinking, from the Book of  Job onwards. Job, who was 
made to suffer for no good reason, never lost his faith. When he demanded 
an answer, it was one that has resonated throughout the ages: Job was not 
entitled to, or capable of  understanding, an explanation. And so Job’s only 
recourse was to live in resignation. But Job’s suffering was an individual, 
personal suffering (or at least was portrayed this way, despite the destruction 
of  his family that caused him to suffer), while the suffering of  the 20th cen-
tury was a categorical suffering on a mass scale, and thus not one to which 
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resignation is a judicious approach. One cannot simply say human beings are 
mortal, we experience illness and pain, and this is a part of  life. There is no ex-
istential scale that can contain the knowledge of  what happened in Auschwitz.
Here too it is important always to historicize. The question of  theodicy, our 
ability to come up with explanations that make sense of  the suffering we 
have experienced or witnessed, has itself  changed dramatically over time. 
This goes back, again, to Max Weber, in whose work we also see a discussion 
of  theodicy. For Weber, it was a matter of  how poor people might ‘come 
to terms’ with their misery. Weber’s answer was that they create salvationist 
religions; they believe that their suffering in this world will be redeemed 
in the next, the Christian idea that the meek shall inherit the earth. What 
Weber points out in his discussion of  theodicy, however, is that the ability, 
the conditions for us, to come up with a satisfactory explanation, have in 
fact diminished in modernity. If  your house fell down and your family was 
killed by an earthquake in the middle ages, we would have said, like Job, 
that we must have done something wrong – not prayed hard enough, etc. 
God must be angry with me. But with the rise of  science, we understand 
how plate tectonics work and we theorize stochastic processes, statistical 
randomness, etc. We understand that there may not be any true meaning, 
which is to say purpose, that can be ascribed to something like an earthquake. 
It hits where it hits, when it hits.
One of  the things we try to do, and we have seen this in the late 20th century, 
is that we try to hold each other accountable, even for natural disasters. So 
when an earthquake hit Aquila, Italy in 2009, the Italian government put 
the seismologists on trial, and indeed convicted them for not providing ad-
equate warning to the population. Following the Southeast Asian tsunami of  
2005, we blamed overdevelopment, incompetent governance and failure to 
respond adequately to climate change. While it is also true that Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau disputed the naturalness of  the destruction in Lisbon in 1755 – 
pointing out that it was not nature that dictated building flimsy dwellings 
on hillsides or dense clusters of  wooden structures that would burn so 
quickly – the general trend has been towards the increasing difficulty of  
coming up with satisfactory explanations of  how our suffering is meaningful.
So what does this have to do with the topic in hand? It seems to me that the 
link connecting violence to memory is to recognize that memory is a form of  
theodicy. That is, memory, particularly the act of  commemoration, is a way 
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of  ascribing meaning to what has happened in history, to suffering, a way to 
redeem suffering in some fashion or other. Here I am moved, however, by 
the philosopher Paul Ricoeur who, in his discussion of  Levinas and of  the 
problem of  theodicy, argues that every theodicy is an exercise in bad faith. 
That is, every time we offer an explanation for suffering that enables us to see 
how it happened and fix the problems in the name of  ‘never again’, we are 
retrospectively assigning meaning. (This can include a scientific explanation 
about the facts that led to an atrocious outcome, for instance, an explana-
tion that might refer to human psychology or bureaucratic organization or 
administrative complexity and the perfect storm of  conditions and events 
that led to Auschwitz.) But not everything, or not everything completely, 
can be explained in this manner. To try to do so is to risk ‘bad faith’, move 
from explaining something to explaining away, or making it seem necessary 
in the service of  some larger or longer end.
In the lecture we heard a few days ago by Professor Wieviorka, we learned 
that violence has a complex social geometry to it. So too does memory. When 
we analyse violence, we need to be careful that we specify the geometry of  
perpetration and victimhood. Are the perpetrators acting as individuals or as 
members of  groups? Who are the victims? What is the power relationship 
between the perpetrators and victims? Are they symmetrical or asymmetrical? 
Do they remain in contention or does one side triumph over the other? To 
what extent? One of  the conditions of  post-war Germany, for instance, was 
that the Holocaust was in fact largely successful – not merely in eliminating 
the lives of  six million people, but in removing Jewish life from German 
culture and society. When we use the term violence, moreover, we need to 
be careful not to overgeneralize a variety of  different phenomena into one 
category. Violence can be once, it can be a condition, it can be enduring, 
repeated or none of  these. It can be reciprocal, can have meaning or can 
be devoid of  meaning.
In the same way, we can analyse the complexities of  memory. In the emerging 
field of  memory studies, there is a great discussion about the relationship 
between individual memory and collective memory. Does collective memory 
exist, or is it merely a metaphor? Memory can be unitary – that is, there 
can be a single agreed set of  memories in a group that one must share or 
at least know in order to be a member of  the group. More often, however, 
memory is contested and fragmented; there may be hegemonic memory, 
official memory, top-down memory or bottom-up memory. Memory also 
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takes on different emotional and epistemological registers. Memory can 
be historical, documentarian, expressive, an effort to seek redemption, etc.
One of  the features of  memory that we do not see clearly enough when we 
are analysing violence is the profound temporality of  memory, the fact that 
memory is not just an act in the present, nor a direct reference to the past, 
but a reference to the past in the present that is nonetheless conditioned by 
its place in the history of  such commemoration. In other words, one cannot 
predict memory from the past or from the present. Memory is the result 
of  an ongoing discourse of  remembrance, where each version of  the past 
follows, and in part responds to, those that preceded it; just as often, each 
subsequent version of  the past is a commentary on, as well as departure 
from (and effort to transform), those earlier versions.
Since this is a conference on European remembrance, it is with great hesi-
tation that I make reference to an American example to demonstrate this 
temporality of  memory, though the United States has already been a sig-
nificant part of  the discussion at this meeting so far. In particular, there was 
reference to the origins of  the idea of  the concentration camp in Cuba (this 
statement itself  being an effort to transform a version of  the past – namely 
one in which the Nazis invented the concentration camp – just as the state-
ment I am making now is an effort to transform this revised memory). In 
fact, concentration camps were not invented by the Spanish in Cuba; nor 
were they – as was a central claim by the right during the German historians’ 
dispute of  the mid-1980s – an imitation of  Stalin’s Gulags. No, the inven-
tion of  the concentration camp lies squarely in the history of  the United 
States. The first such installations in modern form were early ‘reservations’ 
for Native Americans. Another important reference in the history – though 
less so in the memory – of  concentration camps was the prisoner of  war 
camps maintained with particular brutality during the US Civil War. One 
of  the most notorious such examples was Andersonville Prison, in which 
an estimated 15,000 Union soldiers died. Indeed, the prosecution of  the 
camp’s commandant, Captain Henry Wirz, was one of  the first modern 
examples of  a war-crimes trial. Making things even more complex, how-
ever, subsequent revelations (after Wirz’s execution) revealed some merit 
to Wirz’s defense claims that he had tried to alleviate suffering. Wirz thus 
became something of  a symbol for the legatees of  the Confederacy, who 
erected a memorial to him in 1909. Memory clearly has its ups and downs, 
its proponents, entrepreneurs, revisionists and rejectionists.
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This story is particularly interesting to me here because it has long seemed 
to me that there has been a sort of  American exceptionalism when it comes 
to the study of  memory as well as to the power of  memory politics. A good 
example of  this is that conferences like the present one, sponsored by 
a prominent and successful NGO, does not really have – or has not really 
had – its equivalent in the United States. However, it does seem as if  this 
American exceptionalism is coming to an end – and not least in part because 
of  the influence of  European memory politics as a model, and of  the spread 
of  the politics of  regret as a principle of  legitimation here in Europe. Indeed, 
this has been taking place in just the last year, when the United States has 
experienced a wave of  commemorative debates and politics. While there 
have been numerous tributaries from every direction, these were brought 
together into a mighty river of  discourse with the murderous attack of  
a white supremacist on an African-American church in South Carolina in 
June 2015. Only following this event – which took place after decades of  
criticism of  officially sanctioned Confederate symbolism – did the governor 
of  South Carolina unilaterally – though with substantial support from across 
the spectrum – act to stop flying the Confederate flag from the dome of  
the Statehouse. 
Since then, there has been a great deal of  new introspection – or at least more 
widespread introspection – about the shameful and problematic presence of  
the American past. To be sure, much of  this introspection has taken place at 
the top of  the intellectual food chain, and resistance to such thinking was not 
an insignificant part of  the cultural background that has brought us a radical 
populist presidency (if  that is indeed what it is). For instance, Georgetown 
University ‘discovered’ that its present financial security was built on the 
sale of  more than one hundred slaves that the university – itself  associated 
with the Catholic Church – owned. In the present context (begun before the 
South Carolina massacre), the university has undertaken – quite honorably, 
in my view – efforts to expiate this crime, including setting up a memory 
institute. A similar discussion took place recently at Yale University, where 
several buildings and institutions at the university made historical references 
in honour of  individuals that many have come to understand – at least by 
contemporary standards – were perhaps not so honourable (in the literal 
sense) after all. For instance, one of  the undergraduate colleges at Yale 
was named for John C. Calhoun, the seventh vice president of  the United 
States who made his fortune in the slave trade. For decades, Calhoun Hall 
was the proud undergraduate residence and association for many of  the 
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United States’s present elite. The discussion began around the question of  
whether the title of  the head of  Calhoun College – and indeed of  all of  the 
undergraduate colleges at Yale – should continue to be ‘Master’, with its 
evocation of  the era of  slavery. It was fairly readily agreed that the ‘Master’ 
would henceforth be called ‘Head’. Yet the question of  the name of  Calhoun 
College itself  proved, at least at first, to be more difficult, with a presump-
tion against ‘changing the past’. It took a further year to overcome alumni 
resistance to changing the name itself.
In just the past several weeks [note, this lecture was delivered in June 2017, 
before the riots in Charlottesville, Virginia], indeed, we have seen a wave 
of  municipal authorities around the Southern United States tearing down 
monuments to the Confederacy. What is fascinating about these moves, 
first of  all, is that they are happening at all, but second of  all who is agree-
ing and disagreeing with them, and with what arguments. Indeed, in many 
conversations I have had at my own and other universities, including with 
colleagues in history departments, a lot of  people have asserted that tearing 
down such monuments and markers would be tantamount to changing his-
tory in the name of  a sanitized, politically correct memory. Markers of  the 
Confederacy, in such an argument, are tantamount to changing the history 
of  the Confederacy itself. What they are missing (and, again, what has been 
highlighted since the Charlottesville riots) is, again, the complex temporality 
of  such history and memory. What the defenders of  ‘not changing history’ 
neglect to ask is who built these markers and for what reasons. The monu-
ment to Robert E. Lee, which was the occasion for the riots in Charlottesville 
[again, these events took place after this lecture was first delivered, though 
the debate was already underway in early summer], was not a remnant of  
the war itself  but was a mnemonic act undertaken by particular people in 
a particular place at a particular time – and for a particular purpose. Monu-
ments like the Charlottesville Lee statue were built decades after the end of  
the Civil War for the purpose of  expressing a white supremacist ideology.
So even though the violence being commemorated happened in the past, 
before the monuments were built, that violence lives on in and through 
the monuments marking it, which were indeed intended to perpetuate the 
real violence of  the war with the symbolic violence of  memory. We need 
to recognize, in other words, that memory itself  can be a form of  violence. When 
you erect or maintain a statue in a city or town centre that symbolizes the 
historical oppression of  a group of  people, and the descendants of  that 
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group of  people have to walk by it every day and the dominant powers 
say they do not want to change the past, we are failing to recognize the 
ways in which versions of  the past represented in monuments – versions 
of  memory – give meaning to the original act of  suffering and serve to 
perpetuate it. Ending the violence thus requires responding to these later 
acts of  commemoration.
Where does this all leave us? As time is short, here, then, are some general 
prescriptions for the analysis of  violence, memory and the relationships 
between them: we must take care, based on our analysis of  the complexities 
of  violence and memory, not to wash out the differences between differ-
ent kinds of  violence in one overarching culture of  remembrance, one that 
often faces the choice between ‘never forget’ and its apparent opposite: 
‘forgive and forget’. There are different kinds of  violence, different kinds 
of  remembrance for them and different conditions for reconciliation and 
meaning about different kinds of  harms through a monolithic principle of  
remembrance. It matters whether the suffering was individual or collective, 
whether the perpetration was individual or collective, as well as whether the 
memory is individual or collective, and who is doing it for what purposes. 
As the discussion of  theodicy showed, it matters whether the event being 
commemorated was a ‘natural’ event or man-made, the result of  legitimate 
or illegitimate power, necessary and purposeful or ‘useless’. Each of  these 
requires its own form of  commemoration, and we must not overgeneral-
ize the imperative to never forget all situations and all actors, regardless of  
their positions within these matrices of  violence and memory and their 
relations to them.
The legitimacy of  memory is to be found not by settling on any particular 
contents of  memory, but on following a set of  procedures, as well as resisting 
others, that require us to take into account the variety of  different subjec-
tive and objective points of  view. We must enter into constructive – and 
sometimes critical – dialogue with those perspectives, including those of  
both perpetrator and victim, as well as their descendants. In other words, we 
need to understand and differentiate the legitimate and illegitimate concerns 
of  the defenders of  the monuments as well as the legitimate and illegiti-
mate concerns of  those who feel oppressed by them. But understanding all 
points of  view is not the same thing as accepting them. People’s views of  
the past may be authentic and even well motivated, though they may also be 
disingenuous and mean. But all of  these possibilities are part of  the analysis. 
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At the end of  the day, however, the monuments of  violence that deny or 
celebrate, rather than merely recall, its motivations must go. Remembrance, 
like any act, is subject to principles not merely of  authenticity or desire, but 
of  power and politics. The culture of  remembrance does not mean accept-
ing every authentic sentiment about the past.
A further corollary of  these principles, however, is that we must avoid 
self-righteousness and to put our own victimhood and suffering in a wider 
perspective. While I am not a Christian, in this I am moved by the parable 
of  the log and the speck from Matthew: ‘Why do you look at the speck of  
sand in your brother’s eye yet pay no attention to the log in your own eye?’ 
(Matthew 7:3). Perhaps we can adapt this even when we are the victims 
of  tremendous suffering, not to retreat into a commemorative narcissism. 
Instead, our remembrance should be directed toward healing the wounds 
of  our violent past: in the Jewish vocabulary ‘tikkun olam’, to heal the world. 
We do so by recognizing and recalling the pain of  others, not merely of  
ourselves. We must give up, in other words, the strong prioritization of  our 
own personal suffering and the suffering of  our own people. This is how 
we prevent the flame of  suffering from setting the world on fire yet again. 
The memory of  violence must not be matched by the violence of  memory.
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